Originally posted by Daniel-Lim:Yes,it makes more sense for them to worry about China but by the time she starts to thirst for oil Brunei would be dry of it.Potential trouble area would be the spratly islands and China will bump the rest of the claimants off if she has to.
That Singapore is overly well-armed is a reflection of our insecurity, vulnerability and fragility.
The neighbours are actually less concerned about SAF prowess than we think. They know Singapore would not risk starting anything unless seriously provoked.
I would tend to agree that the other Asian countries are arming not because of Singapore, but for other reasons. Malaysia has to worry about such a huge area - the peninsula and Borneo- with so little assets. Indonesia has a even bigger headache.
And yes, the protection and procurement of natural resources will be what future wars will be about.
In a sense, that was one of the prime reasons Japan invaded SE Asia.
Originally posted by Daniel-Lim:And that might be the reason why we are pulling ASEAN along for integration..
[b
In a sense, that was one of the prime reasons Japan invaded SE Asia.[/b]
Brunei a protectorate of England? Since when? Even if it is, can they enforce the obligation half a world away? The Royal Navy isn't what it was decades ago.Originally posted by chino65:I don't quite understand this point about us sending troops to Brunei being moot.
Furthermore, isn't Brunei still a protectorate of England? Or not?
Brunei was a protectorate of England from 1888 to 1984.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Brunei a protectorate of England? Since when? Even if it is, can they enforce the obligation half a world away? The Royal Navy isn't what it was decades ago.
The point is, if we do indeed have a defence pact, which isn't too far fetched given how close we are in relations, the closest in fact in all of ASEAN, we are obligated to help in times of need.
This mindset is not common, sadly.Originally posted by archon1234:The Asian mindsets should be tuned more positice thinking approach.
Increast in Arm Procurement = Investment in a more secured environment = National Wealth Increase (more $$ in pocket).
The UK doesn't have a particularly good track record in terms of coming to the needs of others. Poland and Norway in '39 and '40...Malaya in '41...Palestien in '49 and now they are literally being chased out of Basra in '07Originally posted by chino65:Brunei was a protectorate of England from 1888 to 1984.
Half a world away and wouldn't help? Go read up on history and don't belittle people who came in times of our need.
...
The point is, if we have defence pact with Brunei, please prove it. What is far-fetched or not is not the point.
I disagree. And to say this is a great disrespect especially to those who fought and died in this region and elsewhere.Originally posted by mozzi190:The UK doesn't have a particularly good track record in terms of coming to the needs of others. Poland and Norway in '39 and '40...Malaya in '41...Palestien in '49 and now they are literally being chased out of Basra in '07
It doesn't change the fact that the Royal Navy's power projection capabilities have been quite negligible for the last 2 decades. It might improve with the launch of their 2 new aircraft carriers, but their navy, to put it bluntly, has been operating low for a long while. Even if they had 2 carriers, one will be in dock while the other will be out at sea. The same happened with the Invincible class, where at least one remained in dock while the rest went out to sea. Why the Falklands was a near disaster as it is.Originally posted by chino65:I disagree. And to say this is a great disrespect especially to those who fought and died in this region and elsewhere.
But anyway...
Whatever one's perception of history is, what's clear is that everyone wants to be boss of their own destiny.
I think that soldiering and politics are two entirely diferent things...we see the politicans letting down the soldiers more often than the other way....Originally posted by chino65:I disagree. And to say this is a great disrespect especially to those who fought and died in this region and elsewhere.
But anyway...
Whatever one's perception of history is, what's clear is that everyone wants to be boss of their own destiny.
Dude, IÂ’d rather say the most stupid thing that SG will do is to form such a common ASEAN defense coalition that u mentioned from time to time. Such a defense coalition will only greatly increase the city stateÂ’s chance of involving in a hot war. To make it vivid, letÂ’s say some Boleh force hot-engages some outside force in south china sea, SAF under such common defense liability, may be required to hot pursue as well, even though it doesnÂ’t have any deemed interests in such area. By hot pursuing, itÂ’s subject to hostile retaliation strike from that outside force being engaged by the ASEAN coalition. Most likely quite superior in projection firepower, the outside force could launch simultaneously attack both in bohleh country or Sg, but now you need ask yourself a question: can your beloved homeland, being a tiny island, withhold the same amount of projection power as your neighbor countries in vast farmland? A war even lasted in hours can destroy your achievement built in decades. And you know Singapore, being a financial, communication, high tech center, the most valuable assert, besides human factor, is the stability. Now you want to risk this great assert to a wide, more risky integrated Asean common defense? You want expensive weapons purchased by our taxpayerÂ’s hardly earned money to be used in such a meaningless integrated asean common defense? Those vast farmland countries can recover faster from any war even being directly struck. But not Singapore, if youÂ’re weak, donÂ’t be surprised that people ask you to pay double of his water, ask railway stations to be built in Orchard road, etc, etc.Originally posted by LazerLordz:And that might be the reason why we are pulling ASEAN along for integration..
The answer can be taken from a news report dated 1994 in the International Herald TribuneOriginally posted by Arapahoe:wonder why the Brit did not pull Brunei along into FPDA?
So Far So Good for Wealthy Brunei
By Michael LeiferPublished: THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1994
BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei: How does a small state that has grown immensely rich by exporting oil and natural gas cope with a vulnerable independence? The question is pertinent as Brunei enters its 11th year of independence this month.
Brunei comprises two enclaves of less than 6,000 square kilometers (2,300 square miles) on the northern coast of Borneo. It is divided by the Malaysian state of Sarawak. The sultanate has just over a quarter of a million people. Because of threats to its separate identity from Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s and '70s, it was a reluctant candidate for independence after nearly a century as a British protectorate.
It has relied greatly on diplomacy to protect a historical identity that dates to the 14th century. Yet defense through diplomacy is hardly a guarantee of survival at the end of the 20th century. The government has been very conscious of the experience of Kuwait. It has thus begun building up its armed forces and is expected to purchase its first squadron of fixed-wing combat aircraft, probably British-made Hawk jet fighters, as well as a new generation of off-shore patrol vessels.
Brunei has pursued the diplomacy option with skill, joining as many international clubs as possible. It has established ties with more than 30 states, many of which have an interest in supporting the sultanate's continued independence. Japan, for example, buys substantial amounts of oil and gas from Brunei.
After independence, Brunei joined the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In September 1992 it joined the Nonaligned Movement. Its most important affiliation, however, has been with the Association of South East Asian Nations. ASEAN membership has provided a form of collective security.
The theory of collective security assumes that all states in an international organization share an interest in safeguarding each others' independence from challenge. In ASEAN, collective security among member states has been achieved without military commitments. Instead there is a working respect for national sovereignty. Such respect has become the operating premise of the group, which was set up in 1967 to provide an institutional structure for managing potential conflicts between members.
Brunei joined ASEAN at an opportune time. The group was then challenging Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia as a violation of national sovereignty. Since then, Indonesia and Malaysia, which were instrumental in forming ASEAN, have built a strong stake in its continued cohesion and viability. Any renewal of the former threat to Brunei would do irreparable damage to ASEAN, which is probably the most successful regional organization in the postcolonial world.
The end of the Cold War has served Brunei's security interests. ASEAN recently launched a major initiative to promote a multilateral security dialogue between virtually all East Asian powers, including China, Japan, Vietnam and South Korea. The United States, Canada and Russia are also involved. This initiative, known as the ASEAN Regional Forum, is intended to cope with new strategic uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific region. It will work only if it caters to the interests of the smaller states.
Brunei has external defense links with Britain, which maintains a battalion of Gurkhas in the sultanate. The future of that unit is in doubt. The agreement expires in 1998, but the year before Britain will have relinquished its hold on Hong Kong, site of the Gurkha brigade headquarters. Brunei would like the arrangement to continue, but Britain's position is equivocal.
Brunei has not opted to join the Five-Power Defense Arrangements concluded in 1971 between Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. Although a consultative pact and not a binding mutual defense treaty, that accord is used by its members to promote security cooperation, including regular military exercises. So far Brunei has deferred to Indonesian objections to its membership. Jakarta argues that defense arrangements set up to deal with a once assertive Indonesia have become an anachronism.
A more promising avenue being explored by Brunei is an agreement with the United States that would allow American forces occasional access to Brunei's port and airfield, in line with similar agreements between Washington and other ASEAN countries.
ASEAN membership is no guarantee of independence for Brunei. But it does provide a measure of assurance to one of the few postcolonial states that regarded independence as a threat, not a blessing.
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The writer, professor of inter national relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune
Originally posted by tripwire:its not in the interest of brunei to be part of FPDA.
to do so... brunei would be directly antagonizing indonesia.
furthermore... FPDA is made up of;
2 bickering neighbour, who can never agreed except that durian taste good.
1 far away "power", with no taste for durian and even less stomach to go head on against indonesia across such a vast distance.
1 no wing power with an army less then a division, but got more sheep then human....
and lets not even start with the remaining one.. who just spent money upgrading their servicewomen's breast instead of upgrading their forces.
Singapore: An important link in U.S. Navy forward presence
Sea Power, Dec 1999 by Prina, L Edgar
From the end of World War II, through the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy maintained a key base in the Philippines, one that played a major role in support of the national strategy aimed at peace and stability in the Western Pacific. But when, in 1992, the Philippine Senate rejected an agreement that would have extended the U.S. stay at the Subic Bay base, the Navy had to move out within three years.
The question then became this: Could the loss of Subic, which had contributed so much to the training and readiness of U.S. forward-deployed forces, be offset by making arrangements with other countries for access to bases within their borders? The answer, of course, has been "not entirely." Subic was special. But after the Navy terminated its presence there in 1992, the United States concluded a series of access agreements and other arrangements with its Southeast Asian friends and allies who have wanted a continued U.S. military presence in the area.
Important among these countries is Singapore, a prosperous island-nation with a population of three million-and a deep harbor. It sits astride the junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans near the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. Singapore was the site of a major British Royal Navy base for more than a century-until Imperial Japanese Army forces, led by Gen. Tomoyaki Yamashita, "the Tiger of Malaya," captured it in 1942, in the early days of the war in the Pacific. Singapore became an independent nation within the British Commonwealth in 1964. The majority of its population is ethnic Chinese.
The arrangements Washington has made with Singapore include the privilege of port calls, the use of repair facilities and training ranges, logistic support, and participation in combined naval exercises. As the U.S. Defense Department noted in its East Asian Strategy Report last year, these arrangements have become of increasing importance to the U.S. presence overseas. For example, Singapore announced in early 1998 that its Changi Naval Station, which will be operational in the year 2000, would be available to U.S. naval combatants. The station includes a pier that can accommodate U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.
When Defense Secretary William S. Cohen visited Singapore in October 1999, he and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and his deputy, Tony Tan, discussed the importance of the Changi port expansion to the U.S. naval presence in the region. Cohen visited Changi, where land is being reclaimed to push the port further out to sea. "This is a sign of the strength and scope of our security partnership," he told reporters. "The United States is grateful for Singapore's support."
Prime Minister Goh enunciated the view of most members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during his meeting with President George Bush in early 1992. He said that a substantial U.S. economic and security presence was needed to maintain a stable balance of power in the region, and that peace was the dominant factor that had permitted ASEAN states to expand their markets, especially to the United States.
The Pentagon has valued Singapore's cooperation for years. Its East Asian Strategy Report, cited above, had this to say: "Singapore has been Southeast Asia's leading advocate of a continued United States military presence. Singapore actively searches for ways to keep the United States engaged in the region, whether in multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, or by expanding U.S. military-access opportunities in Singapore itself."
According to the Report, even before the United States began negotiations with the Philippines over the Subic naval base in the early 1990s, Singapore offered to conclude an access agreement that would help disperse the U.S. presence in the region and spread the political responsibility of hosting American forces.
The 1990 Access Memorandum of Understanding has been instrumental in sustaining U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. Although fewer than 200 U.S. personnel are permanently assigned to duty in Singapore, the United States conducts a variety of naval and air training, most notably fighter-aircraft deployments that occur approximately six times a year. A naval logistics unit --Commander, Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC)that was relocated from Subic Bay assists in fleet support and coordinates bilateral naval exercises in Southeast Asia. In addition to this logistics center, which is headed by Rear Adm. Stephen R. Loeffler, the Naval Regional Contract Center and six other agencies moved from Subic to Singapore.
Copyright Navy League of the United States Dec 1999
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