Pretty much given since they chose the F-15SG over the other fighters and that fighter has pretty long range and armed with precision guided munitions to boot.Originally posted by datafuser:Why has the RSAF picked the G550 over other solutions such as further upgrades of existing E-2Cs?
Coupled with the purchase of heavy fighters like F-15SG, can it be interpreted that the RSAF wants to have an expeditionary capability?
Cheers,
Sunho
Dr Paul Mitchell, a visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, said in an interview with Radio Singapore that "if Singapore were to become involved in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in support of American and Korean security" Singapore "would be in a much better position to contribute in a more significant fashion to air operations" because both South Korea and Singapore would be operating almost the same F-15s.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Pretty much given since they chose the F-15SG over the other fighters and that fighter has pretty long range and armed with precision guided munitions to boot.
http://www.rsi.sg/english/newsline/view/20050823181718/1/.htmlCheers,
And as you talk about the issue of interoperability with the US forces for coalition operations, how does the North Korea proposed nuclear weapons program issue factor into the US' proposed weapons and aircraft sales?
PM: I'm not sure that there is a strict relationship between the decision to go with the F-15 variant here. However, it does bear some interesting examples. In particular, the Koreans are operating a variant of the F-15 or will be operating a variant of the F-15 in the future. And obviously, if Singapore were to become involved in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in support of American and Korean security, then it would be in a much better position to contribute in a more significant fashion to air operations.
OK, then is there any thesis from the IDSS or other schools and public speech by ministers? I would be grateful to have it.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:I am afraid not. SAF has always been pretty quiet on its intentions and its motivations.
The closest thing I can think of is a book by Tim Huxley titled "Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore".Originally posted by datafuser:OK, then is there any thesis from the IDSS or other schools and public speech by ministers? I would be grateful to have it.
Cheers,
Sunho
The closest theory I can shed light on this, is the China Threat theory.Originally posted by datafuser:OK, then is there any thesis from the IDSS or other schools and public speech by ministers? I would be grateful to have it.
Cheers,
Sunho
It is interesting that Dr Mitchell would postulate Singaporean involvement in the Korean Peninsula.Originally posted by datafuser:OK, then is there any thesis from the IDSS or other schools and public speech by ministers? I would be grateful to have it.
Cheers,
Sunho
x2. However, when an analyst says these things, there must have been some event or issue that would have triggered something for him to come out with something as ludicrous as this... though...Originally posted by Shotgun:Is Dr Mitchell high on something?
We selected the Strike Eagle no doubt considering the interoperability advantages with US FORCEs, not South Korean Forces.
There is hardly any basis to suggest that variant similarities represent our interest to link up with South Korean forces in the event of war in THAT peninsular. Several other countries operate F-15 variants. The Saudis, Israelis, Japanese. Do we have interest to provide military assistance to all of them as well?
The reason we took the F-15SG, IMO is that the only other twin engined US Aircraft in the selection process severely "incapable" against our requirements.
It is quite possible that China may one day choose to leave North Korea to the dogs...Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Sending our forces to Korea is entirely possible, but there are other strategic considerations. A war with Korea is surely to involve China in some ways and I don't think it is a good idea to antagonise China. And, furthermore, I don't think the US even needs our help.
Oh, well. I should have mentioned the USAF's F-15Es as well.Originally posted by Shotgun:Is Dr Mitchell high on something?
We selected the Strike Eagle no doubt considering the interoperability advantages with US FORCEs, not South Korean Forces.
There is hardly any basis to suggest that variant similarities represent our interest to link up with South Korean forces in the event of war in THAT peninsular. Several other countries operate F-15 variants. The Saudis, Israelis, Japanese. Do we have interest to provide military assistance to all of them as well?
The reason we took the F-15SG, IMO is that the only other twin engined US Aircraft in the selection process severely "incapable" against our requirements.
Well, considering that Singapore has sent Endurance-class LSTs to patrol the Gulf and KC-135R tankers to Iraq, the US would be glad to see as many friendly countries as possible to join.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Sending our forces to Korea is entirely possible, but there are other strategic considerations. A war with Korea is surely to involve China in some ways and I don't think it is a good idea to antagonise China. And, furthermore, I don't think the US even needs our help.
253. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/Cheers,
Washington, January 20, 1966.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 8. Secret; Noforn.
SUBJECT
UK East of Suez Proposals
Attached is a memorandum for the record/2/ on the purported British position for the talks which will be held next week.
/2/Not found.
1. The British apparently have in mind three new elements in their relation to the Far East: (a) increased de facto interdependence East of Suez, through intensified staff talks and other consultations; (b) a formal linkage of the UK to the Far East via ANZUS; and (c) assignment to Asia of the British Polaris submarines.
2. I find no objection to their first proposal; but I feel strong reservations on the other two proposals for the reasons stated below.
3. Underlying UK Objectives. The British propose to have us pay a high price for what they intend, in any case, to do; that is, to shift from Singapore in a few years and then cut down their Far East presence to an Australian air-naval base. The price they seek from us consists in: as firm an institutionalized grip as they can manage on U.S. policy in the Far East; U.S. financial assistance; and the right to continue to maintain their national nuclear deterrent.
4. U.S. Interests. It is our interest to maintain the UK presence in the Far East during the Viet Nam war--both in Singapore and in Malaysia. Over the longer term it is our interest to work out a viable basis for containing Communist China based on the systemic mobilization of Asian and European as well as U.S. resources. Our agreement to the British second and third proposals is not required to effect our primary short-run interest; that is, to keep the UK in the Far East in the short run. They are locked into the Far East by their confrontation in Malaysia. After that confrontation ends, they will cut down their forces irrespective of what we do. There is no political basis in the UK for keeping 45,000 ground troops East of Suez except in defense of Malaysia.
5. The British proposals run counter to our long-run interests in the Far East.
a. If we become too formally involved with the UK via a treaty structure or assignment to the UK Polaris submarines of important Chinese Communist targets, we will be moving towards something close to a British veto over our China policy. It is highly unlikely that domestic politics will allow any government in London to go to war against mainland China; and we could count on the UK influence consistently to make difficult any firm stand vis-a-vis mainland China.
b. The British joining ANZUS would create a white man's club in Asia. It would antagonize not merely the Indonesian military but other Asians as well and make more difficult our long-run task of building an effective security grouping in Asia for the containment of China.
c. Acceptance of the British proposal would turn the British away from Europe and turn the continental Europeans away from the UK. An Anglo-Saxon Asian defense club, built on what appeared to be a special London-Washington relation, would discourage rather than encourage other Europeans to move towards responsibility in Asia. It would also complicate eventual UK entry into Europe and deny the British and ourselves the correct strategy of having British entry into Europe serve as a way of leading Europe as a whole to assume increased responsibilities East of Suez and on the world scene.
6. In these three ways acceptance of the British proposals would make our tasks of containing Communist China more rather than less difficult.
7. Conclusion. I conclude, therefore, that, in dealing with the British proposals, we must distinguish sharply between the short-run and long-run problems we face in Asia. We should be forthcoming on short-term steps to help the UK stay East of Suez by financial assistance, staff talks, etc. On the other hand, we should not allow the British to exploit our short-term concerns in ways which would mortgage our long-term prospects for effective U.S., Asian, and European action East of Suez.
Walt
Thanks for the recommendation.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:The closest thing I can think of is a book by Tim Huxley titled "Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore".
Perhaps, but not before they ensure that the S.Korean Govt is decidedly pro-China.Originally posted by LazerLordz:It is quite possible that China may one day choose to leave North Korea to the dogs...
I had the 1st print of this book when it was released....but I'm waiting for the revised version...Originally posted by datafuser:....I already bought this book at Kinokuniya back in 2002. Has there not been anything new?
Cheers,
Sunho
I fully agree with you that Singapore ordered F-15SGs partly for interoperability with US Forces, not South Korean or, for that matter, Saudi Arabian forces.Originally posted by Shotgun:What I am saying is, we are looking for interoperability with US Forces. So are countries like South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Japan etc etc. Interoperability doesnt just benefit countries like us, but the Americans as well when it comes to responding various regional crises.
Singapore's participation in the Gulf was part of a multi-national peace keeping effort. Not direct participation in combat efforts in Iraq.
What Dr Mitchell is proposing, that we operate F-15 variants in order to maintain interoperability with South Korea, is inaccurate. I'm not saying that Singapore has no interests to see a free and independent South Korea, nor that we don't give a hoot about them. Just that I don't see any reason to commit combat forces to Korea when they are needed in Singapore.
Like what another forum user said, unless China hangs North Korea out to dry, a Korean peninsular conflict is not likely to be contained within North East Asia. We will need to protect crucial passageways in our region to safeguard possible Chinese movements down south.