These only work when you are trying to hide something that does not move, not when you are driving a Twardie down south, all the IR and radar hiding technology in the world is not going to help.Originally posted by tankfanatic:i dont think so... see the achievement of israeli detection satelit and uav. MAF also have implement radar absorbing and thermal evading paint on their equipment. Added to that i ve seen most of their equipment have that radar absorbing net. They really go to great length to hide their equipment, i tell you.
Well having MBTs around help a lot in FIBUA, ask any grunt who had armour support.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:Well yes, of course. But the entire war will get bogged down to an urban warfare scenario, and we don't quite have the armour to deal with that just yet unless the SAF does turn the Leopard 2s we will get into urban warfare models, which is quite likely since MBTs of that size are restricted to largely open land.
In an urban warfare scenario, I would be hesitant to charge in even if we have the numbers as things could turn into Pyrrhic victories if we don't watch it. No sense wasting an army, winning a battle and loosing the war at the same time. Just looking at the Israeli performance is enough to give any reasonably competent commander some pause.
Surely we have counter battery fire that could neutralise arty fire? Do the Malaysians have that sort of thing at the moment? We could also look into UAVs which I would dare say be very useful for such a scenario.
The trouble with the Iraqi example was that the enemy in question just crumbled away only to return later. As such, the insurgency battles were a cumulation of many mistakes.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Well having MBTs around help a lot in FIBUA, ask any grunt who had armour support.
Is the Israeli performance typical of the IDF usually fights? Note the recent conflict was fought with very restrictive goals and tatics. If the IDF truly decided to go all out back then, things would certianly be very different.
A better example to draw from would be the Yanks when they did their thunder runs during the capture of Bagdad. They barely managed to pull it off given they were outrunning their supply lines, outnumbered over 10 to 1, and what have you not but I think it goes a long way to prove what you can do if you take the movement of the battle from the enemy and outthink him.
While the Iraqis actually had more then sufficent firepower to defend Bagdad, the American network centric attack was able to outwit and outfight their defences by keeping several steps ahead of the defenders at all times. Resulting in confusion and chaos in the enemy lines.
Of course SAF aims are far more modest and I don't think we'll fight outnumbered 10 to 1 but the basic premise is quite clear- to fight a static war would be quite silly for us.
Could we really afford to fight a static arty counterbattery war? The MAF will be very willing to trade some arty pieces for cutting off our shipping routes and wrecking havoc on our vital areas.
The Americans faced lots of problems in their Thunder Runs. A lot of lead elements were cut off, ambushed and some even fought til their ammunition were almost depleted. Not a good situation to be in, network centric or not.Aye not denying the issues the Yanks faced with their Thunder Runs; in fact I even mentioned it in my post.
It takes nerves of steel to fight outgunned, even in a network centric battlefield. While the technology and doctrine may be up to it, are the nerves of the soldiers capable of taking it?
The trouble with the Iraqi example was that the enemy in question just crumbled away only to return later. As such, the insurgency battles were a cumulation of many mistakes.I think a lot of the mistakes, political and the like, made during the post-invasion handing of Iraq by the Yanks had a lot to do with why the insurgency managed to happen. But thatÂ’s really something beyond the grunts.
If the M'sians defend Johor a la Hezbollah, it is going to be certainly a very shot war.
Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:If the Malaysians play FIBUA on us, how do you think we will perform? Something that hasn't been mentioned much here is how capable are we against our own tactics? Is the SAF willing to level the whole of Johore just to get rid of snipers, Anti-tank missile squads that hide in every corner of Johor? Even if we stick to the Highway, we are simply avoiding the battlefield and not taking our objectives. Moreover it's all fine and dandy to level an entire city, but it is another matter of quelling the population. We can take Johor but can we hold it?
And why keep drawing on Hezbollah as a proper defense plan? Their apparent resistance to IDF attack comes more from the fact that their opponents were fighting with one hand tied behind their backs completely out of the style that they were best at fighting. Had the IDF [b]really fought, thereÂ’s no doubt the outcome is going to be a quite different.
If the SAF really puts its chips down on the table, it certainly isnÂ’t going to be (I hope) anything like what the IDF did in 2006, which was a mess of restrictive policies, underestimation of the enemy, and no clear victory conditions.
And of course thereÂ’s the other side of the story, despite all their propaganda on how they were inflicting serious losses on the IDF and not taking any while the IDF were missing anything of tatical value and hitting civilians, the truth of the matter is that Hezbollah was actually taking a serious pounding, so much so that the entire thing was actually a massive military defeat, but a propaganda and media victor.
The loose accounting standards and organization of Hezbollah naturally allows them to cover up their losses and be creative about them, but the fact remains as a military threat following the events of 2006 they has been badly affected by their losses.
So I donÂ’t think the MAF is actually going to try to defend Johor ala. Hezbollah, for Hezbollah, beyond showing media savvy and playing on the IDF underestimating their capabilitiesÂ… is not really a model on how to defend stuff. And of course the SAF isnÂ’t exactly going to fight like the IDF did in 2006 as well.
So no, I donÂ’t think it will be a short war. Unless our commanders are so incompetent to have totally no strategic momentum in attacking Johor at all, any battle fought there will likely be of the conventional kind decided more by conventional strategies and tactics then restrictive and ambiguous politics.
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Malaysia always the bogeyman, sure or not?Originally posted by ferryman2393:Angkatan Tentera Malaysia.
always the bogeyman....
the TNI & ATM have proven that they managed to caught the SAF with her pants down before.
have the SAF done likewise?
In the most desperate of times when war is near and real, and most richs and politicals have already escaped the country, do u still believe in Singapore? Or would u pack and go?i like this question. happened before in MY a few years back when DrM chucked his No 2 into gaol. fear of internal strife leads many rich people into extended holiday together with their family and together with their money.
TNI and ATM caught SAF pants down, got meh? share leh...when and how?independence day...
and how is that?Originally posted by ferryman2393:independence day...
Army is organised into 4 area commands (divisions) numbering 1 to 4. Each division is commanded by a jeneral or mejar jeneral (Maj-Gen). 1st division is based in East Malaysia. The rest are in Peninsular or West Malaysia.which forum?
Each division comprises 3 brigades. Brigades number 1 to 12. Each brigade is commanded by a brig-jeneral (Brig-Gen). My understanding of allocation is as follows:
1st Division = 3, 5 and 9 Inf Bde
2nd Division = 2, 6 and 8 Inf Bde
3rd Division = 1 and 7 Inf Bde, 4 Mech Bde
4th Division = 11 and 12 Inf Bde, 10 Para Bde
Each brigade has a complement of approx 4,500 men.
Each Brigade normally comprises 3 regiments. Each regiment is normally commanded by a Kolonel or Lt Kol. Regiments are generally of 2 types, Regimen Ranger Diraja (or Royal Ranger Regiment) and Regimen Askar Melayu Diraja (or Royal Malay Regiment). Abbreviations are normally RRR and RAMD. Each Regimen are battalion sized formations and normally designated as Malbatt (or Malaysian battalion) in UN operations.
RRR number 1 to 10. RAMD number 1 to 25.
4 Mech Bde comprises 7 RRR, 12 and 19 RAMD all of which are mechanised.
10 Para Bde comprises 8 RRR, 9 and 17 RAMD all of which are para formations.
There are also 3 groups (regiment-sized) of special forces. These number 11, 21 and 22. Groups are known as Grup Gerak Khas (or Special Forces groups). I think there is also a Pasukan Khas Laut (Abbr: Paskal) which is a special naval force. There is also a Regimen TUDM under the air force.
There are 5 Armor regiments belonging to the Korp Armor Diraja or Royal Armour Corp. Regiment numbers 1 to 4 and 11. 1 KAD is assigned to 4 Mech Bde. A separate squadron 1 (subset of regimen) comprising Scorpion ACV is assigned to 10 Para Bde.
There are also 16 Artillery regiments. Regimens are known as regimen artillery diraja or Royal Artillery regiments. Each regiment is believed have 3 Batteries. Assumed to be split between 2 Med Arty, 7 Fld Arty, 1 MRL, 4 AD, 1 Arty loc and 1 UAV. Identified numbers include 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 22, 31, 32, 34 and 51. 51 RAD is assigned the Astros MRL and is also believed to be assigned to 3 Div at Gemas. The 155mm G5 is believed to be assigned to 21 and 22 RAD. 31 RAD is believed to be assigned the Banshee 400 UAV. 34 RAD is believed to be assigned the Jernas.
Reserves are known as Regimen Askar Wataniah (or Territorial Army regiments). These are segregated into 300 and 500 series regimens. 500 series regimen number 501 to 516. There is normally 1 per state except for Sarawak and Sabah which have 2. Series 300 numbers start from 301. There was supposed to be some reorg of AW regiments.
The army is supported by several other corps such as the signal corp and has an army air wing (A109H and Mi17s).
Principal equipment are as follows:
ACV: 48 PT91M (w 28 tank transporters), 26 Scorpions, 186 Sibmas, 140 AML60/90s and 92 Ferrets.
APC/MICV (incl non-combat variants): 111 KIFV, 211 Adnan, 184 V100/150, 25 Stormer, 452 Condor, 37 M3
Arty (non-AA): 130-200 105mm Model 56, 12 FH70s, 28 G5 Mk 3, 18 Astros and 81mm mortars. 18 L119s 105mm (not confirmed)
ATGW: Eryx, Baktar Shikens, Metis-M RPG7s, Carl Gustav and RCL. Some sources include AT-7 Saxhorn and Milan 2T.
SAM: Jernas/Starburst/Rapier, Anza Mk II, SA-18 Igla (one source puts it as SA-16 but unlikely).
(i) Edited to delete "Royal" from Malaysian Army. - 17 Aug 06
(ii) Deleted "I think 4 RAMD is also a Gurkha regiment." - 17 Aug 06
(iii) Added "Each regiment is normally commanded by a Kolonel or Lt Kol." - 17 Aug 06
Who said that FIBUA was ever going to be easy? In the end when you got to do it you got to do it even if it's ala Fallujah. This is the reality of urban combat.Originally posted by Fingolfin_Noldor:If the Malaysians play FIBUA on us, how do you think we will perform? Something that hasn't been mentioned much here is how capable are we against our own tactics? Is the SAF willing to level the whole of Johore just to get rid of snipers, Anti-tank missile squads that hide in every corner of Johor? Even if we stick to the Highway, we are simply avoiding the battlefield and not taking our objectives. Moreover it's all fine and dandy to level an entire city, but it is another matter of quelling the population. We can take Johor but can we hold it?
Isn't that the point of having a stronger navy and airforce? After all, our trade comes largely by sea, and it is up to the navy and airforce to maintain the lines of communication and resupply.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:Who said that FIBUA was ever going to be easy? In the end when you got to do it you got to do it even if it's ala Fallujah. This is the reality of urban combat.
However once again the alternative is to sit and wait around to be pounded with impunity in all our areas by enemy arty and trying to solve the problem with counterbattery and PGMs.
Let's not forget that even if they can't directly invade they can also isolate or blockade. They can tahan a few months of economic downturn but the effects as always, are far worse for us. It would be madness to fight a static war, or even think that the poisoned shrimp strategy is a viable one anymore. All it takes is an agressor willing to tahan the poision.
After all in a static defence, we will always be taking far more damage in a far smaller area then their opponent, that bit is blatantly obvious.
Do you think that all this investment in Bxs and Leo2s, network centric warfare and UAVs are so simply we can drive around a little red dot? I think not.
But we loose the war? Johor is large enough to encompass most of the SAF if we deploy 3 divisions for the job. If it turns into our Stalingrad, well, we might as well start working on turning our country into THEIR Stalingrad.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:The problem is this: While we have a stronger air force and navy are they enough to achieve air and sea supremacy or just superiority? Maybe I can say that in the air there is a decided superiority, but at sea? I think while we are ahead, itÂ’s hard to say we are REALLY ahead.
Note that they donÂ’t have to directly engage you to disrupt your operations. All they need to do is to take the battle far out onto their own turf by extending the blockade higher up the shipping routes where our navies. Our ships will be forced to operate higher up if they intend to break the blockade.
Of course thereÂ’s also the issue of Indonesia not playing us out and deciding to mess around with the shipping routes at this time as wellÂ… not to mention it is unlikely trade will come in if a country is under bombardment.
And of course, there is the issue of our airforce being able to operate if they are constantly under the arty range of MAF guns and rockets. Can we really work if thereÂ’s a constant threat of shells landing in the CBD?
As the Israeli experience shows, unless you can take the physical land where the launchers come from, all the PGMs are unable to destroy all the rockets and stuff your enemy has to throw at you. And the thing is, MAF arty is going to be a lot more efficient and effective then the rockets the militants in the Middle East uses. IÂ’m not comfortable with merely trying to plink them from far and hope they donÂ’t come back. We need to actually seize the land they come from, or at least give them something let vital to shoot at (like the SAF).
The way I see it, in a limited war scenario, our economy is going to crash anyway and we are fighting it on the terms of the opponent might as well do something decisive about it and take the fight to them.
Hence I'm for ala Fallujah... if they Fallujah us we are also pretty messed up... might as well do the killing and mess on the other side of the causeway.
Sorry, you have to write so much only for me to tell you that you have misread my post.Originally posted by SingaporeTyrannosaur:The question is: Is there any other alternative if war really breaks out?
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So I have to disagree, if we are at war the best option would be to take the offensive, instead of letting them come to us. Letting them come to us would be a suicidal option given we have virtually no strategic depth.
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