SAF and The Allied Forces Troop Presence In Afghanistan

• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 19:45

  I am posting some articles pertaining to Malaysia and Singapore past history of Communist Insurgency, which are compatible to Afghanistan current issues now. Malayan Emergency The Malayan Emergency (Malay: Darurat; Jawi: ضرورت) was a guerrilla war fought between Commonwealth armed forces and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, from 1948 to 1960. The Malayan Emergency was the colonial government's term for the conflict. The MNLA termed it the Anti-British National Liberation War. The rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the term "emergency" since their losses would not have been covered by Lloyd's insurers if it had been termed a "war."[2] Despite the communists' defeat in 1960, communist leader Chin Peng renewed the insurgency in 1967; it lasted until 1989, and became known as the Communist Insurgency War. Although Australian and British armed forces had fully withdrawn from Malaysia years earlier, the insurgency still failed. Origins The withdrawal of Japan at the end of World War II left the Malayan economy disrupted. Problems included unemployment, low wages, and high levels of food inflation, well above the healthy rate of 2-3%. There was considerable labour unrest and a large number of strikes occurred between 1946 and 1948. During this time, the British administration was attempting to repair Malaya's economy—revenue from Malaya's tin and rubber industries was important to Britain's own post-war recovery. Protesters were dealt with harshly, by measures including arrests and deportations. In turn, protesters became increasingly militant. On 16 June 1948, the first overt act of the war took place when three European plantation managers were killed at Sungai Siput, Perak. The British brought emergency measures into law, first in Perak in response to the Sungai Siput incident and then, in July, country-wide. Under the measures, the MCP and other leftist parties were outlawed, and the police were given the power to imprison communists, and those suspected of assisting them, without trial. The MCP, led by Chin Peng, retreated to rural areas, and formed the MNLA, also known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), or the Malayan People's Liberation Army (MPLA). The MNLA began a guerrilla campaign, targeting mainly the colonial resource extraction industries, which in Malaya were the tin mines and rubber plantations. The MNLA was partly a re-formation of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the MCP-led guerrilla force which had been the principal resistance in Malaya against the Japanese occupation. The British had secretly trained and armed the MPAJA during the later stages of World War II. Disbanded in December, 1945, the MPAJA officially turned all of its weapons in to the British Military Administration. However, many weapons were not returned, and were stashed for possible future use. Guerrilla war The MNLA commonly employed guerrilla tactics, sabotaging installations, attacking rubber plantations and destroying transportation and infrastructure. Support for the MNLA was mainly based on around 500,000 of the 3.12 million ethnic Chinese then living in Malaya. The ethnic Malay population supported them in smaller numbers. The MNLA gained the support of the Chinese because they were denied the equal right to vote in elections, had no land rights to speak of, and were usually very poor. The MNLA's supply organisation was called "Min Yuen." It had a network of contacts within the general population. Besides supplying material, especially food, it was also important to the MNLA as an information gatherer. The MNLA's camps and hideouts were in the rather inaccessible tropical jungle with limited infrastructure. Most MNLA guerrillas were ethnic Chinese, though there were some Malays, Indonesians and Indians among its members. The MNLA was organized into regiments, although these had no fixed establishments and each encompassed all forces operating in a particular region. The regiments had political sections, commissars, instructors and secret service. In the camps, the soldiers attended lectures on Marxism–Leninism, and produced political newsletters to be distributed to the locals. The MNLA also stipulated that their soldiers needed official permission for any romantic involvement with local women. In the early stages of the conflict, the guerrillas envisaged establishing "liberated areas" from which the government forces had been driven, with MNLA control being established, but did not succeed at this. British response The initial government strategy was primarily to guard important economic targets, such as mines and plantation estates. Later, General Sir Harold Briggs, the British Army's Director of Operations in Malaya, developed an overall strategy known as the Briggs Plan. Its central tenet was that the best way to defeat an insurgency, such as the government was facing, was to cut the insurgents off from their supporters amongst the population. The Briggs Plan was multifaceted, with one aspect which has become particularly well known: the forced relocation of some 500,000 rural Malayans, including 400,000 Chinese, from squatter communities on the fringes of the forests into guarded camps called New Villages. These villages were newly constructed in most cases, and were surrounded by barbed wire, police posts and floodlit areas, meant to keep the inhabitants in and the guerrillas out. People resented this at first, but some soon became content with the better living standards in the villages. They were given money and ownership of the land they lived on. Removing a population which might be sympathetic to guerrillas was a counter-insurgency technique which the British had used before, notably against the Boer Commandos in the Second Boer War (1899–1902), although in Malaya, the operation was more humanely and efficiently conducted. In the international scene, the emerging Korean War eclipsed the developing conflict in Malaya. At the start of the Emergency, the British had 13 infantry battalions in Malaya, including seven partly formed Gurkha battalions, three British battalions, two battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment and a British Royal Artillery Regiment being used as infantry. This force was too small to effectively meet the threat of the "communist terrorists" or "bandits", and more infantry battalions were needed in Malaya. The British brought in soldiers from units such as the Royal Marines and King's African Rifles. Another effort was a re-formation of the Special Air Service in 1950 as a specialised reconnaissance, raiding and counter-insurgency unit. The Permanent Secretary of Defence for Malaya, Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, had served in the Chindits in Burma during World War II. His vast experience in jungle warfare proved valuable during this period as he was able to build effective civil-military relations and was one of the chief architects of the counter-insurgency plan in Malaya. In 1951, some British army units began a "hearts and minds campaign" by giving medical and food aid to Malays and indigenous tribes. At the same time, they put pressure on MNLA by patrolling the jungle. The MNLA guerrillas were driven deeper into the jungle and denied resources. The MRLA extorted food from the Sakai and earned their enmity. Many of the captured guerrillas changed sides. In comparison, the MRLA never released any Britons alive. In the end, the conflict involved a maximum of 40,000 British and Commonwealth troops, against a peak of about 7–8,000 communist guerrillas. Control of anti-guerrilla operations The British Army soon realised that clumsy sweeps by large formations were unproductive. Instead, platoons or sections carried out patrols and laid ambushes, based on intelligence (from informers, surrendered MNLA personnel, aerial reconnaissance etc.) A typical operation was "Nassau", carried out in the Kuala Langat swamp: "After several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. Food control was achieved through a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks and searches. One company began operations in the swamp, about December 21, 1954. On January 9, 1955, full-scale tactical operations began; artillery, mortars and aircraft began harassing fires in the South Swamp. Originally, the plan was to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; but the terrorists were well prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties came out occasionally, but the civil population was too afraid to report them. Plans were modified; harassing fires were reduced to night-time only. Ambushes continued and patrolling inside the swamp was intensified. Operations of this nature continued for three months without results. Finally on March 21, an ambush party, after forty-five hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of eight terrorists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map, and local morale rose a little. Another month passed before it was learned that the terrorists were making a contact inside the swamp. One platoon established an ambush; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to camp accounted for two more terrorists. The No. 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and stated that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered in a quarrel over food. On July 7, two additional companies were assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four, including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four more; by the end of July, twenty-three terrorists remained in the swamp with no food or communications with the outside world. This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each one represented 1,500 man-days of patrolling or waiting in ambushes. "Nassau" was considered a success for the end of the emergency was one step nearer." Small scale defoliation experiments using 2-4-D and 2-4-5-T were conducted by the British during the Malayan Emergency in 1951. Areas of jungle close to roadways were cleared using chemical defoliation to help prevent ambushes by Communist Terrorists. Resolution On October 6, 1951 the MNLA ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. The killing has been described as a major factor in causing the Malayan population to roundly reject the MNLA campaign, and also as leading to widespread fear due to the perception that "if even the High Commissioner was no longer safe, there was little hope of protection and safety for the man-in-the-street in Malaya." More recently, MNLA leader Chin Peng stated that the killing had little effect, and that the communists anyway radically altered their strategy that month in their "October Resolutions". The October Resolutions, a response to the Briggs Plan, involved a change of tactics by reducing attacks on economic targets and civilians, increasing efforts to go into political organisation and subversion, and bolstering the supply network from the Min Yuen as well as jungle farming. Gurney's successor, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer, was instructed by the British government to push for immediate measures to give Chinese ethnic residents the right to vote. He also pursued the Briggs Plan, and sped up the formation of a Malayan army. At the same time he made it clear that the Emergency itself was the main impediment to accelerating decolonisation. He also increased financial rewards for detecting guerrillas by any civilians and expanded the intelligence network (Special Branch). Government's declaration of amnesty On September 8, 1955, the Government of the Federation of Malaya issued a declaration of amnesty to the communists. The Government of Singapore issued an identical offer at the same time. Tunku Abdul Rahman, as Chief Minister, made good the offer of an amnesty but promised there would be no negotiations with the MNLA. The terms of the amnesty were: 1. Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offence connected with the Emergency, which you have committed under Communist direction, either before this date or in ignorance of this declaration. 2. You may surrender now and to whom you like including to members of the public. 3. There will be no general "ceasefire" but the security forces will be on alert to help those who wish to accept this offer and for this purpose local "ceasefire" will be arranged. 4. The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they are genuinely intent to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be reunited with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go to China, their request will be given due consideration. Following the declaration, an intensive publicity campaign on a unprecedented scale was launched by the government. Alliance Ministers in the Federal Government travelled extensively up and down the country exhorting the people to call upon the communists to lay down their arms and take advantage of the amnesty. Public demonstrations and processions in support of the amnesty were held in towns and villages. Despite the campaign, few Communists surrendered to the authorities. It was evident that the communists, having had ample warning of its declaration, conducted intensive anti-amnesty propaganda in their ranks and among the mass organizations, tightened discipline and warned that defection would be severely punished. Some critics in the political circles commented that the amnesty was too restrictive and little more than a restatement of the surrender terms which have been in force for a long period. The critics advocated a more realistic and liberal approach of direct negotiations with the MCP to work out a settlement of the issue. Leading officials of the Labour Party had, as part of the settlement, not exclude the possibility of recognition of the MCP as a political organization. Within the Alliance itself, influential elements in both the MCA and UMNO were endeavouring to persuade the Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman to hold negotiations with the MCP. The Baling talks and their consequences Realizing that his conflict had not come to any fruition, Chin Peng sought a discussion with the ruling British government alongside many Malayan officials in 1955. The talks took place in the Government English School at Baling on December 28. The MCP was represented by Chin Peng, the Secretary-General, Rashid Maidin and Chen Tien, head of the MCP's Central Propaganda Department; on the other side were three elected national representatives, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato' Tan Cheng-Lock and David Saul Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore. The meeting was intended to pursue a mutual end to the conflict but the Malayan government representatives, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, dismissed all of Chin Peng's demands. As a result, the conflict heightened and, in response, New Zealand sent NZSAS soldiers, No. 14 Squadron RNZAF, No. 41 (Bristol Freighter) Squadron RNZAF and later, No. 75 Squadron RNZAF, and other Commonwealth members also sent troops to aid the British. Following the failure of the talks, Tunku decided to withdraw the amnesty on 8 February 1956, five months after it had been offered, stating that he would not be willing to meet the Communists again unless they indicated beforehand their desire to see him with a view to making "a complete surrender". Despite the failure of the talks, the MCP made every effort to resume peace talks with Malayan government, without success. Meanwhile, discussions began in the new Emergency Operations Council to intensify the "People's War" against the guerillas. In July 1957, a few weeks before independence, the MCP made another attempt at peace talks, suggesting the following conditions for a negotiated peace: 1. its members should be given privileges enjoyed by citizens; and 2. a guarantee that political as well as armed members of the MCP would not be punished. Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, did not respond to the MCP's proposals. With the independence of Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 31 August 1957, the insurrection lost its rationale as a war of colonial liberation. The last serious resistance from MRLA guerrillas ended with a surrender in the Telok Anson marsh area in 1958. The remaining MRLA forces fled to the Thai border and further east. On 31 July 1960 the Malayan government declared the state of emergency was over, and Chin Peng left south Thailand for Beijing where he was accommodated by the Chinese authorities in the International Liaison Bureau, where many other Southeast Asian Communist Party leaders were housed. Casualties During the conflict, security forces killed 6,710 MRLA guerrillas and captured 1,287, while 2,702 guerrillas surrendered during the conflict, and approximately 500 more did so at its conclusion. 1,345 Malayan troops and police were killed during the fighting, as well as 519 Commonwealth personnel. 2,478 civilians were killed, with another 810 recorded as missing. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency
• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 19:54

  Communist Insurgency War The Communist Insurgency War, or Second Malaysian Emergency was an insurgency and guerrilla war, conducted by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) against Malaysian armed forces from 1968 to 1989. Origins With the declared end of the Emergency throughout the 1960 to 1968 period the MCP took the opportunity to undergo a period of streamlining, retraining, and re-indoctrination. The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) had established a series of safe bases, or what it called liberated areas. Despite their defeat during the first emergency, the MCP was still very much a force to be reckoned with. The MCP had a nucleus of between five and six hundred well-trained guerrillas and a reserve of about one thousand young men were available for full time service if required. The MCP had reorganized its units and reconstituted itself by training a number of new guerrillas. They also developed new techniques of guerrilla warfare and learned much from the Vietnam War on the techniques of fighting guerrilla warfare. In July 1961, Chin Peng met Deng Xiaoping in China. Deng had proposed to the MCP that it conduct a second an armed struggle. Deng insisted that Malaya should revolt and used the success of the Vietnam Communist Party in the Vietnam War as MCP propaganda to launch a second revolt in Malaya. Deng later promised Chin Peng that China would assist the MCP and promised to give the MCP US $100,000 for the second insurgency in Malaya. On 1 June 1968, the Central Command of the MCP issued a directive entitled “Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and Valiantly March Forward.� The MCP was ready to start a new insurgency in Malaysia. On 17 June 1968, to mark the 20th anniversary of their armed struggle against the Malaysian Government, the MCP launched an ambush against security forces in the area of Kroh–Betong in the northern part of Peninsular Malaysia. They achieved a major success, killing 17 members of the security forces. This event marked the start of the second armed revolt of the MCP. At the initial stage of their second insurgency, the MCP achieved a significant amount of success. Their actions at this stage were more bold and aggressive and caused considerable losses to the security forces. These successes were due to their preparation and the training that they received during the “lull periods� or the reconsolidation period after the end of the first insurgency. By this time, they also had significant numbers of new members, who were young and aggressive. They had learned from the past that they could no longer rely on sympathizers from the poor or village people for their food and logistics. MCP internal conflicts In early 1970, the MCP experienced a major crisis within the party. Internal disputes due to the counterintelligence problems posed by the Special Branch had caused severe conflicts among the MCP members. During this period, it was reported that the government agents and spies had succeeded in infiltrating the MCP organization. It was reported that the ‘spies’ were plotting a coup within the MCP Headquarters. The counterintelligence investigators appointed by the MCP Central Committee reported that they believed that 90 percent of the Thai Chinese recruits who joined the party from 1960 onward were government spies. Members in the militant wing started to accuse each other as government spies. Betrayal in guerrilla ranks was regarded as the most serious crime against the party and the punishment was normally death by execution. During the jungle trial held by the MCP leadership, a large number of guerrillas from Headquarters and Betong East Camp were found guilty of being enemy agents. However, the Sadao and the West Betong Group refused to conduct such trials. Instead, they refused to adhere to the MCP Central Committee orders. They in fact made an accusation that the MCP Central Committee was under the control of government agents. By October 1974, the MCP leadership had split into two different factions, between the Maoist and the Marxist-Leninist. The MRLA in the northern part of Malaysia near the Thailand border were located in three places. The MCP Central Committee was with the East Betong Group, and the other two groups were located at West Betong and Sadao. When the crisis was getting worse, the Sadao groups broke away from the main MCP groups and proclaimed themselves as the MCP Revolutionary Faction (RF). Subsequently the Betong West group, who also broke from the main MCP groups, identified their party as the MCP “Marxist-Lenin� (M-L) and later renamed their guerrilla arm as the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) instead of the Malayan Races Liberation Army. Some observers believed that a new revolutionary struggle was initiated with the influence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. They believed that the Vietnam Communist Party, backed by the Soviet Union, had agreed to provide logistical and propaganda support to the ‘new fraction’ groups, such as Betong West and Sadao Group. Later it was found out that the Betong West and the Sadao Group ceased to exist not long after they broke away from the main groups. These groups realized that their armed struggles could not achieve any success. The West Betong and the Sadao groups then decided to surrender themselves to the Thai Government in early 1987. After that time, the MCP arms struggles and militant activities became weak and disintegrated with no clear political or military objective. Road to peace accord Since 1972 Malaysia had established a bilateral relationship with China. The Malaysian Government urged the leaders of China to exert influence on the MCP leadership to convince them to lay down their arms. During Dr. Mahathir Mohammad’s premiership, he initiated an effort to bring MCP to negotiation table to end the insurgency. Dr. Mahathir believed that the MCP was fighting a losing battle and urged them to lay down their arms and join the other Malaysians in developing the country. In 1988, the MCP leadership in the northern part of Malaysia agreed with the Malaysian Government offer to attend a negotiation to a peace initiative. The MCP, which by that time was in a desperate situation to continue their armed struggle agreed with the proposal. Furthermore, since early 1981, Deng Xiao Peng had encouraged them to seek an avenue for a peace accord. When the Communist bloc in Europe collapsed in the late 1980s, the MCP had accepted the fact that they did not have any chance to form a communist government in Malaya. Malaysia by that time was one of the newly developed nations in Asia. Malaysia’s economy was strong and the majority of Malaysia’s citizens refused to accept communist ideology. After a series of negotiations between the Malaysian Government and the MCP, with the Thai Government as the mediator, the MCP finally agreed to sign a Peace Accord in Haadyai, Thailand on the 2 December 1989. The peace accord did not require the MCP to surrender; it only required that the MCP cease their militant activities. With the signing of the Haadyai Peace Accord, the MCP agreed to disband their armed units and destroy all of their weapons. They also ‘pledged their loyalty’ to His Majesty the Yang di Pertuan Agong of Malaysia. This date marked the end of the MCP insurgency in Malaysia. The Security and Development Program (KESBAN) From the Briggs Plan, the Malaysian Government understood the importance of security and development and how it could be used against the MCP insurgency. The Malaysian Government, then, introduced a new strategy of fighting the MCP. It was known as Security and Development, or KESBAN, the local acronym, and focused on civil military affairs. KESBAN constituted the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other (government) agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency which effectively broke the resistance. Undoubtedly as Malaysia experienced, security and development were the most prudent approach to combating insurgencies and terrorism. The KESBAN programs succeeded in developing Malaysia into a more stable and secure society. Malaysia basically had institutionalized the concept of KESBAN, with the setting up of coordinated bodies from the village, district, and state to the federal level. All the relevant agencies were represented and in this way, obstacles and problems were discussed and overcame jointly. The government made huge efforts to develop rural areas with the implementation of massive development programs such as road constructions, building new school, hospital, medical clinic and public utilities such as electric and water supply for the public. The government also instituted other security measures in order to meet the MCP menace, including strict press censorship, increasing the size of the police force, resettling squatters and relocating villages in “insecure� rural areas. By mid 1975, when the MCP militant activities were at a peak, the government promulgated a set of Essential Regulations, without declaring a state of emergency. The Essential Regulations provided for the establishment of a scheme called a ‘Rukun Tetangga,’ ‘Rela’ (People’s Volunteer Group). The concept of “Rukun Tetangga� (Neighborhood Watch) had made the Malays, Chinese, and Indians become closer together, and more tolerant of each other. The Malaysian Government made the right decision by not declaring a state of emergency during the second insurgency. The reason was a desire to avoid the fears of the populace (leading to increase in ethnic antipathy) and to avoid scaring away needed foreign investment. The economic prosperity achieved in the 1970s enabled the administration of Tun Abdul Razak and later Tun Hussein Onn who took over on the death of Tun Razak in 1976, to make considerable progress towards the Malaysian economy. When Dr. Mahathir Mohammad took over as the Malaysian Prime Minister from Dato Hussein Onn in 1980, he succeeded in making Malaysia one of the fastest developing nations in Asia. The annual growth of the Malaysian economy rose up to 8 percent. At the end of the peace accord, it was estimated that there were about 1,188 MCP members still on the active list. Some of them chose to return to their states in Malaysia and the rest selected to stay in a “Peace Village� at the Thai border. The Malaysian Government had paid them all some compensation money. First RM 3,000 was paid on their immediate return, and another RM 5,000 was paid three years after their return. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Insurgency_War
• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 20:00

  COMMUNISTS' INFILTRATION IN SINGAPORE COMMUNISM The communists present in Singapore added to the post-war problems. They were dissatisfied with what the British had done to improve the lives of the people. They aimed to gather the support of the local people against the British. In the beginning, the communists used peaceful means to stir up anti-British feelings in the people. When their plans proved ineffective, they resorted to violence. Before we go any further, let us understand first what communism is. HOW COMMUNISM CAME ABOUT COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FROM 1945 TO 1948 During the period 1945-1948, the Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) Was a legal organisation in Singapore and Malaya. The communists took advantage of the post-war problems and started to stir up the people’s feelings against the British. Through trade unions, they encouraged the workers to fight for better working conditions and higher pay. Many workers went on strike in 1946 and 1947. There were so many outbreaks of strikes that 1947 was known as "The Year of Strikes". However, the workers gradually grew tired of going on strikes. Those who did not succeed in their strikes found themselves worse off as they received no pay at all when they went on strike. They also realised that the communist-controlled trade unions were not genuine in fighting for the workers’ rights. They were more interested in stirring up trouble for the employers. COMMUNISTS' ARMED STRUGGLE FROM 1948 TO 1960 When the communists realised that they had failed to stir up anti-British feelings in the people, they resorted to violent means. Many of them left the towns and went into the jungles of Malaya. IN MALAYA During the first half of 1948, the communists attacked the rubber plantations and tin mines in Malaya. They aimed to close down the plantations and mines and then get the unemployed workers to join them. Their attacks became so frequent and serious that the British government had to declare a state of Emergency over Malaya and Singapore. During the Emergency, the government banned the M.C.P. and increased the number of policemen, soldiers and guards to fight the communists. IN SINGAPORE When the communists realised that their activities in Malaya yielded no positive results, they turned their attention to Singapore. Trade unions and Chinese school students were their targets. 1. The Trade Unions The communists tried to gain control of some important unions. Through trade unions, they would be able to influence the workers and get them to go on strikes. Lim Chin Siong was the leader of a group of unions which had their headquarters in Middle Road. He organised many strikes among the workers. He even tried to get the students to participate in the strikes. 2. Chinese Schools The communists were able to make use of the students in Chinese schools because the schools were not under government control. Furthermore, the Chinese school students were unhappy with the British government because they were not given equal opportunities for the entrance to the University. Chinese school students also could not get well-paid jobs. The Chinese High School and Nanyang Girls' High School were two schools which acted as main centres for pro-communist student activities. THE RIOTS The communists were successful in stirring up anti-British feelings in the Chinese school students. Whenever the students were unhappy with the British government, they held demonstrations. For example, in May 1954, some Chinese school students demonstrated against the colonial government’s decision to make young do part-time military service. The demonstration eventually led to rioting and the police had too resolve the problem. A RIOT BY THE CHINESE HIGH SCHOOLS When the government closed down the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students’ Union in October 1956, the Chinese school students were agitated. The arrest of four Chinese school students and expulsion of students who were involved in Communist activities made things worse. The Chinese school students reacted by starting a riot. THE WORKERS JOINED THE RIOT The student protestors were later joined by some workers. Riots by the students and workers broke out in many parts of the city. Public transportation was made impossible. The army was called to help the police stop the riots. They set up roadblocks to keep the crowds small and managed to stop the riots. Despite this, the communists continued its violent activities until 1960. The Emergency then came to an end in that very year. http://library.thinkquest.org/12405/19.htm
• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 20:09

  Chin Peng Chin Peng (Chinese: 陳平, Mandarin Chén Píng), former OBE, was born in 1924 as Ong Boon Hua (Chinese: 王文�, Pinyin Wáng Wén Huá) in Sitiawan and was a long-time leader of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). A determined anti-colonialist, he led the party's guerrilla insurgency in the Malayan Emergency and beyond. Early years Chin Peng was born in late October 1924, into a middle class Hokchia (hanyu pinyin: Fuqing) family in the small seaside town of Sitiawan, in Perak state, Malaya. His father had come to the town in 1920 and started a bicycle, tyre and spare motor parts business with the help of a relative from Singapore. He attended a Chinese language school in Sitiawan. In 1937 he joined the Chinese Anti Enemy Backing Up Society (AEBUS), formed that year to send aid to China in response to Japan's aggression. According to Chin and Hack, he was not yet at that time a Communist. He was in charge of anti-Japanese activities at his school. Initially a supporter of Sun Yat-sen, by early 1939 he had embraced communism. He planned to go to Yan'an, the renowned communist base in China, but was persuaded to remain in Malaya and take on heavier responsibilities for the Party there. In late 1939, by which time Chin had completed his study up to Senior Middle One, his school announced that the Senior Middle section was to be closed due to lack of money. He chose to continue his education in the Methodist-run Anglo-Chinese Continuation School, which operated in English, because it provided a good cover for his underground activities and because it was local so he would not have to move to Singapore for schooling. However after six months he left the school "for fear of British harassment". Once out of school, he concentrated on his political activities and became, from that point on, a full-time revolutionary. In January 1940 he had been put in charge of three anti-Japanese organisations that had a scope beyond the schools; they were for students, teachers, other cultural members and shop assistants. At the end of January, 1940, he was admitted to the Malayan Communist Party as a candidate member. Harassment by the authorities led him to leave his home town for Kuala Kangsar in July 1940. (This may be the same movement as his leaving school, referred to above.) Later he spent a month in Taiping. In September 1940 the party posted him to Ipoh as Standing Committee Member for Perak. In December he attained full Party membership. In early 1941 AEBUS was dissolved. Chin Peng became Ipoh District Committee Member of the Party. "He led student underground cells of three Chinese secondary schools and the Party's organisations of the shop assistants, domestic servants of European families, workers at brick kilns and barbers." In June 1941 he became a member of the Perak State Committee. Rise to prominence Chin Peng rose to prominence during World War II when many Chinese Malayans took to the jungle to fight a guerrilla war against the Japanese. These fighters, inspired by the example of the Communist Party of China, became known as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Chin Peng became the liaison officer between the MPAJA and the British military in South-East Asia. The Japanese invasion of Malaya began in December 1941. In 1942 Chin was the junior of three members of the Secretariat of the Perak State Committee: Su Yew Meng was secretary and Chang Meng Ching (hanyan pinyin: Zhang Ming Jin) was the other member. In early 1943 the two senior members were captured by the Japanese, which left Chin Peng in charge. Contact with the Party's Central Committee had been lost; he attempted to re-establish it, travelling to Kuala Lumpur and meeting Chai Ker Meng. Later Lai Tek, the Party leader, sent another Central Committee member, Lee Siow Peng (Siao Ping), to replace Chin as State Secretary. However, Lee Siow Peng was captured not long after, while travelling to a meeting that was to be held in Singapore. It was thus that the job of establishing contact with the British commando Force 136 fell to Chin Peng. The first party of that force, consisting of Capt. John Newman and five Chinese agents, had been landed in Malaya on 24 May 1943, by submarine. Chin Peng made contact with this armed group on 30 September 1943. He was active in his support for the British stay-behind troops, but had no illusions about their failure to protect Malaya against the Japanese. In the course of this activity, he came into contact with Freddie Spencer Chapman, who called him a 'true friend' in his Malayan jungle memoir, 'The Jungle Is Neutral'. In the course of the war, Chin was awarded an OBE (subsequently withdrawn by the British government), a mention in despatches and two campaign medals by Britain. He was elected the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Malaya after the betrayal of previous leader Lai Tek who turned out to be an agent for both the British and the Japanese and had denounced the leadership of the Party to the Japanese secret police. Chin Peng was the most senior surviving member. The Emergency The Malayan colonial administration declared a state of emergency on 16 June 1948 after members of the Communist Party of Malaya killed three European plantation managers at Sungei Siput. The CPM was banned in July. Many Singaporean historians and anti-communists allege that Chin Peng ordered the killings. Chin Peng claims he had no prior knowledge. In fact, he says he was so unprepared for the start of hostility that he barely escaped arrest, losing his passport in the process and lost touch with the party for a couple of days. The resulting civil war became known as the Malayan Emergency which lasted for twelve years until 1960. Chin Peng withdrew to southern Thailand with the remnants of his forces during the latter part of the Emergency as a result of security force pressure and at the end of 1960 moved to Beijing, which became his base for many years. In 1960 he wished to give up the armed struggle, but was told by Deng Xiaoping that South-East Asia was ripe for Revolution. The CPM maintained a theoretical armed struggle for decades after. The death toll climbed into the thousands. Those sympathetic to Chin Peng tend to portray the violence perpetrated by the CPM as defensive, while right-wing opponents tend to portray it as aggressive and unethical. Some have claimed the large number of civilian casualties was in contrast to the stance adopted by Mao Zedong and his policy of the Eight Points of Attention. In 1970 the CPM's guerrilla bases in Thailand were convulsed by the trials and executions of supposed spies. Two breakaway factions were formed which condemned the purge. Chin Peng, who was then based in China, has denied involvement and later rehabilitated his accused comrades. The CPM laid down its arms in 1989. On December 2nd of that year, at the town of Had Yai in Southern Thailand, Chin Peng, Rashid Maidin and Abdullah CD met with representatives of the Malaysian and Thai governments. Separate peace agreements were signed between the MCP and both governments. One of the terms of the agreement was that MCP members of Malayan origin be allowed to return to live in Malaysia. Application to return to Malaysia At the beginning of 2000, Chin Peng applied to be permitted to enter Malaysia. This was rejected by the High Court on July 25, 2005. His return is opposed by victims of attacks committed by the Communist Party of Malaya, those who served in the armed forces during the Emergency and members of the public. There has been a resurgence of accounts of the alleged atrocities the Communist Party of Malaya committed in newspapers by those who oppose his return (such as the Ex-Servicemen's Association of Malaysia). Chin Peng has lived in exile in southern Thailand and has also given lectures in the National University of Singapore. The former Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Badawi suggested the Government might reconsider its position in the future. He said he would wait for the outcome of the Court case before making a decision. In June 2008, Chin Peng again lost his bid to return to Malaysia when the Court of Appeal upheld an earlier ruling that compelled him to show identification papers to prove his citizenship. Chin Peng maintained that his birth certificate was seized by the police during a raid in 1948. His counsel Raja Aziz Addruse had submitted before the Court of Appeal that it was wrong for the Malaysia government to compel him to produce the documents, because he was entitled to enter and live in Malaysia by virtue of the agreement. His attempts to return to Malaysia received support by Pulau Pinang Gerakan Chaiman, Datuk Dr Teng Hock Nan. Chin Peng has never expressed regret overseeing Communist Party of Malaya in their war against Malaysian government, in fact, is proud of it as written in his book, "Every generation shapes its dreams. But you pay for your dreams. We certainly paid for ours. I do not regret having fought for what I considered - and still consider a just cause." (Chin Peng, 2003:9) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chin_Peng
• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 20:12

  Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) The Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), which groups Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and Britain, was set up in 1971 to reassure Singapore and Malaysia following the withdrawal of British forces East of the Suez. The initial underlying rationale for the arrangements was that the defence of Singapore and Malaysia remained indivisible and that they still faced common threats. In the early 1970's there was a concern that the pull out of the British from the region would leave a gap that could be exploited off by an unfriendly power. What was needed was a message sent that any attack on Singapore or Malaysia could be successfully repelled with the assistance of British, Australian and New Zealand Forces. The arrangements were facilitated by the election in 1970 of the Conservative government in Britain, which decided to retain a reduced military presence in Singapore. From 1971, a residual force of commonwealth 'ANZUK' at around 7000 remained in Singapore under bilateral arrangements, but Australia pulled out its infantry battalions in 1974 and the remaining British troops left in 1976. New Zealand withdrew its last battalion in 1989. Singapore attaches great importance to the Five-Power Defence agreement, which sees the five nations collaborating on defence issues, notably through joint exercises. Although, Singapore's defence capabilities have improved substantially since the seventies, cooperation within the FPDA is still very much treasured by Singapore and the other members. In 1998 Minister for Defence, Tony Tan said that the FPDA provides for Singapore an assurance that our security is not only of concern to our two countries here, but also of concern to a wider community. For Britain, Australia and New Zealand, it provides an opportunity to show that they are still strongly committed to this part of the world. http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_544_2004-12-18.html
• zulkifli mahmood

  16 Jul 12, 20:25

  Alize wrote: "Singapore can't be compared to Afghanistan. In 1965 Malaysia was pitifully weak and dependent together with Singapore on FPDA security." The Malaya Compunist Party was a big threat to Malaysia and Singapore. Without the British & Commonwealth troops presence and helped plus the determination of the ruling governments, both Malaysia and Singapore would have been Communist Country by now. Alize wrote: "Indonesia and everyone else was weak too. If they had tried anything, they would have been blockaded without a single vessel to challenge it." Indonesia had their own political agendas with the Dutch before "Konfrontasi" event from 1962-1966 that involved Singapore, Malaysia and the various states/countries in Borneo which lies next to Kalimantan, a province of Indonesia. After WW2 ended, President Sukarno had said to the Indonesian people that whatever and whichever land that the Dutch had ruled, that would be the territory of Indonesia. Indonesia had their owned political amibition and agenda before the confrontation event. They had opposed to with the formation of Malaysia. They had the biggest communist party called the Partei Komunist Indonesia and they were actually surrepticiously supported by the biggest communist country in the world back then, Communist Russia - The U.S.S.R. In fact it was a worrisome matter too to the U.S. and President John F Kennedy back then. Alize wrote: "But every neighbour of Afghanistan is meddling in it." Like the infiltration of Moslem insurgents coming in from other neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan you mean. Well, the way I see it with the downfall of many middle-east countries dictators at the present, I think that would keep their minds off and busy about their involvement in Afghanistan, in matters with financing, weapon supplies and Jihad volunteers to the Talibans and Insurgents alike. They have their own internal political problems and resolutions to handle now. However, Pakistan is a very tricky and complex matter overall. I am not sure how to answer you that but I can see that Pakistan is now more neutral after the death of Osama Ibn Laden. But they really need to do something more effective in security and counter-insurgency within their country especially near the border with Afghanistan; and demonstrate support for the existence of Afghanistan Independence. I am not sure why the Pakistani Intelligence Bareau is so worried about the formation of Islamic State Of Afghanistan. I see they are worried about the meddling of the US in Afghanistan in the future I guess. Maybe Russia and China need to talk to Pakistan about this matter......what see they are quite worried too about the US presence in Afghanistan. If you meant the meddling of neighbouring countries in Afghanistan economically, I would say its good for Afghanistan.....with that said I am sure the Afghans will prosper not in the distance future. Alize wrote: "Singapore is small and easy to police and administer and make rapid improvements to. Chinese people are obedient, hardworking and easily influenced. As uneducated as we were in 1965, it was at least better than Afghanistan. At least we only had 4 national languages." True but before we had managed to achieve that political and economics stability older generation Singaporeans went through political unrest due to Communist infiltration and instigations to topple Singapore ruling government. Malaysian troops, people and ruling government had to continue their fight against the communist insurgents after the British and Commonwealth troops withdrawal. It took them more than a decade to eradicate the communist insurgents totally from Malaysian soil. They are the only country in the world that had successfully got rid of the Communist Insurgents. In remembered clearly, somewhere in 1987, when I drove my car across from Perak to Kota Bahru, near Grik, there were Malaysian troops manning the checkpoints. They took my car plate number and told me to be careful and informed me that should I had failed to reach the last checkpoint at a certain time, they would start to look for me...yes it was quite dangerous to drive that road back then. There were active Communists near the border of Malaysia and Thailand. That is the reason I feel Malaysia is a good precedence for Afghanistan to follow. I am sure if they look closely enough Afghanistan could follow the precedence of ours here to achieve political stability and peace in Afghanistan. Alize wrote: "An Afghan will never give up his personal AK-47 and who can blame him for not feeling safe without it?" Yes, that is one reason why they kept the AK-47 near them but it is also their tradition and culture passed down through the ages. Instead of a dagger or sword they brandish AK-47 now. Well, they could be one of the Taliban living amongs the villagers. When they are called upon to attack the foreign troops they are always ready I guess. In the middle-eastern country too the men of the desert possess AK-47. Most Afghans see themselves as warriors and the descendants of Genghis Khan, the ancient king and conqueror of the world. Alize wrote: "I don't think Afghanistan is much better now." The women have more rights and freedom compare to the time when they were under the reigned of the Talibans. They are able to work and walk around in the public places without wearing their traditional Islamic 'Hijab" attire. There are women involvement in Afghanistan political arena now. I think you have heard about the execution of Afghan woman by the Talibans for killing her own husband in self-defense because her husband had abused her and treated her horribly. And that is only one woman there are others. I believe most Afghans women prefer their present state now then during the Taliban's reigned. There are new schools and hospitals. There are many new business opportunities that at least help the unemployed to get a decent job. However, these progress and developments are in big town, besides Kabul. Yes, compare to ten years or 5 years ago, Afghans are much better now. They are happy at least without the Talibans around their neighbourhood though there were suicide bombing incidences. Alize wrote: "They can't even stop farmers from growing opium because besides joining the Taliban, there is no other way to make money." They are forced to grow them by the Talibans for cash to buy weapons. And they are scared of the Talibans. However, if the farmers could be resettled somewhere safe and near the foreign troops, it would stop them growing opiums. It is worth a try and there is nothing to lose in fact. Alize wrote: "Here's what happens sometimes. Afghan units are at least 20% under strength because men have no other way to send money home. Not counting deserters. Afghan units sell guns to the Taliban in exchange for a truce during their rotation. What happens to the next unit?" Their morale is very low and mostly it happens in the country I guess where the foreign troops are not near the vicinity. However, this was not the only problem there were many who said that the Talibans were being paid higher than the government troops. There were talks about this issues in the past but now their salary has already been raised which is compatible to the Talibans and insurgents. Alize wrote: "You might say ANA units should be tied to their areas of responsibility. But being there too long is precisely what makes the ANP corrupt and it is the only reason the ANA is not as corrupt." ANA will do just fine as they improved on their training and received new weapons. ANP need to be trained by the foreign police personnel which I see no countries have yet to contribute in that area. Yes, corruption must be stopped somehow which will take time and I see your points clearly. However, it will be seen from this point that the police and the government officials need to be stopped of corruption practices. You do know that Singapore and Japan were supposed to give trainings on anticorruptions to the Afghanistan civil servants. The recent meetings of President Hamid Kazai in Japan and in the US, they had specifically emphasized that corruptions in Afghanistan will be their top priority. So lets see what will happen. Alize wrote: "Not long ago there was no phone service at night because the Taliban threatened the telcos with blowing up the phone towers. People were making tipoffs at night." Kabul the main city and other big towns usage of the hand mobiles, internets and telecommuncations equipments are widely used. The country side would be different I supposed. They do not even have radios and televisions for the villagers. I think if the Afghan authority could provide them with the basic radio set it would really help the villagers to be in touch of the news update and some simple basic information like prayer calls would really help the villagers in the country to know what really is happening instead of listening to the Talibans alone. It would really help mark my word. Alize wrote: "I'm sorry but I can tell from your language that you've been reading too much on offficial US government websites. Of course these will sound optimistic. You need to read American newspapers widely. No other country's media is more interested in Afghanistan and they are a free press." No worries buddy no need to apologized. I read not only the US or other countries government websites but other websites that is no control of freedom of the press. I also read and participated in an Afghan group forum in the past. I read their profiles and got them into discussion about the presence of the foreign troops in Afghanistan and the future of Afghanistan. I make friends with many US Military Veterans. In the US now there is upcoming Presidency Election, so its natural for the Democrats and Republicans to overshadow and outdo their opponent in support of their future US President. Afghanistan issue is the best political weapon to start their campaign in Presidency Election. Just a word of advise, if you feel that if you volunteer to go to Afghanistan and your effort there is going to be a wasted cause, I would advise you not to apply for that tour of duty and let another SAF brother with optimistic attitude to make a difference for the Afghan people and Afghanistan.
• alize

  16 Jul 12, 22:27

  Malayan Communist Party-  The British and later the Malaysians took it on successfully with a minimum of resources. This speaks of the MCP's weakness. For all the moral support from China and the Soviet Union, they never shipped the MCP a single gun. They calculated that the MCP would never be successful. Communism never took hold in Malaysia or Afghanistan because it has never been among Muslims.

  Indonesia- was weak despite receiving a Soviet buildup until 1965. It was still strong enough to take West Papua and East Timor because they were too remote from their colonial owners, but not enough to defeat the British in Borneo. According to the British, their enemy was very weak on all levels. Their military organisation and human capital were very weak even according to their Soviet advisors. Any naval invasion would have been even more easily repulsed.

  By the time British shield over Singapore and Malaysia was removed in 1971, Indonesia was at peace with both and in any case the Soviet weapons had gone to waste by then.

  Progress in Afghanistan- the words chosen by the top commander in Afghanistan (whose predecessor was sacked by Obama for criticizing his strategy and for making discouraging remarks) are that progress on some "benchmarks" has been made, but that the gains are still vulnerable and "reversible".

  Opium- Even official US sources say it is not the case that Taliban are forcing civilians to grow opium. Civilians grow it and ISAF troops literally walk past it because there is no other way to earn money. But if it what you said were true, it would mean ISAF does not have even the least presence there.

  Resettlement- Assuming the civilians want to move, emptying the area will only create more Taliban territory. Afghan corruption, just like in Vietnam, will doom the resettlement program and make more Taliban recruits.

  Corruption- Afghanistan is too big to exert control over and stamp out corruption.

  Radios- I'm not sure you're even aware that Afghanistan has tens of languages and tribes that dislike or hate both central government and other tribes, and someone has and will always find a way to use these hatreds for their own ends.

  Police training- many countries police forces and militaries do train the ANP and ALP.

  Election- Whoever wins, the issue is settled. The Americans are leaving next year. The question is speed but by next year the ANSF will have operational responsibility in most of the country and by 2014 there will be fewer than 20,000 Americans in Afghanistan.

  In summary I think you are more optimistic than even any American. You have many suggestions that seem more disconnected than our top leadership is from us. If you were president and gave them to a commander in Afghanistan he would not know whether to laugh or cry.

• Dalforce 1941

  16 Jul 12, 22:32

  Originally posted by alize:

  Malayan Communist Party-  The British and later the Malaysians took it on successfully with a minimum of resources. This speaks of the MCP's weakness.

  MCP mainly made up of chinese, no malays, that is the key weakness. 

• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:09

  British Troops In Malaya 1949 http://www.britishpathe.com/video/british-troops-in-malaya
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:19

  This documentary film was shown on 17th July 2012, three days ago, on Channel News Asia. I didn't know it was on until I changed my TV channel to Channel News Asia. Quite interesting. Quite a coincidence. KILL/CAPTURE http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kill-capture/
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:20

  Originally posted by Dalforce 1941:

  MCP mainly made up of chinese, no malays, that is the key weakness. 

  
  What are you trying to say here Dalforce 1941?
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:22

  Originally posted by laurence82:

  

  
  And you too. What are you trying to say here Laurence?
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:28

  Originally posted by bycai:

  probably preparation for 2015 to come, a good displaying singa flag as an everlasting friendship...

  http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/World/Story/STIStory_820039.html

  
  I had visited the link bycai thanks. Ok here it is.... DONOR PLEDGE $20.3 BILLION IN AFGHAN AID AT TOKYO MEET TOKYO (AFP) - Donor nations on Sunday pledged US$16 billion (S$20.3 billion) for Afghanistan to prevent the country from sliding back into turmoil when foreign combat troops depart. A statement at the closing of a conference in Tokyo confirmed donors would stump up US$16 billion in civilian aid through 2015, with the pledge expected to come with several pre-conditions including reforms to clamp down on corruption. Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in the Japanese capital along with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki Moon for a gathering focused on the 'transformation decade' after the Nato drawdown. 'In the initial stage of the transformation decade, the international community committed to providing over US$16 billion through 2015, and sustaining support, through 2017, at or near levels of the past decade to respond to the fiscal gap estimated by the World Bank and the Afghan government,' the statement said. http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/World/Story/STIStory_820039.html
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:41

  Licensing Afghanistan’s opium: solution or fallacy? Dr. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy is a geographer and research fellow at the French CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research), in Paris, France. He specialises in the study of the geopolitics of illicit drugs in Asia and produces www.geopium.org. Abstract For almost two decades Afghanistan has been the world’s largest illicit opium producer. Decades of war, droughts, poverty, and political incapabilities have driven up the country’s opium production despite counter-narcotics programmes ranging from forced eradication to alternative development. In 2005, that is, a few years after the replacement of the Taliban regime by the Karzai administration, the licensing of Afghan opium for the production of legal medicines such as morphine and codeine was proposed as a solution to address illicit Afghan opium production. This proposal benefited from a very positive stance of the world press, in spite of its many inaccuracies and fallacies. Keywords: Afghanistan, opium, illicit production, licensing, solution, morphine, economy, development. Introduction Afghanistan has been the world’s primary producing country of illicit opium since 1991, when it surpassed Burma (Myanmar) in total annual production. Both the Taliban regime (1996-2001) and the Karzai administrations (from 2001 on) inherited an illicit drug economy that has been stimulated by two decades of war but that also fuelled the country’s war economy. However, just as the Taliban regime successfully, but counterproductively, prohibited opium production in 2000, bringing opium production from 3,300 tonnes in 2000 to 185 tonnes in 2001, their regime was toppled by the U.S. military intervention in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Then, in a rather chaotic Afghanistan, opium production resumed and grew back to normal in a matter of only one year (3,400 tonnes in 2002). Since then, despite national and international pledges, eradication threats, bargain deals with opium farmers, and international development aid, Hamid Karzai’s new democratic Afghanistan has failed to curtail or even stabilize opium production. Much to the contrary, after six years of peace-building, state-building, and economic growth, Afghanistan broke two successive all-time records of opium production, in 2006 (6,100 tonnes) and again in 2007 (8,200 tonnes). When interdiction, eradication, and development have failed to solve the “opium problem� in Afghanistan, because interdiction without development is counterproductive and amounts to further deterioration of the livelihoods of opium farmers, and because alternative development is far from having been implemented with adequate economic means and political determination, a rather new, but unrealistic, proposal has emerged in 2005: the licensing of Afghan opium for production of pharmaceutical morphine. Described as “a truly winning solution� by many (countless favourable editorials were published in the world’s press), the proposal of the Senlis Council, a self-dubbed “international drug policy think tank� based in Paris, consists of licensing Afghan opium for the production of legal medicines such as morphine and codeine as a way to respond to the urgent need to significantly reduce Afghanistan’s illegal opium production and trade, but also as a way to overcome the “significant global shortage of opium based medicines such as morphine and codeine�, a problem “felt most acutely in the developing world�. However, this proposal, later renamed as “Poppy for Medicine�, is based on false or inexact premises, on at least two levels: regarding the world market for licit opiates on the one hand, and national and local opium farming communities on the other hand. About Supply And Demand Of Pharmaceutical Morphine According to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the body in charge of examining on a regular basis issues affecting the supply of and demand for opiates used for medical purposes, the supply of such opiates has, for years, been “at levels well in excess of global demand�. As yearly stocks continue to be more than sufficient to cover yearly global demand, the INCB even recommends reducing the production of opiate raw materials. Nevertheless, the INCB stresses that “the low consumption of opioid analgesics for the treatment of moderate to severe pain, especially in developing countries, continues to be a matter of great concern�, explaining that “in 2003, six countries together accounted for 79 per cent of global consumption of morphine� while “developing countries, which represent about 80 per cent of the world’s population, accounted for only about 6 per cent�. Thus, for the INCB, the urgency is more “to raise awareness of the necessity to assess the actual medical needs for opiates� in the world than to increase the production of legal medical morphine by authorizing more countries, including Afghanistan, to legally grow opium poppies. This is all the more understandable since most of the world’s national governments do not respond to the INCB questionnaire on their medical needs and because information about one half of the needs of the world’s population has long been insufficient. However, simply raising levels of morphine production, whether by licensing opium production in Afghanistan or by increasing the yields of current producers, is unlikely to increase the medical consumption of morphine and codeine in the world. The recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO) that morphine and codeine be used as analgesics are too often impeded by obstacles that are not, or not only, supply-related: concerns about drug addiction and drug diversion, restrictive national laws, insufficient import or manufacture, but also deficiencies in national health-care delivery systems, insufficient training, etc. In addition, the demand for modern analgesics is also related to the importance of conventional or allopathic medicine with regard to local traditions and beliefs. In China for example, according to WHO, traditional herbal preparations account for 30 to 50 per cent of total medicinal consumption, while in Africa up to 80 per cent of the population uses traditional medicine for primary health care. In fact, a 2007 report prepared by Help the Hospices, a British charity that trains hospice workers and supports hospices in poor countries, “has produced a disturbing portrait of the difficulties in offering pain relief to the dying in poor countries". Out of the 300 questionnaires that were sent to hospices and end-of-life specialists in poor countries only 69 were returned, showing that the chief reasons cited by respondents for the shortages were “restrictive national drug laws, fear of addiction, broken-down health care systems and lack of knowledge by doctors, patients and policy makers�. According to David E. Joranson, director of the Pain Policy Study Group at the University of Wisconsin’s medical school, the reason why morphine is not more available to patients in poor countries is “the intense fear of addiction, which is often misunderstood�. Joranson, who aims at changing drug laws around the world, denounced the fact that “pain relief hasn’t been given as much attention as the war on drugs has�. In a very significant way, morphine is almost impossible to get for most of the population of India (with the exception of the state of Kerala), despite the fact that the country is the only one in the world to legally produce opium gum for export for the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, “legal morphine use in India plummeted 97 percent after 1985�, that is, after the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, designed to curb drug trafficking, was passed and corresponding state laws were enacted: “the book outlining them is 1,642 pages, and even minor infractions can mean 10-year sentences�. Thus, obviously, the world’s medical consumption of opiates is far from being directly dependent upon supply and demand, and price contingencies, as was actually hinted by the Senlis Council itself when it stressed that, “in 2002, 77% of the world’s morphine was consumed by seven rich countries: USA, the UK, Italy, Australia, France, Spain and Japan�, but that, according to official figures, “even in these countries only 24 per cent of moderate to severe pain relief needs were being met�. The fact that medical consumption of opiates is low even in rich morphine-producing countries clearly shows that the consumption of opiate-based pain-killers is determined by factors much more complex than the laws of the market. A 2007 report produced by the Macfarlan Smith, one of the world’s oldest pharmaceutical companies and the world’s largest morphine producer, severely criticises the declarations and proposal of the Senlis Council notably by stressing the fact that “the actual consumption data of morphine is strongly influenced by cultural attitudes� and not only by price of availability: in 2005, while 2,559 kg of morphine were consumed in France, only 1,699 kg were consumed in the United Kingdom, 388 kg in Spain, and 184 kg in Italy. Therefore, the Macfarlan Smith report stated: “We would strongly argue that morphine stocks are not a controlling factor for world demand�. Indian Licit Opium Production Vs. Afghan Illicit opium production The licensing of the illicit opium supply is very unlikely to bring economic development to Afghanistan and its opium farmers. Firstly, it is important to understand that while legal opium poppy cultivation is undertaken for pharmaceutical use by at least nineteen countries in the world (Australia, Austria, China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, India, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Macedonia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) only four of them produce opium: China, India, Japan and South Korea. Among these India is the only exporter of opium. The other countries actually grow opium poppies, harvest the poppies (“poppy straw�), and produce concentrate of poppy straw (CPS) in the context of a modern mechanised agriculture that resorts for the most part to combine harvesters on large tracts of cultivated land. Because opium harvesting is a long and arduous manual process it requires a numerous and, above all, cheap local workforce if the opium and morphine production process is to be economically viable. This, along with international agreements derived from the role of the opium economy in the country’s colonial past, explains why India is the world’s sole legal producer of opium for export. But Indian opium production is also viable because it benefits from a preferential access to the large US market in spite of very high opiates production costs: in 1999 the production costs for the equivalent of 1 kilogramme of morphine was US$ 56 in Australia, under the CPS system, compared to US$ 159.77 in India. In Afghanistan, the production of one kilogramme of morphine equivalent is approximately US$ 450. At such a price legal Afghan opiates could hardly be marketed. Afghan CPS production is also very unlikely because shifting to the CPS method would only increase national agricultural unemployment and poverty. In any case, such a shift would be most difficult to implement for CPS production requires considerable water inputs not readily available in Afghanistan. Of course, since many countries already produce raw opium materials to make morphine, codeine and thebaine, and have significantly increased the concentration of alkaloids in opium poppy plants, the INCB, pursuant to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, wishes “to avoid the proliferation of supply sites� in order to prevent diversion of opium licitly produced poppy plants and seeds to the illicit market. Needless to say, diversion from the licit to the illicit market occurs much more easily with opium than with concentrate of poppy straw, as the Indian case amply illustrates. In India, legal opium production occurs in selected areas of the states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The Indian Central Government sets an Opium Minimum Qualifying Yield (MQY) according to the yields reported by farmers in previous years. During the 2004-2005 crop year (8,770 licensed hectares) MQY of 58 kg/ha in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, and of 49 kilograms in Uttar Pradesh had to be achieved by opium farmers to be eligible for the renewal of their license in 2005-2006. Cultivators are issued a license for growing poppies and the entire opium produced by all farmers is purchased by and only by the Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) at a price fixed by the Central Government. The price paid to the farmers depends on the yields achieved, with farmers producing more opium getting paid a higher price per kilogram. In 2004-2005, the minimum price paid per kilogram was 750 rupees (US$ 17) for yields up to 44 kg/ha. The maximum price paid was 2,200 rupees (US$ 50 /kg) for yields above 100 kg/ha. The average national yield was 56 kg/ha and was paid at a price of 1,150 rupees/kg (US$ 26). However, it is important to bear in mind that in an effort to better prevent diversion to the illicit market, in 2004-2005 the maximum licensed area to be cultivated in opium poppies per productive unit was 0.10 hectare. Therefore, the maximum income that Indian farmers can derive from legal opium production is restricted by fixed prices and by limiting the size of the area that each one of them may cultivate. With such low prices paid to the Indian opium farmers, diversion to the illegal market, where opium can fetch prices as much as 4 to 5 times higher than the minimum government price, clearly takes place (there is no reliable estimate of such diversion). The 2005 International Control Strategy Report of the US Department of State stresses that “in 2004, the Government of India discovered and shut down six morphine base laboratories in India’s opium growing areas; four in Uttar Pradesh and two in Madhya Pradesh�. The fact that the Central Government raises the MQY and the official price paid to farmers is clearly not enough to keep some farmers from diverting part of their harvest to the illegal market. It is worth noting that the CBN recently tightened its control on opium farming and against diversion, drastically lowering the number of hectares licensed (from 21,141 in 2003-2004 to 8,771 in 2004-2005) and the number of farmers licensed (from 105,697 in 2003-2004 to 87,682 in 2004-2005). Yet, large-scale diversion of its legal opium to the illicit market is not the only problem in India since illicit opium poppy cultivation is also very prevalent: 6,200 hectares of illegally grown poppies were eradicated in West Bengal State alone in 2007. The same year, 800 hectares were eradicated in Arunachal Pradesh out of an estimated 2,000-hectare cultivated surface. In 2007 again, Maoist rebels allegedly resorted to illicit poppy cultivation on 8,000 hectares in Jarkhand state. As illicit cultivation is most likely larger – yet unaccounted for by UNODC in its global estimates – than licit cultivation in a country such as India, where the state is in a much stronger position than in Afghanistan, it is difficult to see how licensing Afghanistan’s opium production could prevent more poppies to be grown for the illicit market. The shortcomings of opium licensing in Afghanistan The proposal to license opium production in Afghanistan thus raises an important question: would prices paid to opium farmers be high enough to provide them with sufficient net returns and to enable the development of Afghanistan’s rural economy while, in the mean time, prevent opium diversion from the licit to the illicit market? In Afghanistan, opium prices have varied greatly during the last decade, ranging from US$ 23 to US$ 350 per kilogram of fresh opium at harvest time. In 2005, the average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time was US$ 102 per kilogram (average yield: 39 kg/ha) and 309,000 families, or about 2 million people (8.7 per cent of the population) were involved in opium poppy cultivation, itinerant workers not included. Such prices, which are far from enriching Afghan opium farmers but allow them to simply cope with poverty, only need to be compared to Indian prices to realise that licit opium production in Afghanistan could not compete with illicit opium production, that most opium farmers would still have to give up opium production while the others would see their revenues plummet, and that, considering the limited writ and power of the Afghan authorities, diversion from the licit to the illicit market would be unavoidable and would reach much higher proportions than in India. In the Afghan sharecropping system, opium poppy cultivators keep only a small share of the revenue generated by opium cropping: 30 per cent of the crop goes to the landowner, 10 per cent goes to the Islamic tithe (ushr), and 15 per cent to 25 per cent goes to seasonal harvesters that labour intensive opium harvesting requires to hire. Still, most of the poor opium poppy cultivators sell the crop in advance at prices that are often around half the harvest price. In such a case, a sharecropper typically ends up receiving only half of the third of the opium crop that is left after the aforementioned deductions have been made. Considering the average licit Indian prices and opium yields, and the fact that Afghan opium cultivators produce opium on average on only one fifth of a hectare, licit opium production is very unlikely to be a solution since it would basically require maintaining opium farmers into poverty to be economically viable. Conclusion Licensing opium production in Afghanistan would clearly not be more successful than eradication or alternative development at addressing the causes of the recourse to illegal opium production and would thus fail to fulfil the international community’s objective: the suppression of illegal opium production. If crop substitution proved to be a failure in the past, why would the substitution of an illegal opium production for a legal opium production work better by reducing farmers’ income and not addressing the structural factors causing illegal opium production? It is crucial to understand that, contrary to what has often been denounced here and there, opium production is more a consequence of Afghanistan’s lawlessness, instability, and poverty than its cause. As this paper has tried to show, opium production clearly proceeds from poverty and food insecurity, from Afghanistan to Burma and Laos, where it is a coping mechanism and a livelihood strategy. Opium production is a vital element in livelihood strategies of part of the Afghan rural population, providing peasants not only with a source of income, but also with access to land and credit. More than opium production as such, it is therefore poverty and the shortcomings of the Afghan agrarian system that should be tackled if illicit opium production is eventually to be curtailed. http://cria-online.org/3_6.html
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:44

  Countries must buy Afghan opium to fight drugs, Tajik minister says Tuesday, May 08, 2012 - Tajikistan should purchase opium directly from farmers in Afghanistan for use by Tajik pharmaceutical companies, a leading government official proposed on Friday. "We need to consider the possibility of purchasing raw opium from Afghan farmers on the spot, without intermediaries," Tajik Interior Minister Ramazon Rakhimov said. “It can be destroyed … or used in pharmacology, medicine or industry,� he told a recent meeting, according to the KyrTAG news agency. All countries should buy opium direct from Afghan producers as a way to tackle drug trafficking, he added. “The criminal world makes $65 billion annually on the sale of opium, but Afghan farmers receive only $1 billion of that amount,� he told the meeting of the Tajik-EU committee on inter-parliamentary cooperation. The official also pointed out that illegal drug sales are a major source of terrorist funding. “Drug production is set to increase� this year, said Nazarov. According to the Tajik Agency for Drug Control, 1 kilo (2.2 pounds) of heroin has a wholesale price in Afghanistan ranging from $800-$2,000. Traffickers get $4,500 per kilo in neighboring Tajikistan, and $8,000 in Russia. Afghan farmers produce around 90 percent of the world’s heroin, which is used in the production of opium. http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/security/viewstory.aspx?id=11962
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 17:48

  Afghanistan’s Opium Profits Soared in 2011 The value of opium produced in Afghanistan increased by 133 percent last year to $1.4 billion, or about 9 percent of the country’s GDP, according to a new Afghanistan Opium Survey [PDF] released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC estimates the 2011 export value of Afghanistan’s opium to be $2.4 billion — or 15 percent of GDP. “These amounts cannot easily be substituted by other economic activities,� according to the report, which noted farmers can make 11 times more growing opium than wheat — the largest disparity since 2003. Sixty percent of the opium farmers surveyed reported that they were motivated by the high prices the crop fetches. As we reported two weeks ago in Opium Brides, Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world’s opium, fueling the global heroin trade and funding both the Taliban and government-linked warlords and bringing billions of dollars a year into the country’s economy. But, as Opium Brides shows, the Afghan government’s efforts to eradicate poppy crops across the country has had a horrifying, unintended consequence, as young Afghan girls are kidnapped or traded to smugglers to meet the debts of impoverished opium farmers. In this clip, a number of Afghan farm families discuss the deadly bargains they’ve been forced to make with the smugglers. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EplJuAX4alI AFGHANISTAN: OPIUM EXPORTS (U.N. DRUG & CRIME OFFICE) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EplJuAX4alI Export value of Afghan opium plummeting, says UN anti-drug agency http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKwd3igZ17g
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 18:04

  Opium Wars A key step to securing peace will be to wean Afghan farmers off growing poppies. The chief of police has a memorable way of demonstrating that he's not afraid of the drug smugglers. He holds up his right hand, revealing the absence of his middle finger. Four years ago, Brig. Gen. Aqa Noor Kintuz was hired as provincial chief of police in the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan and charged with destroying its plentiful poppy fields. "After I finished one of the first eradications," he says, "my vehicle was blown up by a remote-control bomb." He rolls up his right shirtsleeve. His forearm is badly mangled. In the years since, he has received innumerable death threats. Women and children of poppy farmers have hurled stones at his policemen. One of his eradication tractors was torched. The grim axiom defining today's Afghanistan, 85 percent of whose citizens are farmers, is that its economy relies on two dueling revenue streams. One flows from Western aid, in the hopes that the country will renounce the Taliban. The other flows from opium trafficking supported by the Taliban, which use the proceeds to fund attacks on Western troops. Only recently has the Afghan government seemed to take stock of the obvious: For the outside world's largesse to continue, the national economy's addiction to opium must end. The poppy fields must be destroyed. But just as this devoutly Muslim nation did not become the world's leading opium supplier overnight, uprooting Afghanistan's poppy mind-set promises to be a complicated endeavor. In Badakhshan, chief of police Kintuz appears to be making some headway against poppies. Five years ago the province was Afghanistan's second-biggest opium producer, after the Taliban-controlled province of Helmand. For a brief period after a Taliban ban on poppies in 2000, Badakhshan even took the lead in poppy cultivation, because the province was controlled by the Northern Alliance militias, rather than the Taliban. When Kintuz started his job in 2007, 9,000 acres were planted with poppies. Two years later fewer than 1,500 were. Eradication efforts have forced poppy farmers into the margins of the countryside. Their fields are, by design, all but invisible. To find one, you must drive for hours on a crumbled and isolated mountainside road, accompanied by someone who knows the district and will if necessary explain your presence there. You must look far from the roadside, gazing over the rolling terra incognita of northern Afghanistan—studying its monochromatic creases for that rogue burst of color, simultaneously innocent and obscene, that finally screams out what it can only be: a field of poppies. A farmer squats with his back to the flowers, weeding an adjacent field. He is a 37-year-old man with the distinct Mongolian features characteristic of the borderlands, and he wears a brown tunic, a turban, and a tentative smile. He introduces himself as Mohammed Khalid. He acknowledges that the poppy field is his. "My father taught me how to grow poppies ten years ago," he says. "Until this year, I was able to produce 60 pounds of opium from my farmland." Crouching while his fingertips brush against the tilled soil, Khalid describes how the smugglers would advance him the money for his crop and how a half-dozen members of his family would join him in the fields to weed, thin, and finally harvest the inky opium paste from the poppy bulbs—a four-month season of tedium that he hardly begrudged, given the benefits. The bricks of opium that he wrapped in plastic and took to the market would pay for all the food his family needed. In addition, the farmer would use the seeds to make cooking oil and burn the stalks as firewood and for ash to make soap. "It provided everything," he says. With the relentless eradication, Khalid has come up with a strategy. His most visible farmland, the area he is now weeding, will hereafter be used for wheat and melons. Only the sliver of land that is almost impossible to see from the road will remain the sanctum of his high-value crop. "From that small field," he says with a glance over his shoulder at the riotous profusion of violet and pink and white, "I'll get about two pounds of opium. Maybe $80." Possessing only the barest sense that he has become the hinge on which Afghanistan's future and America's national security interests swing, Khalid frowns and says, "I have no idea why they're eradicating. I'm just a poor farmer, and all I have time to think about is how to feed my family." One morning during harvest season, Chief Kintuz and his team conduct a poppy eradication in the Argo district of Badakhshan, just two days after nine members of his counter-narcotics force were killed by a roadside bomb in Darayem. At dawn the convoy sets out from the provincial capital of Feyzabad—driving past clusters of newish houses built in the days before eradication brought such construction to a halt. Thanks to Chief Kintuz's efforts, this undulating countryside no longer features endless vistas of poppies. The nine-mile road to Argo is a splintered mess—deterioration has left it worse now than it had been before a U.S. subcontractor was paid $2.5 million to resurface it. Rolling through the district center, past dozens of shuttered shops where opium was once sold openly, the convoy is greeted with hard stares from the villagers. A few miles beyond Argo, near the village of Barlas, the 30 or so armed counter-narcotics officers dismount their vehicles. The men set out on foot into the hills, searching for sequestered poppies. The fields are everywhere: dozens upon dozens of crazy-colored tracts, none larger than an acre. The officers descend on them with bamboo canes and swing away at the flowers, reaper-like. The chief bashes away as well. A surveyor from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) faithfully records each obliterated site on his clipboard. A young farmer watches the havoc while crouching in his field. "That land belongs to my neighbor Israyel," he says. "I think he knew they were coming and didn't want to be around to see it. The police warned us last year not to plant poppy. So I've switched to melon. But all of this is rain-fed land, so if there's a drought, I've got a real problem." I ask if he or his neighbors have received any of the millions of dollars being poured into Badakhshan Province by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other Western organizations in an attempt to lure Afghan farmers away from poppies. "They promised the Argo district's governor that they'd give us bags of wheat seed and fertilizer," he replies. "But they haven't." The remark is similar to one by an elder of the nearby Tashkan district: "The government said, 'We'll build roads, bridges, and canals, and you'll forget poppies forever.' That was five years ago. They've done nothing." In fairness, several things have been done—a newly paved highway from Feyzabad to Kabul, road construction projects in Tashkan, a saffron farm in Baharak, and 18 new district police offices. But for every worthy project scattered throughout this vast northern province is a village like Sar Ab in Yamgan district, where the lack of a medical clinic led residents to use opium as their only medicine until half of the 1,800 villagers became addicts. Or the village of Du Ghalat, in Argo, where a hundred children huddle like cattle on the dirt floor of a collapsing schoolhouse built with opium money that has dried up as poppy eradication proceeds. Or the millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars earmarked to fund agricultural projects in Badakhshan, which, according to one counter-narcotics official, "never got here—it disappeared." The team advances to another field, and from a crumbling house a woman emerges, shrieking, "For God's sake, don't destroy it! We don't have anything else!" The men say nothing and keep swinging. A few minutes later, they discover another poppy field, surrounded by brick walls. Two small children stand against the wall, crying loudly as the officers approach. An older sister tries to comfort them as their mother hollers, "These children have no father! How will I provide for them now?" The chief looks stricken. Lowering his cane, he walks up to the older girl, murmurs a few sympathetic words and presses a few Afghan dollars into her hand. "Give his money back!" the mother hisses. The officers move on to another widow's poppy field. She sits on a mule sobbing while they undo the labor of her dead husband—who she says had been a mujahideen against the Soviets and more recently fought the Taliban as a member of the Afghan National Army before being killed by a roadside bomb this past winter. As we proceed, I notice that the poppy bulbs in some of the razed fields bear telltale slash marks, indicating that their opium resin had been harvested before our arrival. I also notice fields that are plainly visible but go untouched. Are these oversights? Or has someone been bribed? As the chief and his officers repose under trees after an elaborate picnic lunch of goat, chicken, yogurt, and fresh vegetables filched from nearby fields, I ask the chief if some of his own men may be involved in the opium trafficking. "Yes, there are a few," he says quietly. "But let's talk about this later." When I remind him of his words the next week, the chief says he has purged his department of crooked cops. He says he does not know of any elected officials in Badakhshan involved in smuggling—"otherwise, I would have arrested them." I do not tell him that other sources have fingered a prominent official as a smuggler, as well as another smuggler who was a candidate for the parliament, offering to pay for votes and telling farmers that if elected he would ensure that opium production will continue. Even as Badakhshan becomes poppy free, local commanders and government officials have allegedly reached power-sharing agreements over drug routes taking opium across the northern border into Central Asia. The Afghan economy, even here in the non-Taliban controlled areas of the north, remains reliant on the drug trade. In Feyzabad I interview a man believed to be one of the province's biggest drug smugglers. He will not confirm he is associated with the opium trade. But he tells me matter-of-factly, "Someone who just smuggles on his own isn't going to succeed. He has to have relationships with someone—like the district or provincial police chief." For centuries, opium wafted over Afghanistan before engulfing it altogether. Though Alexander the Great could not totally conquer this rugged northeastern flank of the Persian Empire in the fourth century B.C., he is credited with leaving behind the drug that ultimately would. Actual cultivation of poppy shows up in Afghanistan's recorded history about 300 years ago. It was a crop well suited to the loamy soils of Badakhshan and the eastern province of Nangarhar, where it was first grown—requiring little fertilization and rainfall, a short growing season, and about as much expertise as it takes to hand-scatter seeds and cut slits in a bulb. Poppy occupied a benign niche in the country's agrarian culture throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, even as India's stranglehold over the opium trade later gave way to Turkey and then to the highlands of Southeast Asia, thanks to the growing market for heroin in Europe and the United States. Only in the middle of the 20th century did Afghanistan become an opium exporter. At the request of the United Nations, which Afghanistan joined in 1946, King Mohammad Zahir Shah temporarily halted cultivation. The subsistence poppy farmers of Badakhshan and Nangarhar persuaded him to reverse his decision. In the meantime the crops for which Afghan farmers achieved renown were pistachios, almonds, pomegranates, cotton, and grapes. So it was, until the Soviet invasion of December 1979 upended Afghanistan's landscape. The new occupiers closed off the markets for several of the country's fruits and shut down the cotton gins so as to benefit Uzbekistan's exports. The ensuing decade-long war between the Soviets and the U.S.-backed mujahideen claimed farm-to-market roads, irrigation canals, silos, and food processing factories among its victims. Afghanistan's agriculture was ruined. Between the U.S.S.R.'s withdrawal in 1989 and the Taliban's emergence in 1994, the country descended into chaos as warlords competed for power. Afghan farmers, struggling to regain their standing in the marketplace, discovered that India and Pakistan had developed their own products and were no longer interested in importing Afghanistan's. Those countries had succeeded in cracking down on their own opium production—and drug smugglers began to eye new pockets of instability where illegal trafficking could thrive. Operatives from Pakistan showed up in Nangarhar, then Badakhshan, then the southern province of Helmand. As agricultural consultant Jonathan Greenham describes his work in Pakistan to eradicate its opium production, "We just pushed the problem across the border." These are among the reasons Afghanistan's share of worldwide opium production skyrocketed from 19 percent in 1986 to 90 percent two decades later. The greatest factor, however, was the Taliban. When it first came to power in 1996, the new Islamist government garnered support from tribal leaders by agreeing not to crack down on poppy cultivation. The supreme leader, Mullah Omar, received regular funding from trafficking groups, which he allowed to operate freely. At the same time, the new Afghan government levied a 10 percent tax on all agricultural profits. By 1999 Afghan opium production spiked to more than 5,000 tons, prompting pressure from the UNODC for a crackdown. In July 2000 Mullah Omar issued a fatwa, or religious decree, declaring opium production a violation of Islam. The Taliban enforced the ban with brutal efficiency, as one former poppy farmer told me, "by threatening to set your house on fire." The result was a massive 91 percent reduction in poppy growing in one year. After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, regional warlords once again cranked up opium production. No longer in power, the Taliban now saw opium as a way to fund their insurgency. "They saw the opportunity to generate a tremendous amount of income without sacrificing the subsistence of the people," says Wes Harris of the United States Department of Agriculture. Poppy is a winter crop, so after the harvest in late spring, a farmer can plant corn, cotton, or beans in the same soil. During years when demand is high, a farmer might make as much as six times more from opium than he would from another crop. When the price of opium is low, the farmer can simply wrap his durable product in plastic and store it until the market is more lucrative. It is now believed that the Taliban had a large stockpile of opium when they enforced their ban in 2000 and were deliberately curtailing supply to drive up prices. As the Taliban have gained control of southern Afghanistan over the past several years, growing poppies has only gotten easier. Drug traffickers advance farmers money for the harvest and later arrive to pick up the product. The drug mafia sees to it that the routes to heroin processing labs in the borderlands and then out of Afghanistan are well cleared and the appropriate individuals bought off—since, as one veteran Afghan law enforcement official puts it, "Afghanistan is controlled by the drug mafia. How else do you think those people in the government with their low-paying salaries bought their fancy houses in Dubai and the U.S. in the past few years?" NATO estimates that insurgents get half of their financing from drugs, nearly half a billion dollars. But with Afghanistan's opium economy totaling up to four billion dollars a year, the Taliban command only a fraction of that enormous sum. A conundrum still looms for the poppy farmer: Opium is haram, or forbidden by Islam, as the Taliban decreed when they temporarily halted its cultivation. Or is it? Some Afghan mullahs postulate it is haram only to use opium, not to produce it. Other mullahs cite the Koran's proviso that a starving man may eat haram meat in order to survive. But the religious director of Badakhshan Province, Maulawi Abdul Wali Arshad, says, "We have a law in Islam: Whenever something is illegal, it is illegal from beginning to end. If poppy cultivation is legal, then how do we control opium smuggling? Or opium use? What the Taliban are doing isn't Islamic. The Taliban's involvement with the drug mafia shows that they don't want a truly Islamic government. They just want power." Helmand Province is the Taliban's stronghold and ground zero for Afghanistan's poppy cultivation. It is the place where Americans, in a massive development project after World War II, built an irrigation system that still functions—but only because Afghan farmers have fashioned canals to bypass the clogged main arteries. They direct water to this or that farm simply by pushing aside a pile of mud with a hoe. As one USAID irrigation specialist said as we watched water gush from a canal across a brutally arid landscape, "Amazing, isn't it, to see this when we're basically in the 13th century?" There is ample agricultural ingenuity to be harnessed here. In Marjah, where the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) arrived in February 2010, first to uproot the Taliban and then to win the hearts and minds of the locals, the U.S. marines who surveyed Marjah's poppy fields gazed in wonderment at the desert lands ablaze in Wizard of Oz Technicolor. Many of the young men were from farming communities and could not help but admire the acumen of their Helmand counterparts. Wes Harris is impressed by how the farmers manage to grow soybeans and cotton side by side and to cascade grapevines down desert berms—"using every square centimeter to some end," he says. Given that Marjah's Helmand Province is the source of 54 percent of Afghanistan's opium, the subtext of last year's campaign was clear to all. Far less clear is whether it's working. Operating under the belief that previous forced eradications in Helmand only alienated the farmers and flung them into the sympathetic bosom of the Taliban, the Marines announced last spring that they would pay farmers to eradicate their own crops—$300 per destroyed acre. A substantial number flatly refused to participate. Many of those who did sign on failed to meet the seven-day deadline for the eradication. In a good-faith gesture, the deadline was extended—giving some farmers enough time to first harvest the opium, then collect their check from ISAF. ("Did they turn the poppies over in mid-stride and sneak some past us? Probably so," one military source conceded.) But luck was on the Marines' side: 2010 was a bad growing season for Helmand's poppy farmers, with frost, drought, disease, and insects cutting yields by half. At Camp Hanson, the Marine regiment's station in Marjah, 200 tons of fertilizer and seed packs sit heaped beside the trucks that just delivered them. One of the trucks has a shattered windshield, and four of the men who drove the convoy here from Helmand's capital, Lashkar Gah, are now in the hospital, having been shot in a Taliban ambush. The seeds—black mung beans, red radishes, alfalfa, watermelon, corn—will be sold to a thousand farmers in the area in the hope that they will quit growing poppies. The commanding officer in Marjah is a tenaciously upbeat young man named Brian Christmas who sounds like Santa Claus when he rattles off the things he would love to see America do for Afghanistan's farmers. "There should be more seed programs available to them next year, at low cost. There have to be alternatives here. Like factories. Why not have a chicken coop, so that they can sell their eggs here in Marjah? Instead of just providing cotton, why not make Marjah yarn? A drug factory that employs 30 guys—I'd like to compete with that and say to those guys, 'Let's send you to a vocational tech school. Get you a small business loan. Set you up in a mechanics shop. Or hey, how about going into the police force? Pretty good salary, go home every night—not a bad gig!'" The next day, dozens of farmers show up to claim their latest inducement. Simply setting foot on the Marine base is a risk that many of the area's farmers have decided not to take. The Taliban have set up checkpoints and relieved passersby of their new commodities. One boy is said to have been made to eat his ISAF-issued registration card. A tribal elder found to be assisting the Marines was "beaten to an amazing shade of green," according to a military interpreter. For most, the Taliban are the devil they know—and, more to the point, the devil who will likely still be here long after the ISAF troops are gone. "These guys are playing both ends against the middle and seeing who's winning," says John Hurrell of Rift Valley Agriculture, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordinating the seed and fertilizer distribution. "Whatever pays the best is what they'll grow. Personally, I think they'll sell the fertilizer and seed and go back to growing poppies." One of the farmers I encounter filing out of the Marine compound with a bag of seed is equivocal. "It depends on what the local government does after the military leaves," he tells me. "If they leave us alone, then I'll grow poppy." Will the Afghan authorities continue to press for a poppy-free future once the troops have left Helmand? "The minute poppy starts to pop up, there's got to be an immediate reaction—that's all there is to it," says Lieutenant Colonel Christmas. "The Afghan government has gotta be all over that—using local police. Things will get 100 percent better if they have a police force made up of their own people, ones they can trust." Alas, Christmas could recruit only ten locals to join the Marjah police—unsurprising, considering that the Taliban have threatened and in some cases killed civil servants in Helmand. "We have two forms of money here: poppy, and American dollars," says a beardless 33-year-old Helmand farmer named Rehmatou as he leaves the Marine base with his fertilizer. "This is our economy. The Taliban aren't pressuring me—that's just a story you see on TV. I grow for myself. I smuggle for myself. The Taliban are not the reason. Poverty is the reason. And they'll keep growing poppies here—unless they're forced not to. Force is the solution for everything. As we say in Pashtu, 'Power can flatten mountains.' "Who will stop the smugglers—the police?" he asks with a laugh. "It's the police who transport our opium in their cars! You see the big buildings in Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. This is money from corruption." Rehmatou betrays no love for the Taliban—"They're jackals"—but the system they have imposed works for him. Still, his bemused cynicism fades when I ask, "Is a poppy economy really all that bad for Afghanistan?" "This is a bad way to make money," Rehmatou says gravely. "It trains you for no other occupation. When a father feeds a boy with money from poppies, he will grow poppies too. He'll have no other skill. We have no carpenters, no engineers, no mechanics. We have nothing." With a sad smile, the farmer says, "It is a kind of cancer on our country." Is it possible for the cancer to be removed? Bordering Pakistan to the east, Nangarhar Province has long been a drug smuggling thoroughfare, and its mountainous reaches—which include the Khyber Pass and the Tora Bora cave complex—are notoriously lawless. With its Mediterranean climate, Nangarhar was Afghanistan's biggest opium producer as recently as 2004. Forced eradications began in 2005, but the government's promises of alternative livelihoods were not met initially, and even the provincial capital of Jalalabad remained underdeveloped and quiet. Today the city and its environs appear to be a post-poppy success story. The fertile countryside, long regarded as Afghanistan's breadbasket, is alight with red cabbages and tomatoes. Jalalabad's streets are now among the most vibrant in Afghanistan, and at its teeming wholesale market, hundreds of trucks arrive every morning, bearing dozens of crops such as watermelon, potatoes, squash, okra, and onions. None of these rival the cash value of opium, and one potato farmer I meet at the market tells me that he works an evening job as a security guard to make ends meet. "But I don't regret it—I'm glad not to be growing poppy anymore," he says. In the village of Yaghi Band, which once grew poppies almost exclusively, a group of tribal elders reflect on Nangarhar's post-poppy era in a room overlooking fields of cotton, rice, broccoli, and other crops. "The life isn't as good as it was five years ago," one of them says. "But it's 60 percent of what we had. And we're hopeful of the new projects." Among these projects is one situated directly below us: a hydroelectrically powered textile mill, set up by a USAID affiliate. Contributions to the province from such programs seem endless. Among those I visit are new irrigation dams and canals, new bridges, a women's weaving co-op, a potato chip factory, a honey processing plant, a jam manufacturing facility, and the city's wholesale market, whose deputy director, Khwaja Mohammad, praises the contributions of NGOs but then adds, "Afghanistan is still at war. We can't stand on our own two feet. If a country's been at war for 30 years, it may take 80 years to rebuild it. If the farmers don't continue to receive assistance, you can't expect them not to grow poppy." Eighty years of assistance? Is poppy-free Nangarhar a Potemkin village propped up by aid from the West? What might it cost to offer equivalent generosity to Badakhshan and Helmand, and would it make a difference? When I put these questions to Nasrullah Bakhtani, senior agriculturalist for Afghanistan's Ministry of Agriculture, he says, "Nangarhar has a tribal system. There's one big man in the village, and people accept what he says. The governor there talked to these elders. He asked, 'If we eradicate poppies, what will you need?' Proposals came from the people, and the government said, 'OK, we'll provide those if you stop growing.' As you see, Nangarhar has a lot of projects, people are happy, so they stopped. Helmand and Badakhshan don't have those kind of tribal structures." Bakhtani once grew poppies himself. He stopped in 2002 when Afghanistan's new president, Hamid Karzai, declared that poppy cultivation should cease. As an agriculture specialist, Bakhtani was asked that year by the Karzai administration to help prepare a road map for a post-poppy Afghanistan. That paper, "Scientific Guidelines for Reduction of Poppy," advocated the introduction of alternative crops, expansion of irrigation systems, modernization of animal husbandry techniques, rehabilitation of the northern forests to diminish soil erosion, establishment of textile plants, federal subsidies for seed and fertilizer—in short, the entire laundry list now being implemented by the West. But Bakhtani believes such programs must be community based, not some carrot-and-stick-and-more-carrots approach by outsiders. To circumnavigate the government's pervasive corruption, Bakhtani has in mind an elaborate set of checks and balances whereby a national ministry contracts an organization to start a new project in a particular community. The money for the project would be put in a bank account, and both the community and the ministry would monitor how the contractor spends it. Under this system, he envisions a network of badly needed irrigation canals and drought-resistant pistachio forests in Badakhshan. He imagines greenhouses in Helmand, so that the province can produce off-season tomatoes and other such crops that sell for high prices. This is the future as Nasrullah Bakhtani imagines it, brighter than a poppy field. But, I gently ask: as long as the local governments are filled with corrupt officials bribed by those with a stake in Afghanistan remaining an opium haven, does his proposal stand a chance? "The problem," he says, "is that the government is involved." "And so to eradicate poppy, we would first have to eradicate corruption?" I ask. "Yes. Yes." "And so realistically, is there a chance the poppy can be eliminated as a major part of Afghanistan's economy?" Bakhtani looks thoughtful for a moment. "No," he then says. "Not possible." Grinning, he says, "Sometimes I think I should form my own company, get money from the government, go out into the field and do all of this myself. Go out and show people the way." Then, with a weary shrug: "But people would just say I'm corrupt." http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2011/02/opium-wars/draper-text
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 18:08

  Afghan Opium Report 16 November - In its final Afghan Opium Survey for 2007 issued today, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows that opium is now equivalent to more than half (53%) of the country's licit GDP. Speaking at a conference in Brussels on the future of Afghanistan, hosted by Princeton University, the Executive Director of UNODC, Antonio Maria Costa, announced that the total export value of opiates produced in and trafficked from Afghanistan in 2007 is about $4 billion, a 29 per cent increase over 2006. Approximately one quarter of this amount ($1 billion) is earned by opium farmers. District officials take a percentage through a tax on crops (known as ushr). Insurgents and warlords control the business of producing and distributing the drugs. The rest is made by drug traffickers. While opium has a significant impact on the Afghan economy, massive profits are made abroad through its export as its value increases with every border crossing. The wholesale price of a gram of heroin is, on average, $2.50 in Afghanistan, $3.50 in Pakistan and Iran, $8 in Turkey, $12 in Albania, $18 in Slovenia or Slovakia, $22 in Germany, $30 in the United Kingdom, and $33 in Russia. Retail prices can be up to ten times as high as wholesale prices, also because of "cutting" that mixes the drug with other substances. Considering that more than 660 tons of heroin and morphine are being exported from Afghanistan in 2007 (or have been stored for future export), "the potential windfall for criminals, insurgents and terrorists is staggering and runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars" warned Mr. Costa. He urged Afghanistan and its supporters to take more energetic measures to promote security, development and clean government. Mr. Costa urged NATO to take a more active role in counter-narcotics. "Since drugs are funding the insurgency, NATO has a self-interest in supporting Afghan forces in destroying drug labs, markets and convoys. Destroy the drug trade and you cut off the Taliban's main funding source", said the UN's drug chief. He also made a plea to governments to help the United Nations Security Council to list major drug traffickers involved in the Afghan opium trade (in line with Resolution 1735). "The Security Council has taken the initiative. It's high time for Member States to bring these most wanted criminals to justice", said Mr. Costa. Given the major increase in supply of Afghan opium in 2007, UNODC has observed a proliferation of heroin labs in neighbouring countries and along trafficking routes. These labs are dependent on precursor chemicals, like acetic anhydride, that are smuggled. "There must be more stringent controls in chemical producing countries, better regulation of precursor shipments to prevent their diversion, and targeted operations in and around Afghanistan to seize illegal imports", said the UN drugs head. He also urged stronger intelligence sharing between Afghanistan and its neighbours and among the countries of Central Asia. "Drug trafficking is a trans-national threat and therefore national initiatives have their limitations", said Mr. Costa. Stressing the imperative for more development assistance to Afghanistan (one of the poorest countries in the world), he highlighted his Office's increased cooperation with the World Bank and World Food Programme to encourage sustainable development of licit livelihoods. He also underlined UNODC's commitment to strengthening the Afghan justice system, particularly in the areas of counter narcotics and anti-corruption. "Time is not on our side. Either we sow the seeds of security and development now, or the Taliban will reap its deadly harvest in the future", warned Mr. Costa. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/afghan-opium-report.html
• DestructionFrom Within

  19 Jul 12, 18:09

  I say we should just leave Afghan alone. We, meaning US and anyone else not belonging there. Luckily Singapore is not a resourceful country, otherwise we'll be gang banged like don't know what.

• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 18:25

  Afghanistan | Facts and History Afghanistan has the misfortune of sitting in a strategic position at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Middle East. Despite its mountainous terrain and fiercely independent inhabitants, the country has been invaded time after time throughout its history. Today, Afghanistan is once more embroiled in war, pitting NATO troops and the current government against the ousted Taliban government and its allies from the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Afghanistan is a fascinating but violence-wracked country, where East meets West. Capital and Major Cities: Capital: Kabul, population 1,780,000 (2000 UN estimate) Major Cities: (All 1988 UN estimates; 2008 populations likely to be much higher) Kandahar, population 226,000 Mazar-e-Sharif, population 131,000 Jalalabad, population 58,000 Konduz, population 57,000 Government: Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, headed by the President. Afghan presidents may serve a maximum of two 5-year terms. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature, with a 249-member House of the People (Wolesi Jirga), and a 102-member House of the Elders (Meshrano Jirga). The nine justices of the Supreme Court (Stera Mahkama) are appointed to terms of 10 years by the President. These appointments are subject to approval by the Wolesi Jirga. Afghanistan's current President is Hamid Karzai, who was elected in October of 2004. The Vice Presidents are Ahmad Zia Masoud and Adbul Karim Khalili. Population: The population of Afghanistan is estimated at about 32.7 million. Afghanistan is home to a number of ethnic groups. The largest is the Pashtun, 42% of the population. Tajiks make up 27%, Hazaras and Uzbeks 9% each, Aimaks 4%, Turkmen 3% and Baluchi 2%. The remaining 13% are tiny populations of Nuristanis, Kizibashis, and other groups. Over 3.5 million Afghan citizens live abroad as refugees. The majority are in Pakistan and Iran. Life expectancy for both men and women within Afghanistan is only 44 years. The infant mortality rate is 166 per 1,000 live births. Official Languages: Afghanistan's official languages are Dari and Pashto, both of which are Indo-European languages in the Iranian sub-family. Written Dari and Pashto both use a modified Arabic script. Dari is the Afghan dialect of the Persian language. It is quite similar to Iranian Dari, with slight differences in pronunciation and accent. The two are mutually intelligible. Around 33% of Afghanis speak Dari as their first language. About 40% of the people of Afghanistan speak Pashto, the language of the Pashtun tribe. It is also spoken in the Pashtun areas of western Pakistan. Other Afghan languages include Hazaragi, Uzbek and Turkmen. Religion: The overwhelming majority of Afghanistan's people are Muslim, around 99%. About 80% are Sunni, and 19% Shia. The final 1% includes about 20,000 Baha'is, 3,000-5,000 Christians, and one remaining Bukharan Jewish man, Zablon Simintov. All of the other members of the Jewish community fled when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Until the mid-1980s, Afghanistan also had a population of 30,000 to 150,000 Hindus and Sikhs. During the Taliban regime, the Hindu minority was forced to wear yellow badges when they went out in public, and Hindu women had to wear the Islamic-style hijab. Today, only a few Hindus remain. Geography: Afghanistan is a land-locked country bordering on Iran to the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north, a tiny border with China at the northeast, and Pakistan to the east and south. Its total area is 647,500 square kilometers (almost 250,000 square miles). Most of Afghanistan is in the Hindu Kush Mountains, with some lower-lying desert areas. The highest point is Nowshak, at 7,486 meters (24,560 feet). The lowest is the Amu Darya River Basin, at 258 meters (846 feet). An arid and mountainous country, Afghanistan has little crop land; a scant 12% is arable, and only 0.2% is under permanent crop-cover. Climate: The climate of Afghanistan is very dry and seasonal, with temperatures varying by altitude. Kabul's average January temperature is 0 degrees Celsius (32 Fahrenheit), while noon temperatures in July often reach 38 Celsius (100 Fahrenheit). Jalalabad can hit 46 Celsius (115 Fahrenheit) in the summer. Most of the precipitation that falls in Afghanistan comes in the form of winter snow. The nation-wide annual average is only 25-30 centimeters (10 to 12 inches), but snow drifts in the mountain valleys can reach depths of over 2 meters. The desert experiences sandstorms, carried on winds moving at up to 177 kph (110 mph). Economy: Afghanistan is among the poorest countries on Earth. More than 53% of the population live under the poverty line. The economy of Afghanistan receives large infusions of foreign aid, totaling billions of U.S. dollars annually. The country's most valuable export is opium; eradication efforts have done little to reduce production of this illegal cash crop. Other export goods include wheat, cotton, wool, handwoven rugs, and precious stones. Afghanistan imports much of its food and energy. Agriculture employs 80% of the labor force, industry and services 10% each. The unemployment rate is 40%. The currency is the afghani. History of Afghanistan: Afghanistan was settled at least 50,000 years ago. Early cities such as Mundigak and Balkh sprang up around 5,000 years ago; they likely were affiliated with the Aryan culture of India. Around 700 B.C., the Median Empire expanded its rule to Afghanistan. The Medes were an Iranian people, rivals of the Persians. By 550 B.C., the Persians had displaced the Medians, establishing the Achaemenid Dynasty. Alexander the Great of Macedonia invaded Afghanistan in 328 B.C., founding a Hellenistic empire with its capital at Bactria (Balkh). The Greeks were displaced around 150 B.C. by the Parthians, nomadic Iranians who established the Kushan Empire. The Parthians ruled until about 300 A.D., when the Sassanians took control. Most Afghans were Hindu, Buddhist or Zoroastrian at that time, but an Arab invasion in 642 A.D. introduced Islam. The Arabs defeated the Sassanians, and ruled until 870, at which time they were driven out again by the Persians. In 1220, Mongol warriors under Genghis Khan conquered Afghanistan, and descendants of the Mongols would rule much of the region until 1747. In 1747, the Durrani Dynasty was founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani, an ethnic Pashtun. This marked the origin of modern Afghanistan. The nineteenth century witnessed increasing Russian and British competition for influence in Central Asia, in "The Great Game." Britain fought two wars with the Afghans, in 1839-1842 and 1878-1880. The British were routed in the first Anglo-Afghan War, but took control of Afghanistan's foreign relations after the second. Afghanistan was neutral in World War I, but Crown Prince Habibullah was assassinated for purported pro-British ideas in 1919. Later that year, Afghanistan attacked India, prompting the British to relinquish control over Afghan foreign affairs. Habibullah's younger brother Amanullah reigned from 1919 until his abdication in 1929. His cousin, Nadir Khan, became king, but lasted only four years before he was assassinated. Nadir Khan's son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, then took the throne, ruling from 1933 to 1973. He was ousted in a coup by his cousin Sardar Daoud, who declared the country a republic. Daoud was ousted in turn in 1978 by the Soviet-backed PDPA, which instituted Marxist rule. The Soviets took advantage of the political instability to invade in 1979; they would remain for 10 years. Warlords ruled from 1989 until the extremist Taliban took power in 1996. The Taliban regime was ousted by U.S.-led forces in 2001 for its support of Osama bin Laden. http://asianhistory.about.com/od/afghanista1/p/ProfAfghanistan.htm OTHER RELATED LINKS http://afghanistan.saarctourism.org/ethnic-groups.html https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 18:26

  Originally posted by DestructionFrom Within:

  I say we should just leave Afghan alone. We, meaning US and anyone else not belonging there. Luckily Singapore is not a resourceful country, otherwise we'll be gang banged like don't know what.

  
  Ok I can see clearly that you are not agreeable to MINDEF sending SAF personnel there.
• alize

  19 Jul 12, 19:34

  We don't really do the wall of text thing here, Afghanistan expert.

  If you have good reason to be optimistic about Afghanistan, then maybe you can advise the Americans, because no one is even considering staying beyond 2014.

  The most optimistic outcome I can think of is the country remaining in some semblance of a state with US air support, drone strikes and focused counter-terrorist raids, which will also have to end someday.

• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 19:38

  Yes, they will support Afghanistan in that manner after 2014 with some military advisers around ....like what the British did for Malaysia and Singapore.
• zulkifli mahmood

  19 Jul 12, 20:17

  Here my reply to you Alize. Alize wrote: "Malayan Communist Party- The British and later the Malaysians took it on successfully with a minimum of resources. This speaks of the MCP's weakness. For all the moral support from China and the Soviet Union, they never shipped the MCP a single gun. They calculated that the MCP would never be successful." In July 1961, Deng Xiaoping promised Chin Peng US$100,000 for the second MCP revolt in Malaysia. It was quite a large amount back then to support MCP since they operated in mobile guerilla warfar in the Malaysian thick jungle. Well, whether that promised was fulfilled we wouldn't know would we, only Chin Peng could answer you that. Alize wrote: "Communism never took hold in Malaysia or Afghanistan because it has never been among Muslims." I don't really understand what exactly you meant here however I just like to highlight this point that they were Malays who were members of MCP. And there were Indian members too in MCP. Rashid Maidin and Abdullah CD, were not Moslems you mean? Alize wrote: "Indonesia- was weak despite receiving a Soviet buildup until 1965." Their ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) was very strong. The coup of 1965, which is termed as 30S PKI, if you asked any Indonesian, they would look you in the eye and then shake their head, it is the darkest historical event for all Indonesian and Indonesia, about 500,000 or more Indonesians had died during that campaign to disband the members of Partei Komunis Indonesia. President Sukarno palace was bombed by a Soviet made Mid fighter airplane. Members of PKI had buried their fatigue uniforms and should they were caught it would be fatal for them. Alize wrote: "It was still strong enough to take West Papua and East Timor because they were too remote from their colonial owners, but not enough to defeat the British in Borneo. According to the British, their enemy was very weak on all levels. Their military organisation and human capital were very weak even according to their Soviet advisors. Any naval invasion would have been even more easily repulsed. By the time British shield over Singapore and Malaysia was removed in 1971, Indonesia was at peace with both and in any case the Soviet weapons had gone to waste by then" West Papua was invaded in 1962 by the Indonesian and Indonesian recognized it as Irian Jaya. If you asked any Irian Jaya native, whether they are Indonesian, they would say with seriousness, "Huh, what Indonesian? My country is not Indonesia and I'm not an Indonesian."...Lols. However, I met this guy outside Indonesia and I laughed when I heard his reply. I took it that he was joking but I will never know. East Timur ( now called Timor Laste) which many Indonesian called it as Tim-Tim back then was invaded and annexed by Indonesia in 1979 when the Portugese left that country and there was a small scale civil war then pro-independence group FRETILIN declared independence after they had taken Dili, the capital of Tim-Tim. I met many of them and many of them like to be under the Portugese rule because they told me that life was better under the Portugese rule than under the Indonesian administration. Yes, you are correct there, the Indonesian knew that to take SABAH, SARAWAK and BRUNEI by forced, they would have to face the British and The Commonwealth countries. Alize wrote: "Progress in Afghanistan - the words chosen by the top commander in Afghanistan (whose predecessor was sacked by Obama for criticizing his strategy and for making discouraging remarks) are that progress on some "benchmarks" has been made, but that the gains are still vulnerable and "reversible"." The President got his reason for doing that. As I see it, if I have NCOs and Officers who are unable to function on the battlefield, lead their men to victory and defeat the enemies, I would have done likewise. Get those Officers and NCOs replace to hinder the men from being demoralized by his actions and remarks. Alize wrote: "Opium- Even official US sources say it is not the case that Taliban are forcing civilians to grow opium. Civilians grow it and ISAF troops literally walk past it because there is no other way to earn money. But if it what you said were true, it would mean ISAF does not have even the least presence there." Opium is the main export commodity for Afghanistan. Many pharmaceutical companies overseas manufactured it into drugs for medicines and of course I won't deny it there are illegal trades there are being operated by Talibans and smugglers for weapons and personal gains. So, the opium grown within the vicinity of ISAF area could be legal opium for export and for medicine productions. Alize wrote: "Resettlement - Assuming the civilians want to move, emptying the area will only create more Taliban territory. Afghan corruption, just like in Vietnam, will doom the resettlement program and make more Taliban recruits." That is exactly what we want to see them do. When the Talibans moved into those abandoned villages, they will be annihilated. About the resettlement, at first many villagers would complain when they are resettle in new housing area. However, after seeing their lives are much better with jobs and lands, they would be grateful to the resettlement programmes. In Malaysia it works well and in Indonesia, they called it Transmigrasi, it works well too. Alize wrote: "Corruption - Afghanistan is too big to exert control over and stamp out corruption." So is Malaysia and Indonesia and China. Corruption exists in every country whether it is a third world country or a developed country....like Singapore. Alize wrote: "Radios - I'm not sure you're even aware that Afghanistan has tens of languages and tribes that dislike or hate both central government and other tribes, and someone has and will always find a way to use these hatreds for their own ends." I smile when you asked me that question. Malaysia has more ethnic groups and languages than Afghanistan. Indonesia, the 4th largest population in the world has hundreds of ethnic groups and languages more than Afghanistan. In any countries when there are many ethnic groups and languages, there are united in the main language. Malaysia is Bahasa Malaysia and the second language is their ethnic languages. Indonesia is Bahasa Indonesia and bahasa daerah. India main language is Hindi and I think the second largest language is Tamil. Pakistan is Urdu. Singapore is English. The Afghan main language are Pashto and Dari. There is no problem there. They can always listen to their favourite stations. Music is an international language so to speak. During WW2, the Japanese had disallowed the conquered people from owning any radio set. Having one and when you are caught usually it means death sentence to you. They did that so the people would not know any news from abroad and the war progress of the Americans and Allied Forces. Anyway, music is an international language it would not do any harm for any Afghan villagers or the Talibans to hear some good music or prayers over the radio. Well, it a good medium for the Intelligence. Alize wrote: "Police training - many countries police forces and militaries do train the ANP and ALP." Not enough. Only recently they had introduce this and it is not enough and hope it is not too late either. Alize Wrote: "Election - Whoever wins, the issue is settled. The Americans are leaving next year. The question is speed but by next year the ANSF will have operational responsibility in most of the country and by 2014 there will be fewer than 20,000 Americans in Afghanistan." Four years ago when Obama was campaigning for his presidency election, he had promised the American people he would bring back home the US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible. When he took over President Bush, he saw it wasn't an easy task. It took him almost 4 years to make that US Troops withdrawal from occupied Iraq possible. So to speak about politics it is better to say what the general public wants to hear to win votes. So maybe this has already been calculated by the leaders of the world that by 2014 foreign troops are reduced because the Talibans and insurgents are weak by then....could be and we can never know the future. We could only anticipate or predict. Alize wrote: "In summary I think you are more optimistic than even any American. You have many suggestions that seem more disconnected than our top leadership is from us." If the Americans could remember the event of 911 in 2001 like the Australians rememberance of Bali Bombing in 2002, they would know why their men and women are in Afghanistan now. They must remember that when their men and women are in Afghanistan it is for a noble cause and it is worth it. I say this because when you do something good and worthy you must go out there and go all the way. If you do something half way it is incomplete and you would regret it later. I am sure that America and other countries who have military men and women serving for their country in Afghanistan now wouldn't want to do the same job twice....like Iraq. The first gulf war and then there was the second gulf war. Alize wrote: "If you were president and gave them to a commander in Afghanistan he would not know whether to laugh or cry." I really do not understand why you asked me this question. However, I wouldn't mind answering you. I expect them to lead and stay strong and make that mission work for the Afghan people and stopped the terrorists there. If not they would cry or their future generation would cry should the terrorists attack their homeland again or for Singapore when the terrorists succeeded in their terror attacks within Singapore.
• alize

  19 Jul 12, 22:10

  Why are you writing so much about the history of Indonesia and the people of East Timor? This neither supports or challenges my statement that Indonesia was weak- what's the point you were trying to make?

  As for my reply to your suggestions, see my next post.