Sys failure in ADF aviation ?
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other sys failure in singapore aviation:
Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 was a scheduled flight from Singapore Changi Airport to Los Angeles International Airport via Chiang Kai-Shek Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan.
On October 31, 2000, at 15:17 UTC, 23:17 Taipei local time, 9V-SPK, a Boeing 747-400, attempted to take off from the wrong runway at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport during heavy rain caused by Typhoon Xangsane. The crew attempted takeoff on runway 05R, which had been closed for repairs, instead of the assigned runway 05L (which runs parallel to 05R). Due to poor visibility in the heavy rain, the flight crew did not see that construction equipment had been parked on runway 05R. The aircraft collided with the machinery and broke up into pieces. A massive fire followed. 79 of 159 passengers and 4 of 20 crew members died in the accident.
Investigation findings
An investigation into the accident was conducted by the Taiwan Aviation Safety Council (ASC). The final report was issued by the ASC on 24 April 2002. In the report section "Findings Related to Probable Causes," which detailed factors that played a major role in the circumstances leading to the accident, it was stated that the flight crew did not review the taxi route, despite having all the relevant charts, and as a result did not know the aircraft had entered the wrong runway. Upon entering the wrong runway, the flight crew had neglected to check the paravisual display (PVD) and the primary flight display (PFD), which would have indicated that the aircraft was lined up on the wrong runway. According to the ASC, these errors, coupled with the imminent arrival of the typhoon and the poor weather conditions, caused the flight crew to lose situational awareness and led them to attempt to take off from the wrong runway. -
can u imagine that RSAF has not been consulted when a new fighter
is going to be procured?
This really happened in Australia---The Defence Management Review and the Super Hornet Decision
by Jonathan O'Donnell — last modified 2007-08-15 23:01
Austral Policy Forum 07-15A, 16 August 2007
John Faulkner(Senator John Faulkner (NSW, ALP))
----http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/the-defence-management-review-and-the-super-hornet-decision
Be patient.Read some.
The Senator put his head on chopping board
by claiming this.
The bottom line is:
Has Aussie called for any RFI or RFP for comparsions
of planes,before Aussie decide Super Hornets?...There is much we do not know about what happened at that strange meeting, but it was clearly a remarkable—possibly unique—occasion. The NSC (National Security Committee of Cabinet )decided to buy a new fighter without advice from Defence or the RAAF. I have been told by very reliable sources that neither the secretary nor CDF even knew the issue was on the agenda; let alone what the minister was going to propose.
2.Inspired by this www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australian-air-power
Just imagine their surprise when the Super Hornets were discussed, and imagine their disbelief as they witnessed the defence minister briefing the NSC with a presentation on the Super Hornets, the details of which they had not seen. It must have been demeaning for CDF and the secretary to sit through the briefing knowing full well that the minister had failed to involve or consult them.
The minister simply ignored both his principal military adviser, the CDF, and his departmental secretary responsible for a $22 billion defence budget. The minister was seeking a decision to authorize massive expenditure on the purchase of Super Hornets....
At no stage were CDF and the Secretary involved in these critical events. At no time were detailed comparative risk assessments undertaken by Defence capability staff. I believe we are entitled to expect proper and thorough assessments to be carried out when such a strategically significant purchase is made and to be assured that the Super Hornets will be able, in the words of the 2000 white paper, to:
"... control our air approaches to ensure that we can operate effectively against any hostile forces approaching Australia."
I believe that the decision-making processes on the Super Hornets bear out Ms ProustÂ’s conclusions about the dysfunctional nature of the relationship between the minister and his department and they leave little hope for the successful implementation of her recommendation on fixing the poor relationship between the two.....
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can u imagine that SAF has not been consulted when their elite commando trainer is going to be change training safety regulation and invent new dangerous training?
This really happened in Singapore---repulsive, shocking, senseless traininglawyers described the training conducted as
Be patient.Read some.
"repulsive, shocking and senseless".
The Commando trainer put his head on chopping board
by claiming this.
The bottom line is:
Has Commando called for any TSR for comparsions
of trainings,before Singgie Commando decide use dunking?4 commandos have been officially charged for the dunking death of Sgt Hu. Readers will remember that incident at Tekong where they conducted the now infamous "capture, escape and survive" course. Sgt Hu drowned while a few others escaped death but not without injury. After the public and media firestorm, Mindef vowed to make training more transparent and get to the bottom of the matter.
While this particular charging seems reminiscent of the Navy incident (Navy ship crashes into private one, 4 sergeants die, 3 on board charged), to my mind it's a totally different boat.
In the Navy incident, those in charge were on the boat and hence any mistakes made or orders passed were from the boat. Hence the accountable ones were also on the boat. IMO, there was complete accountability.
In this dunking incident, the incident occurred in a training camp, where the "tekan" sessions were routine and regimented. Yet, what do we have? 4 junior officers charged and one big shot steps down gracefully. Sure, some might argue that these 4 were rogue officers drunk with power, but it was also believed that the upper echelons were of full knowledge of the training going on under their command. Previous batches of this infamous course reported similar treatments from different officers. If such torture sessions were so regular and similar in treatment, where is the root of it? Of course no specific instructions will be written down in some training manual but one can bet that it was either a unique interpretation of vague training instructions or an informal (yet celebrated) culture passed down from batch to batch.
If either were true and even if the upper echelon didn't know what was happening on the ground, by dint of those two reasons, upper echelon is guilty of dereliction of duty and is therefore guilty and liable and must be held accountable.
To my mind, if you want to present accountability, make everyone involved accountable. To kill a hydra, cut off its head, so to speak.
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AUSTRALIAN fighter pilots will be taught to land on aircraft carriers for the first time in 25 years.
A select handful of Royal Australian Air Force instructors will be chosen for lessons on how to land on US aircraft carriers flying the new F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter.
The plan, which could eventually lead to participation in US carrier-based operations, marks the first time Australian pilots have flown off aircraft carriers since the retirement of the navy's flagship carrier HMAS Melbourne in 1982.
The carrier training underscores the rapidly evolving military partnership between the US and Australian military.
Senior US navy sources said the relationship was likely to involve an increasing convergence in training and tactics between the RAAF's fast jets and their US equivalent.
RAAF Flight Lieutenant John Haly will become the first Australian air force pilot to become carrier-qualified when he attempts his toughest flying skills test later this year.
Asked to clarify RAAF Super Hornet training, Defence Minister Brendan Nelson said yesterday: "There is no plan for RAAF pilots to undertake training in aircraft carrier landings."
The official government line contradicts briefings provided to The Australian by senior US military officials at Lemoore Naval Air Station in California that other RAAF "Top Gun" instructor pilots are expected to follow Flight Lieutenant Haly and be provided with carrier training.
Full-scale Super Hornet training for RAAF air crew starts in the US in 2009.
"We've got him (Flight Lieutenant Haly) driving on the right side of the road so we figure he's trainable," said Lemoore-based Commander Art "Kato" Delacruz, executive officer of Strike Fighter Squadron VFA-122.
The RAAF is buying 24 F/A-18F Block-2 Super Hornets for $6 billion to maintain its air combat capability between the phasing out of the ageing F-111 fleet in 2010 and the introduction of the delayed fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in 2013.
Despite criticism of the deal in Australia, US Navy aviators say the the Block-2 Super Hornet is the world's most capable multi-role combat aircraft.
Australia is acquiring a virtually identical aircraft to the one currently operated by the US Navy, with the first four aircraft scheduled for delivery in early 2010 and final delivery in late 2011.
Boeing, the manufacturer of the Super Hornet, says the Australian version will be equipped with enough technology for the aircraft to remain a formidable asset for the next 20 years.
During a briefing at the weekend, Flight Lieutenant Haly said it took only five hours' flying time for an F/A-18C pilot trained on a "Classic Hornet" to become familiar with the new Super Hornet. Acquiring the tactical skills to take advantage of the jet's massive capabilities would take considerably longer, he said.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22279837-31477,00.html
