1942 - The Beginning of the End: The Destruction of the Johore CausewayOn 31 Jan 42, the mournful skirls of bagpipes were heard in the vicinity of the Causeway separating Singapore from Malaya. The 2nd Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders were crossing the Causeway, the last British and Commonwealth troops to leave Malaya after covering the retreat of the rest of the British Army. When the last man, LTC Ian Stewart, the Commanding Officer of the Argylls, was across, the order to blow up the Causeway was given and at 0815hrs, Singapore's link with the Malay Peninsula was broken.
The destruction of the Causeway was the culmination of events that had begun on 8 Dec 41 with the Japanese landings in the North. The British and Commonwealth forces had fought a long, hard and courageous but losing campaign in mainland Malaya. The final decision to destroy the Causeway saw the retreat of the British Army into the "Fortress Singapore" with its large civilian population, limited resources and hastily prepared northern defences.
Like most cases throughout history with regards to water crossings, the destruction of the Causeway was intended to delay the enemy and give the defenders a chance to rest, regroup and prepare for the next battle. The Causeway's destruction did achieve this to an extent, as the Japanese themselves admitted. The Causeway with its 60 - 70 foot gap, although bridged to allow their tanks to cross to support the final assault, was only repaired on 14 Feb 42. Meanwhile the Japanese forces that had landed in Singapore on 8 Feb 42 were able to push the British back to the outskirts of the city, largely due to the way Singapore's pre-war defences had been constructed. On 15 Feb 42, the British surrendered.
The gap in the Causeway. (Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum)Although Singapore was strongly defended in the south, there was no such defensive capability in the north of the island. The original mission of defending the Sembawang Naval Base meant that the enemy had to be prevented from shelling or besieging the base. As such, the British concentrated their defences in the south. Thus according to this thinking, having defences in the north 'would have been folly as this would not have stopped the enemy from bombing or shelling the base'1. This would negate the strategic benefits of the base. This coupled with the overconfidence of the British meant that defences weren't seriously begun until the Japanese entered Johor in mid-Jan 42. The defences were too little, too late.
The Japanese, on the other hand, were able to change their plans quickly to bypass the Causeway and launch an amphibious attack concentrated in the north-west of Singapore with the same thoroughness that had characterised their speedy campaign down the Peninsula.
A lesson that can be drawn from these events is of the danger of overconfidence and not knowing the capabilities of an enemy. In addition, one should always be operationally prepared and ready to adapt to any changing situation. Had the British gone ahead and built the defences in the north, the mere presence of prepared defences could have had an impact on the Japanese advance.