There are 2000 armed Gurkhas in Singapore and their number grows annually by 140.
This is a dangerous sign.
Gurkhas are not Singaporeans. They are mercenaries. AND Mercenaries work for money.
In other words, Gurkhas can be bought with money. Loyalty is a tricky issue here, for their loyalty is dependent on their having to be satisfied with material reward. AND NOW this has proven to be true with their recent rioting incident in Mount Vernon Camp over pay issues which is very worrying.
I do not know how the trouble makers will be taken to task in this incident and whether or not there will be a coverup because of the way in which the MHA has conducted itself with the lack of transparency in the way it fumbled over the Mas Selamat Kastari escape.
The latest Gurkha rioting incident raises many questions in the minds of Singapore Citizens as to: How this mercenary unit being brought in and being armed? How is this mercenary unit empowered to act in Singapore? How is this mercenary unit subject to law and discipline and control?
Will the rioters be charged and disciplined accordingly? What sort of discipline will they receive?
As seen from the Mas Selamat Kastari escape, our administration will bend over backwards for these foreign mercenaries. The Gurkhas on duty ought to have been charged under the Penal Code but instead they were let off with a slap on their wrists. I believe the negligent Singaporean ISD officers received far heavier sanction compared to the negligent Gurkhas. It is amazing how much better treatment these foreigners are being treated in comparison to their Singaporean counterparts in the Police.
[By the way when Singaporean boys have petty fight in groups, they are often charged with rioting and they go to jail for it, I wonder if our Singapore Police Force is held to any higher standards of conduct]
We can trust that the Singapore Police Force and the Ministry of Home Affairs will do their best to cover up this incident and sweep it under the carpet. As if underneath the carpet is already not dirty enough. I would caution against condoning such coverup and I would also caution against the Singaporean public to be complacent enough to overlook the need to pressure the MHA into revealing the worms in the innards of the Gurkha Contingent.
This is because it is my view that the continued presence of Gurkhas in Singapore is the greatest danger to Singapore itself. My reasons are stated below.
If the PAP administration persists on being unrepentant on their mercenary ways and insist on using mercenaries for their security or should i say “the security of Singapore”, it would not be difficult to imagine the possibility of such attitudes infecting the Gurkha Contingent [which is mercenary in the first place] and resulting in the Gurkha Contingent selling out Singapore in time to come.
Imagine, there are 2000 mercenaries armed and ready. Their allegiance unknown. It is easy for them to even try to eliminate the entire leadership and neutralize the other Singaporean units in the Singapore Police Force should they ever decide to do so. And it would be easy for them to do so because the PAP trusts the Gurkhas more than they trust Singaporean Police Officers, they get the Gurkhas to guard Ministers homes.
Furthermore, the Gurkhas are professional soldiers and mercenaries, they are put constantly under training during their service. They upon completion of their vocational training continue to serve their careers in the position they have been trained for.
Singaporean National Servicemen on the other hand are under training only whilst doing their national service and they only turn operational near to their Run-Out-Date (Operationally ready date) only to be released and returned to their civilian status.
In the Singapore Armed Forces, we all know that in each SAF camp, there are roughly only 10-12 rifles in each aggregated guard detail and maybe 200-300 rounds of ammunition in each guardhouse. Other than that, all other weapons and ammunition are stored separately and drawing of arms and ammunition in times of need will take time.
As of now, we know nothing of the Gurkha Contingent’s weapons drawing protocol and ammunition storage and drawing protocol but there is reason to believe that their ammunition and weapons are stored in the same camp unlike the weapons and ammunition which are stored separately in all SAF units. Therefore, it is my belief that our SAF units cannot react fast enough to be mobilized, armed and ready for action if their was a mobilization call to neutralize the Gurkha Contingent when the need arises.
The red tape from the rules set by our leaders surrounding SAF weapons and ammunition drawing and the inherent fact that our Singaporean National Servicemen stay in the far flung corners of Singapore [with compliments from the Central Posting Centre in Mindef] as opposed to the Gurkhas being accommodated in their camp whilst on duty and being accommodated near their camp whilst off duty will prevent our local units from reacting fast enough to tackle the mercenary unit should the mercenaries turn renegade.
[Please recall that in this incident, the SOC reacted fast enough to deploy Mount Vernon Camp because it was an incident of scuffle and rioting. This situation would be vastly different from the scenario where the entire Gurkha Contingent co-operate and mutiny, there would be no 999 call to the Radio Division Singapore Police Force, there would also be no advance warning call to the Special Operations Command.]
The PAP had better come up with much better reasons for maintaining the need for the Gurkha Contingent.
Should the Gurkha Contingent revolt for reasons unknown, the PAP’s policy of recruiting and arming foreigners heavily on its own soil may prove to be the worst ever decision the administration has made and might in actual fact lead to the downfall of Singapore.
I repeat myself. Gurkhas are not Singaporeans, they are mercenaries and they intend to retire in their homeland when they finish their terms of services. Gurkhas are i believe more heavily armed, from what the photos reveal, with at least Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine guns and M-16 assault rifles as opposed to most of their Singaporean counterparts with their Smith & Wesson 0.38 revolvers. God knows whether or not they have the same heavy weapons as a SAF Infantry Battalion e.g. GPMGs.
Thank God that Singapore still has its Special Operations Command, Police Task Force unit, KINS and PINS. This however does not square the equation because do we have as many as 2000 fighting men in the Special Operations Command? I believe not.
The question is to MHA is this - What function does this unit perform which cannot be performed by true blue Singaporeans?
I hereby declare my intention to campaign for the disarming and disbanding of the Gurkha Contingent and I hope other Singaporeans will rally with me with this call.
Until the administration gets pressured enough to be accountable with how the Gurkhas’ recruitment, training, deployment and weapons access and cost of upkeep, I pray for all Singaporean police officers, especially those in the Special Operations Command, to keep a keen and watchful eye on the Gurkha Contingent for reasons which i need not say more.
No one need to look too far into history to know the dangers of having a foreign armed mercenary unit in Singapore.
the good thing about mercenaries is that they won't risk their life recklessly for political ideals, and will stay loyal to their contract because breaking the contract is bad publicity for their business.
The simple answer is that the racial riots of the past and the religious tensions of the present and forseeable future require that the Singapore Government have at hand an impartial and neutral party, not beholden to any local populace or ideology, and loyal to the Government, in order to maintain peace and order in times of civil conflict.
Although the SAF and SPF have been fairly untainted instruments in the racial riots of the past, there is no guarantee that it will remain so in a future upheaval. Thus the need for the Gurkhas.
The fallacy of the argument: "Gurkhas = mercenaries = fight for money = disloyal" can be seen in the history of the Gurkha regiment in service to the British, from which our Gurkhas are derived.
Another mistake is made in linking the Gurkhas to the PAP. The Gurkhas are loyal to the President of Singapore and to the Government--which may or may not be PAP.
Originally posted by edwin3060:The simple answer is that the racial riots of the past and the religious tensions of the present and forseeable future require that the Singapore Government have at hand an impartial and neutral party, not beholden to any local populace or ideology, and loyal to the Government, in order to maintain peace and order in times of civil conflict.
Although the SAF and SPF have been fairly untainted instruments in the racial riots of the past, there is no guarantee that it will remain so in a future upheaval. Thus the need for the Gurkhas.
The fallacy of the argument: "Gurkhas = mercenaries = fight for money = disloyal" can be seen in the history of the Gurkha regiment in service to the British, from which our Gurkhas are derived.
Another mistake is made in linking the Gurkhas to the PAP. The Gurkhas are loyal to the President of Singapore and to the Government--which may or may not be PAP.
hmm, not that i agree totally with the poster here on everything.
but the link between gurkha and PAP is fascinating and not without basis. for instance. go wander around the area around singtel comcentre. if you walk somewhere in the right direction, you'd come across a home (private estate) thats guarded by SPF gurkhas.
gurkhas are also frequently deployed in high profile VIP/escort duties. for instance, when a high level foreign diplomat or event is going on, you have gurkha's openly deployed at VIP complex changi airport and you can actually observe them in select locations.
not outright or clear evidence of the link perhaps, but anecdotal evidence to suggest something else ?
i think its really very interesting that the poster has raised such questions.
i dont wish to comment about the organisation and deployment of gurkhas. i simply dont know enough.
but i do find that the gurkhas actually have roles which tend to have areas of interet conflicts in terms of responsiblity and scope with other enforcement agencies. if so then, why the need or justification for this added force?
@edwin3060:
our gurkhas are pretty different from the british army gurkhas for several reasons
1) ours are under police control
2) ours can be considered operating under the para-military sphere of operations
3) ours are underpaid by a huge yardstick compared to the british ones but much more than the Indian Gurkhas
4) whereas british army/indian army gurkhas for that matter have a clear and distinct role in the military (elite/shock troops). our gurkhas are officially under SPF but do have assignments / can be branched out under ARMY command as well. complicated role/complex scope issues ?
Personally, I agree with edwin3060, in that history has a lot to do with the Gurkhas' presence in Singapore. The fact is that the Gurkhas have proven to be useful in the past, and I believe that their presence is still useful especially after 911. One issue that the poster seems to ignore is a practical one. As I am sure everyone is aware, the SPF is desperately in need of more manpower. As the poster himself hints, even the SOC may not have the manpower to be as large as it needs to be. Having said that, how does the poster intend to fill the gaps that will inadvertantly appear if we remove the Gurkhas?
Aside from worrying about the Gurkhas and the "threat" that they may pose, I think SPF has larger problems to solve. Namely, how to recruit and retain professional officers, and jack up its manpower so it can do its current job more effectively.
In any case, nobody here can claim to fully know how the Gurkhas are managed, what happened at Mt Vernon, or what led to the disputes. My view is that we should not get ahead of ourselves.
Originally posted by sgstars:
but the link between gurkha and PAP is fascinating and not without basis. for instance. go wander around the area around singtel comcentre. if you walk somewhere in the right direction, you'd come across a home (private estate) thats guarded by SPF gurkhas.
gurkhas are also frequently deployed in high profile VIP/escort duties. for instance, when a high level foreign diplomat or event is going on, you have gurkha's openly deployed at VIP complex changi airport and you can actually observe them in select locations.
not outright or clear evidence of the link perhaps, but anecdotal evidence to suggest something else ?
i think its really very interesting that the poster has raised such questions.
i dont wish to comment about the organisation and deployment of gurkhas. i simply dont know enough.
but i do find that the gurkhas actually have roles which tend to have areas of interet conflicts in terms of responsiblity and scope with other enforcement agencies. if so then, why the need or justification for this added force?
@edwin3060:
our gurkhas are pretty different from the british army gurkhas for several reasons
1) ours are under police control
2) ours can be considered operating under the para-military sphere of operations
3) ours are underpaid by a huge yardstick compared to the british ones but much more than the Indian Gurkhas
4) whereas british army/indian army gurkhas for that matter have a clear and distinct role in the military (elite/shock troops). our gurkhas are officially under SPF but do have assignments / can be branched out under ARMY command as well. complicated role/complex scope issues ?
As to your first point, guarding of VIPs, etc, these are national duties, and not tied to the PAP at all. If, for example, another party was to form the government, the Gurkhas would also have to be deployed to guard the PM, and other important ministers, in addition to the President. That was why I said that one of the roles of the Gurkhas is to guard the President and the Government of Singapore, as well as other VIPs, diplomats etc.
Also, among the Special Ops communities, you will find that there are many common areas of training, and the reason for that is both backup and to ensure that all these highly trained people speak the same language-- in some areas of training both SOC and the SOF do the same thing, does that mean that they shouldn't have cross training? How sure are you that just one command will be enough in an emergency situation?
Finally, like I said previously in other threads, while our Gurkhas are under the control of the SPF, the Gurkha detachment here was originally detached from the Gurkha Regiment in Britain, and Gurkha selection is still done by the British before the Gurkhas are sent to Singapore for both historical and practical reasons. So your whole contention about the Gurkhas being different are null and void.
Originally posted by edwin3060:
As to your first point, guarding of VIPs, etc, these are national duties, and not tied to the PAP at all. If, for example, another party was to form the government, the Gurkhas would also have to be deployed to guard the PM, and other important ministers, in addition to the President. That was why I said that one of the roles of the Gurkhas is to guard the President and the Government of Singapore, as well as other VIPs, diplomats etc.
Also, among the Special Ops communities, you will find that there are many common areas of training, and the reason for that is both backup and to ensure that all these highly trained people speak the same language-- in some areas of training both SOC and the SOF do the same thing, does that mean that they shouldn't have cross training? How sure are you that just one command will be enough in an emergency situation?
Finally, like I said previously in other threads, while our Gurkhas are under the control of the SPF, the Gurkha detachment here was originally detached from the Gurkha Regiment in Britain, and Gurkha selection is still done by the British before the Gurkhas are sent to Singapore for both historical and practical reasons. So your whole contention about the Gurkhas being different are null and void.
Close protection of VIPs falls within the duties of the security command officers whom are Singaporeans. Gurkhas just make up the sentries, u see them guarding other installations as well.
There is a whole lot of difference between the duties of SOC and SOF. Unless you are talking about STAR within the SOC, i do not think the other units that form the main bulk of SOC shares facilities with SOF.
Gurkhas are no ordinary mercenaries. They have a long tradition of loyalty & fighting fiercely for their " masters ".
The serve a very important role in Singapore in that they will follow the rule of law and are impartial to religious or racial sentiments.
All organizations or communities are certainly not immune to having problems & the Gurkhas are no exception. They are people too.
Originally posted by edwin3060:
As to your first point, guarding of VIPs, etc, these are national duties, and not tied to the PAP at all. If, for example, another party was to form the government, the Gurkhas would also have to be deployed to guard the PM, and other important ministers, in addition to the President. That was why I said that one of the roles of the Gurkhas is to guard the President and the Government of Singapore, as well as other VIPs, diplomats etc.
Also, among the Special Ops communities, you will find that there are many common areas of training, and the reason for that is both backup and to ensure that all these highly trained people speak the same language-- in some areas of training both SOC and the SOF do the same thing, does that mean that they shouldn't have cross training? How sure are you that just one command will be enough in an emergency situation?
Finally, like I said previously in other threads, while our Gurkhas are under the control of the SPF, the Gurkha detachment here was originally detached from the Gurkha Regiment in Britain, and Gurkha selection is still done by the British before the Gurkhas are sent to Singapore for both historical and practical reasons. So your whole contention about the Gurkhas being different are null and void.
if you read between the lines of what i wrote i think you'd get my meaning. Not every VIP in singapore has gurkha protection. go figure.certain individuals only and their households. and not simply just "high value" targets only. not everyone will have these gurkhas for protection. if you cant get this, i doubt you will. like i said, the best way of understanding this is to take a walk in the area between istana and singtel comcentre. you should see things that wont fit your explaination.
regarding your special ops thing. i dont know where you get your sources from. but let me share with you what i have gleaned from anecdotal evidence and after speaking to a gurkha here during one assignment i had.
the gurkhas in military uniforms are NOT special forces. they are under police command but have a special dual command structure where they can be transferred to military command in the event of special case situations. this only happened after the robbers landed in tekong in 2006. go figure. i wasnt even going near their role of "elite/special troops", that i know too little to comment. But from what i observed about their gear and their weapons, not as clear cut as you can imagine. its rather complicated. they are Much much more heavily armed and equipped compared to normal "SOC" troopers.
and it contravenes the UN regulation on mercenaries if i m seeing it right.
my point regarding them being under two commands. its unique. in Britain and India, the two countries with the largest contigents of gurkha's, they tend to be under a sole military structure. Here their role is dual role.
i never knew the british "selected" our gurkhas before coming here. the guy i spoke to sure didnt give me that impression. He even told me that back home in his village, everyone tries out for the british army first. highest pay, best benefits. even a chance to become citizens. Those who cannot make it then usually try to go for either the SPF or the indian army. Indian army is a popular choice because its nearer to home for them and they get a pension if the complete their service in the army,
these are facts. perhaps you and i are seeing it from different points of view but that dosent mean its moot.
dont wear blinkers over your eyes. nothing is static. things change.
have you been to cuppage road area recently ? i used to head there for jamming at a place near tong le industrial building. maybe if you know where it is, then you can go observe and see the reason about why gurkha's are actually complaining about the pay.
it might be anecdotal evidence but with a open mind and first hand insight, its all quite apparent to me.
I
Seems to me we need more Gurkhas, not less...
Who else is willing to die for the low pay you get in the army?