Mapping World War III: Soviet Global Invasion Routes
-
Mapping World War III: Soviet Global Invasion Routes
Here we have a fascinating collection of strategic conceptual maps taken from a 1987 Department of Defense study, which examined the expected land and sea invasion routes for the Soviet Union in her primary operational theaters. Collectively the maps represents a staggering vision of armed global conflict that would have far outstripped even the most ambitious imperial wars of the Achaemenids, the Mongols, the Romans and Nazi Germany combined.
Visually, the Cold War was in many ways typified by maps of this sort. And it might have been the last period (at least for our lifetimes), where interstate warfare could be anticipated and expressed in such grand and expansive geo-strategic terms. Even with their large armies, powerful economies and ambitious national characters, it’s hard to imagine a comparable vision for world war driven by the armies of the three likely predominant powers of the 21st century: China, India and the United States.
As a note, the acronym “TVD” which appears on each of these maps stands for “Teatr Voennykh Deistvii,” which was the Russian military term for a continental operational theater. During the Cold War the Soviet Union generally identified eight TVDs on her immediate borders (Atlantic, Arctic, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern, Southern, Far East, Pacific). All of these are covered in one way or another by these maps.
The Conquest of Western Europe:
This map is a really a picture in macro-scale of the epic tank battle for the plains of Germany, that entire generations of Western and Soviet officers built careers around planning and preparing for. In the history of human civilization, the Soviet Western TVD invasion was probably the most researched, contemplated, and gamed out battle that was never actually to take place. Fifty years of voluminous strategic studies were compiled by both sides on this very subject, as both sides searched for advantages in a truly enormous field chess game.
In 1987 there were 30 forward deployed Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe to spearhead this assault, with a further 94 in Western Russia to rapidly reinforce it. Such was the fear and planning that went into this imagined future battle, that in the West, the mere act of reinforcing the spearhead was considered to be an overt prelude to war. Many unnerving international crises were generated by both illusions and realities of this feared reinforcement.
Those fears were not unwarranted. Had those “initial operational directions” the map depicts ever been marched on with actual Russian boots, this would easily have been the most spectacular mechanized battle in history. Even dwarfing the titanic armor fights of World War II…and perhaps representing the last hurrah for the world as we knew it. As we shall see, NATO faces graver trouble on other fronts below.
The Invasion of China and the Fall of Japan:
For scale and strategy, this is one of the most compelling maps of the collection. It shows the USSR striking deep into Manchuria –China’s vulnerable industrial heartland– and simultaneously attacking her wide-open western flank in the remote Xinjiang frontier. Japan in turn is taken by amphibious assault from Sakhalin Oblast, and US territory is directly invaded across the narrow Bering Strait, which would doubtlessly haven drawn away American Pacific forces to defend her state (and North America). American forces which would otherwise be needed to mount a hasty defense of largely demilitarized Japan. An inevitable trade of rooks, perhaps.
Northwestern Europe Invasion:
Directionally, this is a reversal of the German Weseruebung plan, which conquered the region by amphibious hops up the coast of Norway, coupled with a northward land attack up through her mountain-and-valley interior. Here the USSR attacks from the north and drives south down the Scandinavian Peninsula. Probably a more effective approach. Finland is cut apart by two attack vectors, the turning pivot strike intended for Sweden and Norway, and a direct assault from Russia into central Finland. The Gulf of Bothnia would doubtlessly become a scene of tight and intense naval action between NATO and the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Control of the Gulf would be decisive for any occupation of Finland, which as the map shows, is geographically vital for Soviet supply routes in their deeper march into Scandinavia.
For Her Own Place in the Sun:
The West’s foreign energy supplies are seized as the USSR thrusts into the old Persian Empire, due south into Iran by course of the passes in her southern republics of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. An attack on Eastern Turkey opens a second NATO front and provides passage to Iraq and the Persian Gulf. It seems that fierce little Israel may simply be bypassed for the easier pickings of Jordan, in the eventual march on the Arabian Peninsula. Cut off from aid from a now preoccupied United States, it might be a sound way of dealing with the Israelis.
In the course of this attack, Russia would finally achieve her epic historical dream on an incredible level: the permanent acquisition of warm water ports. The ancient strategic vision of the Tsars has come to pass before our eyes in this map.
Encircling and Breaking NATO:
This is the key auxiliary attack that could win World War III and with it, NATO is definitely in trouble. A third front is opened as the Soviet Union –likely heavily supplemented with Warsaw Pact allies from her eastern and southeastern allied states– launches an ambitious wheeling pincer attack through Greece, into populous Asia Minor.
If combined with the Southern TVD invasion of Turkey seen above, this could have been brilliantly devastating to NATO and closed off the Eastern Mediterranean for some time. Note that functionally independent Yugoslavia is attacked as an enemy, in order to condition a shocking split attack into south-central Europe. This would isolate Italy behind the Alps and take neutralist Austria.
But the worst trouble is that as the epic tank battle for Germany rages in the Western TVD, this underside flanking strike could have spelled doom for the defense of Western Europe. With NATO forces retreating out of Germany to evade encirclement the war moves to France and the combined Soviet Western and Southwestern invasion forces can potentially push through to the Atlantic coast. Perhaps correcting Hitler’s error of failing to immediately attack the United Kingdom (as the Western TVD map suggests). America might suddenly stand alone.
Had everything managed to remain conventional to this point, it is here we see the point at which the survival of civilization as we know it hangs in the balance. The temptation on the American president would be enormous to start wiping out these gargantuan Soviet armies with the equally vast American nuclear arsenal. Equally, the temptation on the Soviet leadership would be substantial to trade queens with her great adversary, through counterforce first strike on American nuclear forces.
Were the US to strike tactically against the Soviet invasion force, escalation to countervalue strikes (against economic and population centers), was Soviet retaliatory doctrine itself, and the entire war would enter a new phase of global mass murder, as the Americans inevitably retaliate when their cities are vaporized by Russian rocketry.
In the post-nuclear novel and movie, this is the point at which World War III ends and we are all reduced to wearing bearskins and roaming around stateless post-technological deserts. But the reality was probably a substantially worse world.
If anything, disaster and mass murder tends to increase the authority of the state over populations, not collapse it. Was the power of the Nazi state more or less complete when her cities were smoldering ruins? In such situations people are rendered completely dependent on even a damaged state, when all other sources of power have been disrupted or destroyed…and in our scenario here, these are states which would not be inclined to give up the war having already lost so much.
As the pre-war nuclear stockpiles are expended (mostly canceling each other out, rather than falling on cities), much of the population of both the United States and the Soviet Union would survive. Particularly if the build-up was a conventional escalation, allowing for the inevitable panic evacuation of dense urban areas.
Therefore if you want a true retrofuturist nightmare-scape, imagine a nuclear World War III, but one in which after the horrendous nuclear exchange is largely over, you haven’t the saving grace of a desolate but free world and the end of the war.
Imagine suffering a nuclear attack and yet the war going on…in a newly mass mobilized and utterly militarized and depopulating society….potentially for years, even decades. That was probably the real nightmare we escaped, now that these maps have thankfully become lost visions in a vanished dream of global war.
-
122. Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, October 20, 1975, 4:15–6:35 p.m.
SUBJECTGlobal Strategy for Dealing with the Soviet Union; the Historical Lessons
of the 1930s
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing: You visited the Forbidden City?!
Secretary Kissinger: I love to visit there. During my last trip I escaped
my keepers and visited there by myself.
I appreciate all the arrangements you have made.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing: It seems to me that of all emperors and kings
[in the world], the Chinese emperors did not know how to enjoy life.Secretary Kissinger: Didn’t know how to enjoy life?
Vice Premier Teng: In terms of food and clothing, yes; but in terms
of the quality of their residences they did not know how to enjoy life.
One other thing is that the Chinese emperors changed their clothes
every day—new clothes every day! Do you think they would be very
comfortable wearing new clothes every day? And at every meal the
emperor would have 99 courses. Actually they could only take whatever
was close to them.
Secretary Kissinger: It doesn’t sound like trouble or hardship to
me. If you give me one corner [of the Forbidden City] I would be
comforable.
Vice Premier Teng: That was built by the Empress Dowager.
And the other feature of the Chinese emperors was that whatever
[food] they thought of they would try to get immediately. The Imperial
cooks would only give them food that was most obtainable. They
didn’t give them any other dishes, otherwise the emperor would kill
the cooks!
Secretary Kissinger: Why was that?
Vice Premier Teng: Because the cooks could only get the things
that were available in that season. If the emperor liked a dish and asked
for it but could not get it, he would kill the cook.
Secretary Kissinger: That is what my staff does in the State Department.
They try to limit my choices.
Vice Premier Teng: Let’s turn to the subjects we are going to discuss.
I will first explain our views.
Our relations were started in February, 1972. That was during President
Nixon’s visit to China. And before that Doctor made visits to
Peking to prepare for President Nixon’s visit to China. And we have
stated on more than one occasion that we appreciate the first remarks
by former President Nixon to Chairman Mao. When he met the Chairman
he said, “I have come to China out of our national interest.” We
also appreciate that President Nixon took this courageous step. And
we also understand the sincerity of President Nixon when he said that
he had come to China out of the national interest of the United States.
We believe this is not diplomatic talk.And thereafter, the Doctor made several visits to China, and Chairman
Mao told President Nixon, as well as the Doctor, that we have
common points which were reflected in the Shanghai Communiqué.
Our common aim is to fix the polar bear, deal with the polar bear.
I believe the Doctor also remembers that when in talking about
the Middle East, Chairman Mao also advised the United States to use
two hands. You should not only use one hand to help Israel, but also
the other hand to help the Arab countries, especially Egypt. In the talk,
Chairman Mao emphasized that China supported the Arab countries.
And this position of China is different from that of the United States.
But we can also see a common ground—that is we can both fix the polar
bear.
Chairman Mao stressed on many occasions that between us there
are certain problems of bilateral relations, but what is more important
are the international problems. On international issues, we think we
should look at the international problems from a political point of view.
Only in this way can we have a common view, can we have coordination
in some respects. And exactly on this point we appreciate the
statesmanship of President Nixon. We have never attached any importance
to what you call the Watergate event. By political problems I
mean how we should deal with the Soviet Union. This is a question of
strategy—a question of global strategy.
And this morning I listened attentively to the Doctor’s remarks,
and according to what you said this morning the United States has a
clear world view with regard to strategy, and now you are only thinking
of tactics. As I understand it, tactics are guided by strategy and
serve strategy. The tactics manifest in various fields may conform to
the strategy and may also deviate from strategy.
The Doctor seems to believe that the Chinese are intransigent in
tactics, and I know what you are referring to. You put stress on flexibility.
If we are to make an assessment of ourselves, we can say that
we have never been intransigent. We think that flexibility must conform
to strategic needs. Too much flexibility leads people to wonder
what the strategy really is.
This morning the Doctor first talked about strategy towards the
Soviet Union. There exist differences between us in this respect. We believe
the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe—in the
Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf—all the places
linked to Europe.
Although the Soviet Union has stationed one million troops along
the 7,200 kilometer border [between Russian an China] the Soviet strategy
remains toward the West. The Soviet strategy is to make a feint toward
the East while attacking in the West.
In this regard, the U.S. has stressed to us on many occasions the
danger of a Soviet attack against China. I believe that the Doctor still
remembers that Chairman Mao had a deep talk with you in this regard.
He concluded that the polar bear is out to fix the United States.
We have heard, on not less than one occasion, that the Doctor has
said that whether the Soviet Union was making a feint in the East while
attacking the West, or making a feint in the West while attacking in the
East, this makes not much difference.
We hold different views. How to assess Soviet strategy? This is not
a matter of rhetoric but a matter of substance. This assessment is the
starting point of the tactics formulated to deal with international
matters.
We say that the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West and it is
out to fix the United States. Even the one million Soviet troops stationed
in the East are directed against the U.S. Seventh Fleet first of all
and not merely against China. First we say that the Soviet troops are
directed against the Seventh Fleet, and then Japan, and then China.
Also we say that the Soviet focus is in the West.
We are also making solid preparations. But one should by no
means be under the false impression that when China proposes this
theory that China wants to direct the Soviet Union Westward so that
the Soviet Union will not go to the East.
I heard that during your first trip to China, prior to President
Nixon’s visit, Premier Chou talked to you. I was not present, but he
said China’s strategy was to get prepared to deal with aggression from
all sides. At that time we did not have the Shanghai Communiqué yet.
Well, although I have read the verbal record of your talk, I do not remember
what the original words were; but anyway, the Premier told
you that even if the Soviet Union siezes the land north of the Yellow
River, and Japan grabs the northeast, the United States the east, and
India grabs Tibet, we are not afraid. That was what we thought at that
time.
After the Shanghai Communiqué, we made no reference to these
words. We have always believed that we should rely on our independent
strength to deal with the Soviet Union, and we have never
cherished any illusions about this. We have told this to the Doctor as
well as to visiting American friends. We do not depend on nuclear
weapons; even less on nuclear protection [by other countries].
We depend on two things: First is the perseverance of the 800 million Chinese
people. If the Soviet Union wants to attack China it must be prepared
to fight for at least two decades. We mainly depend on millet
plus rifles. Of course, this millet plus rifles is different from what we
had during Yenan times. We pursue a policy of self-reliance in our economic
construction and also in our strategic problems.
As I said just now, we are not directing the evil of the Soviet Union
Westward, but we are concerned about the West because if the Soviet
Union is to make trouble its focal point is in the West. Naturally we
are concerned about it. It is precisely proceeding from this assessment
that we are interested in a unified and strong Europe—including the
improvement of relations between Europe and the United States.
It is also precisely proceeded from this strategic assessment that
we advised you to use both of your hands in dealing with Arabs and
Israelis.
It is also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we expressed
that we did not understand the attitude of the United States
in the case when the Soviet Union and India dismembered Pakistan.
These are political problems as well as strategic problems, and
these include tactics under the guidance of these problems, these strategic
problems—for instance, when we advised you to use both of your
hands [in the Middle East] this was tactics.
It was also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we have
often told you, as well as Japan, that Japan should put a first priority
on relations between Japan and the United States and then between
Japan and China. This not only concerns the West but also the East.
On this point, we have advised our American friends on many occasions
that the United States should formulate its own focus of strategy.
We have often said the United States was keeping ten fleas under
its ten fingers and that the United States should not let itself bog down
in the quagmire of Indochina.
And out of this strategic consideration, when the United States
was building its military base in Diego Garcia on the Indian Ocean
China did not criticize this.On these questions and a number of other issues we proceed from
political and strategic considerations to deal with international problems
as well as our bilateral relations. We have made our assessment
of Soviet strategy after careful study of the international situation. In
our talks with the Europeans, they have constantly raised the [following]
question: “If there is trouble in Europe, what will be the attitude
of the United States?” I will be very candid with the Doctor, the Europeans
are very apprehensive on this point.
Secretary Kissinger: But our question is what will be the attitude
of the Europeans?
Vice Premier Teng: Perhaps this has something to do with your relations
with the Europeans. The Doctor may recall that in 1973 Chairman
Mao asked you whether it was possible for the new isolationism
to emerge in the United States.3 You answered in the affirmative, negative
term. You said no.
Secretary Kissinger: I just now said to Mr. Lord that I knew I was
tricky, but I am not that tricky—to answer “affirmatively no.” (Laughter)
Vice Premier Teng: But from that you can assess what Chairman
Mao is thinking, what we are thinking about. This observation of the
situation dates back as early as the first nuclear arms talks between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Those talks took place in 1963. That
treaty was prepared by three countries, and it left a deep impression
on me at that time. I made my last visit to the Soviet Union as head of
the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate with the
Russians, and it [the non-proliferation treaty] was made public on the
day when we left [Moscow].
At that time our talks with the Soviet Union were completely bankrupt,
and we were certain that a most important part of the treaty was
directed against China. I don’t doubt that at that time the attitude of
the United States and the British was to restrain the Soviet Union from
nuclear development. Of course this is a strategic problem and, in terms
of tactics, after more than nine years—nearly ten years—in this period
things have changed. They show that the aim—the purpose—of these
tactics has failed to be achieved.
In 1972, when you reached the second [SALT] agreement, the Soviet
Union drastically quickened their pace in the development of nuclear
arms. Their pace was quicker than the United States. When the
third agreement [on prevention of nuclear war] was reached between
your countries, it [the strategic balance] had reached equilibrium. In
November last year when we met [after the Vladivostok meeting],
the Doctor informed us that the number of Soviet missiles had not
yet reached the ceiling, and this morning you told us that the number
of Soviet missiles had exceeded the ceiling—leaving aside the
quality.
This is our observation from one angle. And in the race between
the Soviet Union and the United States, the United States has not
gained. In terms of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has far exceeded
you and Europe.
It is almost eleven months since we met last year. During this period
we have again made our observations. And through our observations
we have got the impression that the Helsinki Conference is an
indication—and not only the Helsinki Conference, but things before
the Helsinki Conference—that it is worthwhile to recall history.
Secretary Kissinger: What things?
Vice Premier Teng: Well, problems of various descriptions [mentioned]
earlier.By recalling history, I mean the period prior to the Second World
War—the period 1936 to 1939, which is particularly worthwhile to
recall. The Doctor studies history and I think is more knowledgable
than I.As I understand, the Doctor once said that in actuality the Soviet
Union has gone beyond the Rhineland. This shows that the Doctor has
made a study of it. After the Germans entered into the Rhineland you
may recall what was the attitude of the British and French, and what
was the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier. They pursued
a policy of appeasement towards Hitler, and shortly after that the Munich
agreement was concluded.
In pursuing such policies the purpose of Chamberlain and Daladier
was obvious. They wanted to direct the peril Eastward, and their
first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash actions.
Their second aim was to direct the peril toward the East. The stark historical
realities have brought out the failure of the policies carried out
by Chamberlain and Daladier. Their policies have gone to the opposite
of their wishes. They neither got international peace and stability nor
achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the East. Instead,
the spearhead of Hitler was directed to the West—Czechoslovakia
and Poland. These countries were in the West, and they [the Germans]
did not attack the Soviet Union first.
If I remember correctly from what I read in newspapers, when
Chamberlain visited Germany he carried an umbrella. But it neither
shaded him from the moon or the sun—no, the rain or the sun. At that
time France boasted that they had the Maginot line. But Germany did
not attack the Maginot line. They attacked from Belgium and attacked
France, and France collapsed and Chamberlain gave up all resistance.
He mobilized all the ships to move from Dunkirk—that is, he wanted
to slip away.
So in fact this appeasement policy led to an earlier break out of the
Second World War. In our contacts with quite a number of Europeans
they often raise the lessons of Munich. According to our observations,
we may say that the danger of such historical tragedy is increasing.
The Doctor asked just now what were other things apart from the
Helsinki Conference. I raised three questions to you this morning. This
shows there were other things apart from the Helsinki Conference.
In terms of strategy, Soviet weapons have far exceeded those of
the West. Also you have reached the equilibrium of weapons.
In terms of total military strength, the Soviet Union has a greater military
strength than the United States and the European countries put together.
But the Soviet Union has two big weaknesses: One, they lack
food grains; the second is that their industrial equipment and technology
is backward. In the long run although the Soviet Union has a
greater military strength, these two weaknesses have put the Soviet
Union in a weak position. It is limited in its strength so that when a
war breaks out the Soviet Union cannot hold out long.
Therefore, we do not understand why the United States and the
West have used their strong points to make up for the Soviet weakness.
If the United States and Europe have taken advantage of the weaknesses
of the Soviet Union you might have been in a stronger negotiating
position.
As for our views on the Helsinki Conference, I think you know
our views, which differ from yours. We call it the European Insecurity
Conference and you call it the European Security Conference. The Munich
agreement pulled the wool over the eyes of Chamberlain, Daladier,
and some European people.
And in the case when you supply them, make up for the weak points of the Soviet Union, you help the Soviet Union to overcome its weaknesses. You can say you pulled the wool over the eyes of the West and demoralized the Western people
and let them slacken their pace. We have a Chinese saying: A donkey
is made to push the mill stone because when you make the donkey to
push around the mill stone you have to blindfold it.
This is a political or we may say a strategic problem in the present
situation which people are most concerned with. And we are now
speaking our views on these problems very candidly.
As for the Russians, they now feel you cannot restrain them. They
are not reliable and cannot be restrained. And, of course, in the West—
including the United States—there are two schools of public opinion.
A greater part of the public opinion has clearly seen this. A considerable,
greater part of the public opinion has seen this. We understand
that the Americans, Europeans, and including the Japanese, do not
want a war because they have gone through two World Wars. This we
can understand. They fear a war.
We always feel that to rely on the European Security Conference,
or anything else in an attempt to appease the Russians, will fail. These
things will be counter productive. For example, the Europeans fear war
day and night. They hope to obtain peace for a certain period of time
at any price. Exactly because of that, we should not blindfold them by
the evolution of détente. We should remind them of the possibility of
attack from the polar bear. So every time Chairman Mao meets foreign
guests he advises them to get prepared. Without preparation they
would suffer. The most effective way to deal with the possible attack
from the Russians is not what you call agreements or treaties, [not]
what is written on paper, but actual preparations.
As for China, we have told you on many occasions, and I will
[again] tell you frankly, that China fears nothing under heaven or on
earth. China will not ask favors from anyone. We depend on the digging
of tunnels. We rely on millet plus rifles to deal with all problems
internationally and locally, including the problems in the East.
There is an argument in the world to the effect that China is afraid
of an attack by the Russians. As a friend, I will be candid and tell you
that this assessment is wrong.
Today we are only talking about strategic problems. The Doctor
was a former professor. I have taken my 50 minutes to talk and I have
gone beyond 50 minutes. That was because I am only a soldier. It is
not easy to confine oneself within 50 minutes. I once taught in a school.
I gave a lecture for 50 minutes, but I have never been a professor. I
have taken too much of your time.
Secretary Kissinger: No, it was interesting and important.
Can we take a five minute break, and maybe I will make a few
observations?
Vice Premier Teng: Yes.
(There was a short break at this point.)
Secretary Kissinger: Do you want me to make some observations
now, or how do you propose to proceed?
Vice Premier Teng: Yes. Please go ahead.
Secretary Kissinger: I listened with great interest to the Vice Premier’s
presentation and I would like to make a few observations.
First, I have noticed the frequent reference to President Nixon. I
have worked very closely with President Nixon.
And I think it is correct to say that we jointly designed the policy to which you referred
approvingly. It is also the case that I am still in touch with him every
two or three weeks at some length, so I know his views very precisely.
I can safely say that the policy we are pursuing today is the policy that
President Nixon would pursue if it had not been for Watergate. The
policy toward the Soviet Union that is being pursued today was designed
by President Nixon and myself and is the same that is being
pursued today. There is no difference between President Nixon’s policy
toward the Soviet Union and President Ford’s.If anything, President
Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet Union. And I say this
as the one man in public life who has maintained contact with President
Nixon and never criticized him and has stated publicly that he
has made a great contribution in matters of foreign policy.
Leaving this aside, I must say I listened to the Vice Premier’s presentation
with some sadness. I had thought, obviously incorrectly, that
some of the public statements which I had heard were said for public
effect. But this is obviously not the case. Now what I regret is that I
can understand two countries, operating from the same perception, can
operate using different tactics—and can understand each other’s tactics.
That causes me no difficulty. But if there is not a common strategic
perception, then one wonders what exactly the basis of our policy
is. If you seriously think that we are trying to push the Soviet Union
to attack in the East, then we are in grave danger of frittering away all
our efforts—with yourself and everyone else.
The Vice Premier was kind enough to point out the lessons of history
between 1936 and 1939. He pointed out that those in the West who
tried to push the aggressor towards the East became the first victims
of the attack; and that is true. But it is also true that those in the East
who sought to escape their dilemma by pushing their aggressor toward
the West eventually became the objects of the aggressor anyway.
And when we say that the West and the East have essentially the
same strategic problem, we don’t say this because we have an interest
in participating in the defense of the East. Anyone who knows the
American domestic situation must know that this cannot be our overwhelming
ambition. We say it because strategically wherever the attack
occurs it will affect the other. And you act on these assumptions
too.
And we are saying this not to do you any favors, because you are
not all that helpful to us in other parts of the world. We are doing this
out of our own national interest.
In 1971, in January of 1971, before we had been in China, during
the crisis in India, when India had dismembered Pakistan, I talked to
your Ambassador in New York on a Friday evening. He told me that
China always fights as long as it has one rifle. I then told him we would
move an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. On Sunday morning,
when we were on the way to the Azores to meet President Pompidou,
we received a message that your Ambassador in New York wanted to
see us; and we sent General Haig to see him. We thought then that you
might be taking some military action.
And we decided that even though we had no diplomatic relations—President Nixon and I decided—that if you moved, and if the Soviet Union brought pressure on you, we
would resist and assist you, even though you had not asked us to. We
did that out of our conviction of the national interest.
And we have said recently again to the Prime Minister of Pakistan—
because he asked us about this—we said that we would not be
indifferent if the Soviet Union brought pressure on China because of
the Indian situation. He must have told you this. And again, you have
not asked us to do this, nor did we do this as a favor to China.So, since I have been in Washington we have gone to a confrontation
with the Soviet Union three times: Once over a nuclear submarine
base in Cuba; once over the Syrian invasion of Jordan; once
over the question of the alert in the Middle East in 1973 and—no, four
times—once on the question of access routes to Berlin. We did all of
these things on our own, without knowing what any other country,
much less China, would do.
The Vice Premier referred to the spirit of Munich. I have studied
that period and I lived through it, as a victim, so I know it rather well.
The Munich policy was conducted by governments who denied that
there was a danger, and who attempted to avoid their problems by
denying that they existed. The current United States policy, as we have
attempted to tell you, has no illusions about the danger, but it attempts
to find the most effective means of resistance given the realities we
face. A country that spends $110 billion a year for defense cannot be
said to be pursing the spirit of Munich. But the reality we face is a certain
attitude that has developed in the United States and an attitude
that exists also in Europe even much more.
I know some of the Europeans who you talk about. Some are personally
good friends of mine. But there is no European of any standing
that has any question about what the United States will do. In any
threat, we will be there. Our concern is whether the Europeans will be
there. It is the United States that organizes the defense of the North Atlantic
and that brings about the only cohesion that exists. It was not
the United States that advocated the European Security Conference. It
was, rather, to ease some of the pressures on the European governments
that we reluctantly agreed to it in 1971.
Now the Vice Premier is quite correct, this is a problem that greatly
concerns us, whether the policy that is being pursued may lead to confusion.
This is a serious concern. But the Vice Premier should also consider
that the policy we are pursuing is the best means we have to rally
resistance. If we pursued some other approach, the left wing parties in
Europe might split the United States from Europe with the argument
that the United States is a threat to the peace of the world.
If you follow the present investigations that are going on in America,
you will see that it was the present Administration, including myself,
that has used methods to prevent the Soviet Union from stretching
out its hands—even if these are not your preferred methods.
And if we were slow in our disengagement from Indochina—and
this was not a situation that we created—it was precisely to prevent
the mood of neoisolationism from developing that Chairman Mao
talked of. We do not rely on the European Security Conference. And
we do not rely on détente. Nor is everyone in the United States who
talks against détente a reliable opponent of the Soviet Union, because
without a strategic grasp of the situation much of it [anti-détente talk]
is simply politics. To talk tough is easy—to act with strength and maintain
support for a strong policy over a period of time in a democracy
is a difficult problem.
If the Soviet Union should stretch out its hands, we will be brutal
in our response, no matter where it occurs—and we won’t ask people
whether they share our assessment when we resist. But to be able to
do this we have to prepare our public by our own methods, and by
methods that will enable us to sustain this policy over many years, and
not go like Dulles from a period of intransigence to a period of excessive
conciliation.
The Administration in the ‘50’s started out not willing to shake hands
with Communists [translated as, “with China”] and wound up almost
giving away Berlin—had it not been for Khrushchev’s clumsiness.
Our strategy is exactly as we discussed it with Chairman Mao three
years ago. It has not changed, and it has the strategic advantage. But
we have to be the best judge of the means appropriate to our situation.
And we will not stand still for a strategic advance by the Soviet
Union.
And we do not separate the fronts into East and West. If the Soviet
Union feels strong enough to attack in either the West or the East,
the policy will already have failed. The Soviet Union must not be in a
position where it feels strong enough to attack at all.
Now I would like to correct a few other misapprehensions which
the Vice Premier voiced, and then I will make one other observation.
One thing has to do with relative military strength. It is perfectly
true that the Soviet Union has gained in relative strength in the last
decade. This is not the result of the agreements that have been signed.
This is the result of changes in technology, and the erroneous decision
of the Administration that was in office in the 60’s when the Soviet Union
was building up its strategic forces.
If you analyze the result of the [SALT] agreement of 1972, since 1972 the strategic strength of the United States has increased considerably relative to that of the Soviet Union. It is also true that after some point in the field of strategic weapons, it is difficult to translate military superiority into a political advantage.
With respect to the second agreement, the Vladivostok agreement,
you must have translated what I said incorrectly from the German.
There has been no change in the Soviet strength since Vladivostok.
Since the Soviet Union does not dismantle their obsolete units, they
have 2,700 units and they have had those for five years. After Vladivostok
they would have to get rid of 200. Since we do get rid of our
obsolete units we have somewhat less than 2,400.But numbers are not
so important anyway, as each [U.S.] unit can carry more warheads. We
have gone ahead by a ratio of 6 or 7 to 1. Moreover, since the Soviets
like big things which take room, they have about 85 to 90 percent of
their forces on land, where they are vulnerable because the accuracy
of our forces is improved. Less than 20 percent of our forces are on
land, and they are less vulnerable. So it is not true that in the strategic
balance we are behind, even though there are many newspaper articles
in America written for political purposes that assert this.
In 1960 President Kennedy was elected by speaking of the missile
gap, even though the Soviet Union had only 30 missiles, each of which
took ten hours to get ready to fire and we had 1,200 airplanes. Ever
since then it has been the secret dream of every American presidential
candidate to run on a missile gap campaign, so we are in danger of
this issue erupting every four years.
In 1970 when we confronted the Soviets on the submarine base in
Cuba, in 1970 in Jordan, in 1970 in Berlin, and in 1973 in the Middle
East, they always yielded within 36 hours when we made a military
move. Their military calculations are not as optimistic as some of our
European friends fear—such as Denmark.
On the question of food grains: We have moved at the slowest pace
that is politically possible for us, and have even held up our grain sales
—even while Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Western Europe have
cleared out their bins in selling to the Soviets. The long term program
we are now negotiating precisely prevents them from storing large
quantities because it puts a ceiling on what they can buy in one year
on the American market.
So our policy is quite clear, and in pursuing it we have not asked
anything from China. We have kept you informed by our many discussions,
but I don’t recall that we have ever asked for anything from
the People’s Republic of China. Of course, China pursues its own policies,
and we respect your independence. I hope you will make the positions
which you made clear to us clear to every European visitor who
comes here. We do not object to your public posture. We think it is essentially
correct, and indeed it is even helpful. We do object when you
direct it against us, when you accuse us of betraying our allies and endangering
the security of the world by deliberately promoting war and
standing on the side lines, when in fact we are doing actual things to
prevent a war and preserve the world equilibrium.
And you should also consider that if the United States public finds
too much discouragement around the world, and if everywhere we
move we find the opposition of every country, then precisely this
mood of isolationism which concerns so many other countries will
develop.
We attach great significance to our relationship with the People’s
Republic of China because we believe you conduct a serious policy and
because we believe your word counts. And we believe that the world
is one entity from a strategic point of view and a political point of view.
We are prepared to coordinate actions along the lines of my conversations
with Chairman Mao two years ago. But the world situation
is extremely complex, and the domestic situations around the world
are also extremely complex. It is important that you have a correct perception
of our objectives. If you think we are engaged in petty tactical
maneuvers then that would be a pity for both of us. You do not ask for
favors, and we do not ask for favors. The basis of a correct policy is an
accurate perception of the national interest and respect by each side for
the perception of the national interest of the other.
This is why we think a visit by the President here would be useful,
and that is the purpose of our policy. We don’t need theater, and
we don’t need you to divert Soviet energies—that would be a total misconception
and it might lead to the same catastrophe as in the 1930s.
After all we resisted Soviet expansion when we were allies, and we
will resist it for our own reasons as you resist it for your own reasons.
I repeat, we attach great significance to our relations. We are prepared
to coordinate. We think you are serious, and we are equally serious.
On that basis I think we can have a useful relationship.
As I have not used up 50 minutes, I will use the remainder
tomorrow.
Vice Premier Teng: Yes. It is quite late—shall we go on tomorrow
afternoon?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Vice Premier Teng: As to the time, we can discuss it later.
Secretary Kissinger: We are not going anywhere.
Vice Premier Teng: Right.
Secretary Kissinger: Good.
