Originally posted by Arapahoe:when i read articles such as the above....
I don't mean to be a skeptics but has international relations conduct differently between nations since WWII?
We are still concern about energy, raw material, mercantilism...."Reason of the State" still applied.
What is true is that it maybe "Unthinkable to have conflict between 2 Giant and that we might not want to see it happen"
Was Churchhill war crazy or the only sane person before the invasion of Poland.
It depend on which side of the world you are lookin from......
The answer to that is a distinctive yes, the international relations are conducted fundamentally different after cold war.
Economy is the fundament for superstructures like politics or military, if we all agree on this principle, then it’s not too difficult to understand that during cold war, there’re two economic systems, soviet central-planning economic system and western market orientated economic system, both economic systems were completing for the single resources, to be energy, territories etc, The individual international relations or militaries as the superstructures for individual economy, were competing each other.
However, with the ending of cold war, the central planning economic system is no longer there, today’s economic system is identified as the common market, integrated supply chain etc. Because of the integrated supply chain, energy, raw materials etc, no longer necessarily to be in a “you die so I alive” situation. In terms of volume, both China & US, are the top 2 trade nations in the world. In this regard, both China & US share the most of the common market and world wide supply chain. Talking about supply chain, then it’s linked to, for example, SLOC which in turn is directly linked to one’s navy responsibility to protect it. After cold war, US’s CVGs are no longer in a competition with a hostile USSR fleet, its main duty is to protect the SLOCs where the traffic for global supply chain flows. As such, the US CVGs' function of protection of the SLOC doesn’t jeopardize the China’s interests as many of Chinese export goods and raw materials are using the same route. Vise verse, If a PLAN’s carrier group emerges, the sole purpose is to secure the same SLOC, which eliminate any interference of the free flow of Chinese goods and imports. Those activities are essential parts of the global economy, why US must be against them?
Originally posted by Arapahoe:when i read articles such as the above....
I don't mean to be a skeptics but has international relations conduct differently between nations since WWII?
We are still concern about energy, raw material, mercantilism...."Reason of the State" still applied.
What is true is that it maybe "Unthinkable to have conflict between 2 Giant and that we might not want to see it happen"
Was Churchhill war crazy or the only sane person before the invasion of Poland.
It depend on which side of the world you are lookin from......
International relations have certainly been conducted differently between nations since WW-2 - more so between the colonial masters and their newly independent colonies.
The United Nations charter seems to be the accepted rule and standards that most civilized nations will live by.
However, if you are referring to the reasons for nations to pursue national goals that are centered on economic survival - they remain largely the same in the pursuit for raw materials, energy, and market for the goods produced.
Real conflicts in terms of using the military option can only disrupt economic progress and result in destruction - as seen in the recent wars over Kuwait and the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia, Albania, the various ethnic and tribal conflicts in Africa, the ongoing wars in the various provinces in Afghanistan and Pakistan - in which economic and social progress come to a halt.
Was Churchill "war crazy" - or was he the only viable personality that could mobilise the efforts to confront Hitler's passion in using the German war machine ?
No matter which side you stand on - Churchill certainly was not the one who ignited WW-2.
Just wanted to highlight that Churchill was prime minister of UK only on 10 May 1940. WW2 started in Sep 1939.
Prior to 1940, UK PM was Neville Chamberlain. Often Messrs Chamberlain is often credited with the appeasement of the Germans resulting the reoccupation of the rhine in 1936 and the rollover of czechoslovakia in 1938. Some analysts believe that if Chamberlain had been more forceful during this period, Hitler might not have been as bold in his actions that precipitated the war.
Prior to May 1940, Churchill was first lord of the admiralty twice across 2 world wars. Gallipoli was probably his biggest disaster and he's definitely much more of a war monger than Chamberlain ever was.
Some people believe that a chamberlain equivalent US president could in the same manner precipitate a war with China.
People like to talk I’ve got the best line of fighter like F-15SG, coupled with harpoon. Long range, big gun so I can rule the South China Sea and taking on big boys. Well, this is one common opinion I often come across nowadays in forums. But rest assured I’m not the one to ruin somebody’s day. I’d just like to highlight a force with only the top of line fighters like F-15or Su-30, is not going to be the champion in the sea. In a big picture, fleets are moving in the vast sea, especially in a busy trafficked place for example, the spratly’s, detect and identify a hostile target from friend or neutral ones as well as persistent tracking it can’t be accomplished by fighter alone, you need establish your own F2T2EA,( Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess ) killer chain in which the fighter jet is just the tip node. On the contrary, Chinese are well aware how important the F2T2EA is if they really want to go blue water, and over the years, huge money is invested some infrastructures are preliminarily in place, which is more lethal than just adding squad after squad of fighter jets.
Over the last decade, whole range of Y-8 based MPAs and ELINT/SIGLINT airborne platforms are gradually induced into both PLAAF & PLAN, more information can be found here:
http://cnair.top81.cn/y-8x_sh-5_a-50i.htm
Compass Navigation systems will have a regional coverage by 2012, which means some long range LACMs in PLA service like CJ-10 will have reliable GPS alike guidance by then.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compass_navigation_system
In short, you need your C4ISR cover as far as your maritime striker’s range can reach, US is essentially moving all their F2T2EA killer chain airborne, so they can go globally. Looking at Y-8 based EW/MPA aircrafts and IL-76 based AWACS, Chinese are doing the same now. Even a small CVGs well covered by C4ISR network, its limited airborne fighters can posed even greater threat than a bigger numbered fighters based on fixed airfield, because they can strike your fixed airbase/C3 nobe, radar station etc, while you need go through the whole F2T2EA in order to neutralize the sea based threat.
Here is another read about the PLA’s C4ISR
Advances in PLA C4ISR Capabilities
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 4February 18, 2010 01:56 PM Age: 22 hrsCategory: China Brief, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Featured
By: Carlo Kopp
C4ISR (Command Control Communication Computer and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) systems are a key measure of military capability, and an area in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is steadily advancing. Determining how strong PLA capabilities in this area are presents some analytical challenges, as unlike other areas of PLA military growth, C4ISR has received little public exposure. The Chinese military's ISR systems are more easily surveyed due to the wealth of published imagery, but technical detail on most is scarce and must often be dissected by engineering analysis of antennas or other visual features.
C4 Versus ISR – Analytical Challenges
All modern C4ISR systems can be broadly divided into the "back end" or C4 components, comprising the command and control systems, and the networks and computers supporting them, and "front end" or ISR components, comprising the orbital, airborne, maritime and fixed or mobile ground-based sensor systems, which collect raw data for the "back end" components.
The traditional division of C4ISR systems into strategic, operational and tactical is becoming problematic, as the flexibility of modern digital systems permits many such components to be concurrently employed for all three purposes.
There are good reasons why the PLA has not widely advertised its C4ISR capabilities. The first is that Western, especially U.S. military doctrine, emphasizes early and intensive attacks on an opponent's C4ISR systems to create confusion and paralysis at a tactical, operational and strategic level. As many C4ISR systems are fixed and difficult to harden, wide public disclosure presents opportunities for opposing intelligence analysis and collection against a critical national vulnerability in times of conflict.
Another consideration is that footage or imagery of racked computer and networking equipment has much less public relations appeal, compared to fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, guided bombs and other more traditional symbols of national military power.
From a technical analysis perspective, study of C4ISR systems also presents challenges due to the pervasive and usually distributed nature of the technologies used to construct them, the complexity of networked systems, and the now global propensity to share transmission channels, such as satellites, optical fibers, copper cables, and microwave links between civilian and military users, making it difficult to determine where the military capability starts and ends. Often high-quality HUMINT (human intelligence) is the only means of determining the ground truth in such systems.
Airborne and Land Based ISR
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has advanced the furthest in atmospheric ISR capabilities, with the development of the KJ-2000 and KJ-200 Airborne Early Warning and Control systems, which like their Western counterparts, fully integrate active radar and passive radiofrequency sensors, with a comprehensive digital and voice C4 system. These airborne systems employ phased array radar technology one full generation ahead of the U.S. E-3C AWACS and E-2C Hawkeye. The C4 fit on either system has not been disclosed. At least four KJ-2000 systems are claimed operational [1].
Reconnaissance pods and internally integrated sensor capabilities in PLAAF strike and multi-role aircraft lag strongly at this time against their Western counterparts. Targeting pods with ISR potential are only now appearing in operational units, mostly for targeting smart munitions.
The PLA has advanced considerably in air defense capabilities, and the C4ISR components have been prominent. Wide and diverse ranges of modern radars of Chinese and Russian origin are progressively displacing legacy Chinese designs. Notable examples are the Russian 64N6E Big Bird battle management radar, used recently in S-300PMU2/SA-20B Gargoyle ATBM trials, and the new Chinese developed Type 120, 305A and 305B high-mobility acquisition radars. These are supplemented by mobile ground-based passive emitter locating systems such as the CETC YLC-20 series [2].
PLA ground forces are now introducing tactical UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to support maneuver force elements, with these displayed prominently during the 60th anniversary parade. While the PLA UAV force is immature by Western standards, considerable effort is being invested to develop this sector. For instance, systems in development or early service include the W-50 fixed wing UAV and Z-3 rotary wing UAV, as well as the CH3 modeled on the U.S. Predator. These supplementary conventional battlefield ISR assets are like the new CAIC WZ-10 reconnaissance and attack helicopter, modeled on U.S. and E.U. equivalents (See "New Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISR," China Brief, January 22, 2009).
The established trend to emulate the full spectrum of Western ISR systems is not confined to aerial systems, with two UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles) with ISR potential, the ASENDRO and the CHRYSOR in development (See "New Advances in PLA Battlefield Aerospace and ISR," China Brief, January 22, 2009).
C4 – The Connectivity Challenge
What is less clear is the system-level integration and networking intended for what will become a very modern and diverse fleet of tactical and operational level ISR systems. The latter problem has bedeviled Western military operators for two decades, and definitive technological solutions remain to be found.
China is deploying an extensive grid of terrestrial fiber optic links to support its civil infrastructure, which as noted by various U.S. government reports, provide for a significant dual use capability to support the Chinese military’s C4ISR needs. Buried fiber optic cables provide high bandwidth and are inherently secure from remote SIGINT (signals intelligence), hardened against electromagnetic and radiofrequency weapons and jamming.
PLA thinking on wide operational level connectivity is evidenced by two new systems displayed at the 60th anniversary parade. These are a family of fully mobile tactical satellite terminals, using characteristic dishes with boom feeds, and tropospheric scatter communications systems, easily distinguished by paired dish antennas.
While the PLA's SATCOM (satellite communication) terminals reflect global trends, the deployment of troposcatter (or tropospheric scatter) communications equipment is much more interesting. The mature U.S. equivalent AN/TRC-170 system was a mainstay of U.S. operational level connectivity during the Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom Campaigns, providing advancing land forces with high data rate "backbone" connectivity to rear areas.
Troposcatter systems are unique in that they provide non-line-of-sight over the horizon connectivity without the use of a satellite or airborne relay station, this being achieved by bouncing high-power microwave beams off of refractive gradients in the upper atmosphere. As such, a pair of mobile troposcatter terminals can provide multiple Megabits/second data rates to ranges of 100 - 150 miles. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have employed troposcatter systems for conventional land force long haul data and voice communications applications [3].
The PLA appears to be using troposcatter terminals to support Russian supplied S-300PMU2 and indigenous HQ-9 mobile air defense missile batteries, this permitting a battery to maintain a high data rate channel to any fixed fiber optic terminal within a 150 mile range [4]. As a result, these mobile missile batteries can continuously redeploy in a "shoot and scoot" manner to evade opposing ISR systems, while maintaining connectivity with the centralized fixed air defense C4 system [5]. The wealth of recent high-quality Chinese scientific research papers on advanced troposcatter techniques suggests this technology will become pivotal in PLA C3 operations [6].
There is no direct evidence to date of the troposcatter system being deployed to support mobile Second Artillery Corps (SAC) ballistic and cruise missile batteries (SAC is the strategic missile forces of the PLA). But given that the "shoot and scoot" operating doctrine for these assets differs little from that of air defense missile batteries, the future employment of troposcatter terminals to provide C3 support for SAC units should not come as a surprise if it happens.
Maritime C4ISR Challenges
The PLA Navy has historically relied heavily on its fleet of 1,500 nautical miles range H-6D maritime strike aircraft to provide ISR capability for surface fleet elements, emulating Soviet and NATO Cold War doctrine. This is now changing with the doctrinal shift to the "Second Island Chain" strategy, in which the PLA Navy and Air Force assume responsibility for controlling a much larger geographical area, following an arc from the Marianas, through Northern Australia, to the Andaman Islands [7].
The advent of DF-21 derived ASBMs (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles), modern coastal battery deployed cruise missiles like the DH/CJ-10 and C-602, and a range of ASCMs (Anti Ship Cruise Missile) carried by PLA Navy strike aircraft such as the Su-30MK2 Flanker, JH-7 Flounder, and the new turbofan powered H-6K Badger, demands accurate and timely C4ISR support to be effective against opposing maritime forces [8].
To date China's maritime C4ISR model has emulated Soviet Cold War thinking, reflecting the geo-strategic realities of a continental power seeking to control vulnerable maritime sea-lanes. Unlike the Soviets, however, China's heavy dependency upon energy and raw materials imports by sea presents an additional vulnerability, more akin to that of the Western powers.
The Soviets initially performed maritime ISR using long range surface search radar equipped Tu-16K Badger C/D and Tu-95RTs/142 Bear D/F long range aircraft, which were equipped with data links to relay maritime surface target coordinates to ASCM armed aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines. As the U.S. Navy increased the reach of its carrier battle group missile and fighter defenses, the Soviets deployed the SMKRITs (Sistema Morskoy Kosmicheskoy Razvedki I Tseleukazaniya / Maritime Space Reconnaissance and Targeting System) RORSATs (Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite), which employed a Molniya satellite communications downlink to relay targeting data to maritime strike assets [9].
China is currently deploying a number of coastal OTH-SW (Over The Horizon Surface Wave) and OTH-B (Over The Horizon Backscatter) radar systems, which provide ISR capabilities against surface shipping systems and aircraft [10]. This technology can provide prodigious detection ranges compared to coastal microwave radars, but is limited by atmospheric conditions, and typically lacks the required accuracy to target a terminally guided weapon, thus providing an effective tripwire ISR capability out to the Second Island Chain, but not the precision targeting capability required to support air and missile strikes.
Implementation of the Second Island Chain strategy will drive the PLA Navy inevitably in the direction of long range UAVs, aircraft and satellites for the provision of targeting ISR, and most likely GeoStationary Earth Orbit (GEO) SATCOM for C3 capability to support aircraft, UAVs and warships performing maritime strike operations.
China's remote sensing satellite program, characterized by the extant Yaogan-1, -2, -3, -4, and -5, the Haiyang-1B, and the CBERS-2 and -2B satellite systems, have been identified by the Pentagon as dual use capabilities [11]. The planned HJ-1C and HY-3 high resolution radar imaging satellites will have significant potential for RORSAT (Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite) operation, and even if inadequate, will provide the technology base for a future PLA RORSAT constellation [12].
China operates a robust number of foreign built and indigenous GEO satellites for civilian direct broadcast channels, and telecommunications transponder services, including the C-band DFH-3, DFH-4 series. In 2000, the PLA launched the first of the FH-1 series of military SATCOM vehicles, intended as part of the Qu Dian C4ISR system; the latter is described as similar in concept to the NATO/US MIDS/JTIDS/Link-16 and Link-22 systems. In 2008, China launched the Tian Lian-1 data relay satellite, intended to provide expanded communications coverage for orbital assets (Xinhua News Agency, April 25, 2008).
If the PLA exploits existing and developing satellite technology effectively, it will be capable of fielding an effective orbital C4ISR segment to support the Second Island Chain strategy over this decade, including a credible RORSAT capability. Existing dual use capabilities may be improvised to provide a limited near-term capability.
Contemporary Western ISR doctrine sees the penetration of hostile computers and networks as the cyberspace segment of a nation's ISR capabilities. China's well-documented, albeit officially denied, activities in penetrating foreign, especially U.S. government, computer systems and networks indicate a strong appreciation of the value of cyberspace as an ISR environment.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, while much of the PLA's C4ISR capability remains opaque, what is abundantly clear from what is known is that the PLA has an acute understanding of the value of advanced C4ISR in modern conflicts and is investing heavily in this area, emulating specific capabilities and doctrine developed in recent decades in the West and in Russia. Numerous instances demonstrate robust indigenous capability to develop key C4ISR technologies, and apply these technologies in unique and original ways. If the observed trends in PLA C4ISR doctrine and technological capabilities continue unabated, the PLA will have a world-class C4ISR capability in place by the end of the coming decade.Notes
38 - Great material that you have posted.
Ever since the US led Desert Storm in 1991, and the effective overthrow of the Taliban Authority in Afghanistan begun in December 2001 - that was led by a small group of US Special Forces which saw the Taliban being routed in less then six months - shocked China's Military and pushed them to begin a complete review of the old PLA strategic and operational thinking.
The success of the US forces in two successive quick campaigns forced China's Military Commanders to compare their human grinding performance in the ‘Sino-Vietnam War in 1979’ - which was China's first military engagement since the Korean War conducted about twenty years earlier.
The present technical progress and success achieved by China's Military is due in no small part to the genius of China's Scientists and Engineers, as well as the daring of China's Military to seize opportunities to confront the US Military to force some 'deliberate incidents' that result in the temporary detention of prized US Military Hardwares.
Such incidents included the forced landing of a US EP-3 Electronic Spy Plane that flew close to China's airspace, and resulted in an unequal confrontation between China's fighter jets and a single US propellor powered intelligence plane.
In the record book, this was known as the ‘Hainan Island incident – 1 April 2001’
The Chinese scientists and engineers had a field day dismantling the equipment and studied the various components in details, and obviously would have many photos taken of every details of all kinds of hardwares - short of stripping the plane to its bare airframe.
In an article - ‘Industrial Espionage in the Digital Age by Sam Vaknin, Ph.D’ - it observed a high rate of industrial espionage that had occurred over the last decade, as nations compete to stay ahead in the industrial and technical competition.
China's involvement in this effort resulted in the arrest of several Chinese Nationals in the USA - caught for their thinly disguised connections to mainland China company - with the crimes involving sensitive and advanced technologies.
Having the resources and the equipment available through reverse engineering and outright copying is only one end of the effort, and it will require clear minds to be able to visualise the use of such new technologies in the battlefield of tomorrow, and to study any weaknesses of present technologies so as to develop local solutions to resolve identified problems.
The entire exercise must be an ongoing process that will require many hours of testing through real time repeated field testings by the military, so as to iron out the bugs and ensure all levels of the military can benefit from the technologies and make it an integral part of a modern military force.
The SAF experience testify to the local process that is guided by DSTA and DSO assisting in the development of the 3G SAF.
Power projection far from your shore is not an easy task judging from what Chinese doing and Yanks did. Ppl are amazing how cheap tomahawk or PGN is but may easily ignore how expensive the system behind it. Even today, with much financial and research efforts, PLA still doesn’t have credible fire projection even over South China Sea, but with the pace of its modernization. The day will come sooner or later. Especially with the incoming CVGs, such a battle group may pose little threat to USN, but could be the game changer to other small nations.
PLA definitely has credible fire projection even over South China Sea. One can't write off 500+ 3rd gen BVR-missile equipped fighters with 150+ JH-7s, 200+ H-6s and another 2000+ other combat aircraft in support. China has AEW, tanker refuel, asat, long range sam, EW, ECM capabilities, etc. At sea, its has numerous subs and other surface combat/amphibious assets.
The key is how it will perform in a contested scenario esp when subject to US interference.
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Power projection far from your shore is not an easy task judging from what Chinese doing and Yanks did. Ppl are amazing how cheap tomahawk or PGN is but may easily ignore how expensive the system behind it. Even today, with much financial and research efforts, PLA still doesn’t have credible fire projection even over South China Sea, but with the pace of its modernization. The day will come sooner or later. Especially with the incoming CVGs, such a battle group may pose little threat to USN, but could be the game changer to other small nations
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It will take a bit of time, but China, militarily, will definitely be a force to reckon with in the near future. They have the political will , wealth and technological ( eventually ) prowness to do it. The age of the dragon is drawing close.
Unfortunately, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel, Liu Mingfu in his zeal to leave his mark in getting some attention to himself - failed to realise the course of history in which even Admiral Yamamoto quietly reminded his Staff Officers that the soon to be launched Pearl Harbor Attack will simply awaken the sleeping giant.
China's present modernisation of its military is merely skin deep at best - and the mind set of its entire military down to the last man has yet to totally embrace or even fully appreciate the New World that they have found themselves in.
At the present state of affairs, perhaps only certain elite corp comprising the younger Officer Cadre will be able appreciate the application of technology for warfare in the Twenty-First Century.
The technology lode that is available to all the branches of the People's Liberation Army is not as extensively available or appreciated as found in other military.
The technology that is available to the PLA is not at any sophisticated levels when compared to what the Russian have been able to produce for their own military - as seen in China's continued dependence on Russian technologies for some of their domestically developed military hardware - even to this date
Compared to the various branches of the US Military, China's PLA has yet to achieve the depth and breadth in its use or dependence of incorporating technology into the Military Strategies for warfare in this Twenty-First century.
The immediate objective for China is to build a strong PLA geared entirely towards the prevention of Taiwan declaring unilateral independence, and to prevent USA from offering any direct military involvement.
Beyond the theatre of the Taiwan Straits, it is unlikely that China's Military Think Tank has any idea of projecting military force to challenge the USA - which will inevitably bring China to challenge also USA alliance arrangement with NATO and SEATO.
Is China prepared to challenge so many countries simply to assert herself and claim its military supremacy ?
China does not need to assert herself militarily - just to make a worthless claim that is at best superficial and has no further value beyond face value.
China's ambitions are to be a world superpower both economically and militarily one day.Of course it cannot be done overnight but they are making the first steps & they will probably l be able to achieve it in the future barring any missteps.
To reach a high technological level, one need not start from scratch & buying Russian or any other technology is a starting point. It is faster & cheaper to purchase expertise if one does not have it for the moment. It is a shortcut & is the sensible and logical thing to do.
China would properly wish there is a major shift in tectonic plate....so that she does not have to neighbor with so many nations.
Any chanllenge to the pacific will affect the interest of countries in Asia ...and the reasons most asian still depend upon Trade mainly "Export".
Unfortunately the General is not the first person to position this viewed, and perharps it is an internal message to the communist party rather than a general with a political career.....
Originally posted by Sepecat:China's ambitions are to be a world superpower both economically and militarily one day.Of course it cannot be done overnight but they are making the first steps & they will probably l be able to achieve it in the future barring any missteps.
To reach a high technological level, one need not start from scratch & buying Russian or any other technology is a starting point. It is faster & cheaper to purchase expertise if one does not have it for the moment. It is a shortcut & is the sensible and logical thing to do.
Unless the next 50 years we can come up with alternative energy....to replace fossil fuel. At the rate of growth Path, China is still going to be depended upon importing energy from different source it may be a bridge too far to be claiming super power in comparision with the America continent all the way from the North to the South.
Compared to Zhu Cheng Hu, this guy is mild.
I am really not surprised that China has focused a lot of ELINT and maritime surveillance technologies. Afterall, their asymmetric response to US naval dominance requires detection capabilities that can extend well out into the seas to engage with long range supersonic AShMs.
The problem with such an approach highlights their strategy to keep US naval air power out of striking range. Looking at the latest QDR, the US is also developing responses to anti-access types of strategy. From the initial look, it will involve unmanned and stealthy platform types to blind Chinese anti-access detection nodes. I guess we'll see more in time to come.
Originally posted by Shotgun:Compared to Zhu Cheng Hu, this guy is mild.
I am really not surprised that China has focused a lot of ELINT and maritime surveillance technologies. Afterall, their asymmetric response to US naval dominance requires detection capabilities that can extend well out into the seas to engage with long range supersonic AShMs.
The problem with such an approach highlights their strategy to keep US naval air power out of striking range. Looking at the latest QDR, the US is also developing responses to anti-access types of strategy. From the initial look, it will involve unmanned and stealthy platform types to blind Chinese anti-access detection nodes. I guess we'll see more in time to come.
Admiral Yamamoto put it very succinctly, when he said - "we maybe waking up a sleeping giant" - prior to executing the orders given to him to plan and launch the attack on Pearl Harbor.
For every platform, there will always be a counter platform - it will result in endless rounds of technological pursuit - to find the solutions to continuously changing game plans - as had happened during the US-Russian Cold War Nuclear Competition.
If China intend to build up a military deterrent so as to achieve a "forced solution" to its perceived Taiwan problem - it is surely going in the wrong direction.