nice read on SAF... found by accident.
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what i have below is copied from someones blog... rather nice reading...
http://singaporeangle.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_singaporeangle_archive.html
Sunday, February 27, 2005
Operation Flying Eagle (Part 3)
posted by HUICHIEH LOY at 1:36 PM
The third and final part to ST's "Operation Flying Eagle: The inside story of the SAF's tsunami relief deployment" is out, entitled, "Mission accomplished...and what the operation really accomplished" (Feb 27), by Felix Soh. (My posts on Parts 1 and 2 previously). Once again, skipping most of the previously known stuff, there remains some points worth highlighting.
The first part of the article brings us up to speed: the return to relative normalcy in Meulaboh--one sign being the coming of increased traffic, and even traffic jams. Three weeks after Operation Flying Eagle began, the SAF began its phasing out, handing over the reconstruction work to the NGOs. Next come some assessments.
First, the article points out though the SAF's contributions are easily dwarved by what the US military brought to the relief effort (but by no means completely puny, I would add), "the early timing of the Singapore assistance made a big difference"--
The timely arrival of SAF relief assistance was critical as the people in Meulaboh were running low on water, food and medicine. The SAF contingent was the first to reach the town.
But there's more:
It was not just a 'numbers and size' game. It was having the right calibre of men and employing the right kind of equipment, for example, the much-in-demand heavy-lift Chinooks, to deliver relief where the help was most critically needed, which made Singapore's effort effective and impactful.
This point was acknowledged by the Americans themselves. As the New York Times magazine said: 'Consider the example of Singapore, a tiny country with a small but professional military.
'While the little (American) Seahawks flying off the deck of the Abraham Lincoln carried modest loads, six giant Chinooks, provided by the Singapore Armed Forces with little fanfare, did a good deal of the heavy lifting.'
In a way it's slighly unfair to the Americans--obviously they deployed as quickly as they could with what they've got--and it's not their fault that they did not have many Chinooks in this part of the world. But they did have many other helicopters flying from the Carriers and other Navy vessels. Still, it is fortunate that Singapore does have the right equipment, and in a place where they could be of maximum effectiveness. But to continue, the article goes on to ask the important question. No, no, not exactly this one: -
So, what were the ingredients that made Operation Flying Eagle a success?
But this one:
What was the SAF's 'takeaway' from the operation? What was the learning it acquired from the mission?
It's not that the first question is not worth asking, or the Operation Flying was not a success--it surely was. The answers to that question has always been clear. I am a little disappointed, however, with the article; because I think while it answered the first question amply, I see less by way of an answer to the second set of questions. But perhaps I should not be--the really interesting stuff will predictably also be the classified stuff. In general, it will be the happy stuff that makes the press...
In any case, the article identifies three broad points in explaining Op. Flying Eagle's success: First, the close institutional and personal relationship between the SAF and TNI. Second, the cultural sensitivity of the SAF personnel to the Indonesians and their way of life. Third, the quality of SAF's men, doctrines and equipment. (All have appear in one form or other on this blog before.) For the first--the close ties between the SAF and TNI, the following example tells whole volumes:
IN THE possession of the Republic of Singapore Navy is a special sea chart of the Meulaboh area in western Sumatra. It is special because it is hand-traced. The manually drawn chart, which was critical for navigation in the unfamiliar waters of Meulaboh, is a reflection of the close relationship developed over the years between the SAF and the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI).
RSS Endurance commanding officer Lt-Col Li said: 'We had no suitable chart of the correct scale. Through our relationship with the TNI-AL (navy), we managed to obtain a chart of Meulaboh waters and this greatly helped in keeping the ship safe.'
When the second LST, RSS Persistence, arrived, he asked the Indonesian navy whether they had another chart to spare. There was none. 'Instead, the admiral's staff manually traced a copy of the chart for us,' he said.
Apart from the hard work that someone in the TNI-AL had to go through to get the chart hand traced, what is much more telling is the Indonesian's willingness to trust the SAF with a chart of this nature. This willingness--in my opinion--cannot be simply attributed to the fact that,
from their frequent interaction in bilateral meetings and visits. SAF commanders were familiar with the key Indonesian military personnel running the emergency relief work in Aceh.
I'm sure that paved the way somewhat; but at the end of the day, Indonesia does not fear Singapore. They do not feel threatened by the SAF, even though they probably recognize the SAF's technological superiority and so on, and even though as neighboring countries, we may irritate them at times. This underlying factor cannot be overlooked. It also suggests that the same level of trust may not be forthcoming if it had been another neighbor we were dealing with (I'll leave it at that). Needless to say, the sensitivity and sincerity displayed by the SAF helped
...the TNI officers were comfortable with the presence of the SAF officers. They were also impressed with the SAF's low profile and the sincerity of its assistance. An Indonesian intelligence source said: 'When SAF soldiers stepped on Indonesian soil, we never had a doubt that they were genuine and sincere in wanting to help.'
The Singaporeans never took the Indonesians for granted. Meulaboh task force commander Colonel Tan Chuan Jin commented: 'Every day, we re-calibrated our interaction with the Indonesian authorities and people. We were mindful of treating people with respect and dignity.'
For instance, it would make a dramatic media photo opportunity to have survivors running after food and bottled water thrown from a helicopter. But the SAF did not do this as it could be dangerous for people on the ground. -
But my point is that all this cannot be detached from the fundamental reality. It is not that the SAF personnel are not sincere or genuinely considerate about Indonesian sensitivities; but that the perceptions have been helped along by ever present reality of the sheer unbalance between Singapore and Indonesia. The best intentions and sensitivity that a US marine, say, can have and display, however, would not have counted as much.
In any case, let's hope that the goodwill generated by the SAF personnel did not die with the end of Op. Flying Eagle:
The Indonesians are appreciative of Singapore's contributions and intentions. Political observer Muchyar Yara told The Sunday Times: 'It was not just the machinery and technology that the SAF brought with them to Aceh. It was their men in the frontline. 'They had cultural acumen. They spoke the language and knew how to relate to the Acehnese, which some of the other foreign troops found a lot harder.' He added: 'There is a perception in some pockets in Indonesia that Singapore is a rich state that looks after only its own interests. But the crisis in Aceh showed that it was no fair-weather friend of Indonesia's.'
On the third point--the quaility of the SAF, men, machine, doctrine, it's almost as if ST has gotten wind of Singapore Ink's charge at the "lack of jointness", as the article went out of its way to paint up jointness between the services:
Teamwork was certainly a key factor. It was a joint operation involving all the services - land, sea and air. While some foreign armed forces are riven with unproductive rivalry and petty jealousies among their services, the SAF is a paragon of so-called 'jointness'.
Mr Teo said: 'Regulars, NSmen, operationally ready NSmen and volunteers were all involved and were able to work as a team. This shows the close integration between army, navy and air force. The relief efforts required combined capabilities.' -
Well, let's be honest here. Inter-service rivalry is not as big a deal in the SAF mostly because--everything else aside--it is a very young military we are talking about here. The services never had the long traditions and histories that tend to generate special loyalties within each service, and therewith, inter-service rivalry. Furthermore, the SAF had the advantage of being started from scratch with the help of the very best--the Israelis; as opposed having evolved over decades and centuries from pre-modern precusors complete with stashes of captured colors from some bygone age. In fact, the Israelis themselves said that they managed to with the SAF even things they had wanted to, but somehow failed to do back home:
In discussions conducted by the chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, with the participation of the deputy chief of staff and head of the Operations Branch, Ezer Weizmann, it was decided to make Major General Rehavam Ze'evi, who was then deputy head of the Operations Branch, responsible for building the Singaporean army. Ze'evi (nicknamed "Gandhi" ) paid a secret visit to Singapore and the preparatory work began on his return. "Gandhi said he wanted to create an ideal army for Singapore, something we hadn't built here," Carmel says. "Instead of setting up a Defense Ministry and a General Staff, Gandhi suggested an integrated organization, a more economical structure. So there wouldn't be too many generals and too few soldiers." (from here)
Incidentally, the youth of the SAF is a big reason why it can undertake such rapid transformations to becoming a "3G" armed forces--there just isn't as much hidebound tradition to overcome. But back to jointness--while I think the baseline conditions advantage the SAF as far as the integration of the services is concerned, how that intergration actually translates into an effectively joint armed forces in operations is another matter altogether. All indications are that the SAF aquitted itself favorably in Op Flying Eagle, but I'm sure there's lots more that can be done.
I've already touched on SAF personnel "thinking out of the box" in my posts on the first two installments, but Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean mentioned it this time as well:
"We do have a versatile set of capabilities and were able to assemble them together for the mission. Our people are professional and are trained in a flexible way when faced with circumstances never experienced before. They found the best way, for example, to get ashore, to bring equipment in, to fly helicopters to places unknown, to locate places to land. The field engineers had to find sea landing sites as well as clear and create new landing sites for heavy helicopters. These required a lot of flexibility and sound initiative."
He will go on to say that Op Flying Eagle showed the operational readiness of the SAF, and vindicated its arduous, intensive training tempo and regime. Many units had experience in deploying overseas for exercises, which helped. And the commanders exhibited good leadership and initiative:
[Said BG Goh Kee Nguan, contingent HQ commander] "In an operation that's so spread out and the situation on the ground so dynamic, we must have commanders who can work on their own."
And there's even a PR pay off as well:
The success of Singapore's biggest-ever tsunami deployment has boosted the public's confidence in the SAF more than any of its testosterone-packed advertisements in the media...
[CDF LTG Ng Yat Chung said:] "The operation has improved the confidence of Singaporeans in the SAF and their pride in the SAF. It is an eye-opener for Singaporeans of what the SAF could do after years of training and systematic development of our capability."...
In turn, the mission has boosted the confidence of the SAF's rank-and-file in their organisation. For them, the success of the mission is a ringing endorsement of the SAF's direction, policies and equipment. In other words, the 'system' works.
Hopefully; and again, no reason to rest on one's laurels here. The transformation of the SAF into a 3G force is still ongoing. In mounting Operation Flying Eagle, the SAF not only helped a friend in need, it seized a golden opportuntiy to put its men, machines, doctrine, and much else to the test. Let's hope that the lessons learned--the real lessons, the ones that are classified--will go a long way in making SAF better and more effective in defending Singapore in the years to come.
UPDATE: Singapore Ink's comments on the article are out (Lzydata beat me to it again). As expected, the jointness thing came up:
Heh, it's funny that two weeks ago it was this very "jointness" in the SAF I questioned...While there may not be much “unproductive rivalry and petty jealousies" among our services, if one simply remembers the first part of this series of reports, it’s clear that SAF is not yet a "paragon of… 'jointness'."
He also takes issue with the article's citation of Eliot Cohen (which I didn't bother with, since I've not read that book before), but you can read the Singapore Ink post for yourself. -
here is part one... i read it.. nice too... well written.
http://singaporeangle.blogspot.com/2005/02/operation-flying-eagle-part-1.html
Sunday, February 13, 2005
Operation Flying Eagle (Part 1)
posted by HUICHIEH LOY at 12:01 PM
Today, the Straits Times put out the first of a three part series: "Operation Flying Eagle--The inside story of the SAF's tsunami relief deployment" (ST, Feb 13). Most of the big-picture details have already appeared in one form or other on this blog (see this, scroll down to "SAF General" and "Indonesia"). Some highlights of details not previously known (or not well known until now).
On the non-too-well-publicized efforts of the Indonesians themselves--
'Often, it was the tendency of the foreign media to focus on what the foreign forces and agencies did, but the Indonesians themselves played a great role,' said Mr Teo [Chee Hean]. 'They did a lot on the ground themselves with whatever they had to rescue the injured. The administration in the affected areas was completely devastated. Many officials and TNI personnel were killed or lost their homes. The infrastructure from which they operated was also destroyed.'
He pointed out that the Indonesians did ad hoc relief work even before the foreign agencies arrived. The Singaporeans observed that, although exhausted, grief-stricken and working under appalling conditions, Indonesian soldiers and civilian volunteers continued to work tirelessly to clear debris and remove bodies...
Noted Mr Teo: 'There is a strong spirit amongst the Indonesian people, a good number of them leaders and commanders. It was during times like these that leadership on the ground made a difference.'
I've posted on the sheer speed of the deployment earlier (e.g., here)--the LST set off within 72 hours from "cold start"--an amazing feat by any standard. More details are available now. It should be kept in mind that of the 470 on board the RSN Endurance, the overwhemling majority are professionals (63 NSF and 2 NSmen; see here)--
Late on Tuesday, Dec 28, a planning team was tasked with getting the Endurance ready with a complement of medical people, field engineers, divers, helicopter detachment and support personnel. The humanitarian assistance support group estimated that it needed 48 hours to deploy with 470 people from many different units in the SAF, including the ship's crew of 70. This was the first time that the Endurance would carry so many people on board.
The SAF planning teams were working flat out, 24 hours a day. They realised the urgency of the situation as they started activating personnel to assemble the task force. One soldier was mobilised with only two hours' notice. Some pilots had 45 minutes' notice. The better cases had 72 hours while the average recall time was 24 hours. The SAF did a good job bringing together disparate units at such short notice.
Said Colonel Tan Chuan Jin, the Sandhurst-trained brigade commander of HQ 7th Singapore Infantry Brigade who was the commander for the Meulaboh mission: 'We began pulling in forces that have never trained together before. Many have never even been on board a ship.' -
Unlike Singapore Ink, I'm not all that surprise at the supposed "lack of jointness" exhibited (people not having trained together). Training for rapid deployment on LSTs overseas is still comparatively new to us, and besides, what kind of message would our neighbors be getting if we are always practicing for that.
In any case, this is hardly the usual combat deployment. But that said, there is certainly much that the SAF could work on, and I'm sure Operation Flying Eagle gave it the golden opportunity to evaluate existing equipment, methods, prodecures, etc, in ways that more set piece exercises would not be able to. All in all, the men and women of the SAF are to be commended for pulling it off:
THERE was no manual, no text book, no standard operating procedures and no precedent to fall back on. It was a 'live' mission, yet there was no rehearsal, which was de rigueur even for SAF exercises. The reality hit home for many of the men: They were going in cold.
Ironically, this may be the best kind of preparation for combat deployment. The Israelis, I was once told, plan to the utmost detail before any military exercise. But once the exercise starts, all the plans are destroyed and every one has to improvise on short notice. Some of that spirit may have rubbed off:
The Ministry of Defence came out with broad directions and the planning team brainstormed on first principles to develop a plan in which the situation was ever evolving...It was a feat that a blueprint was firmed up within 72 hours for a task force that was pulled in at short notice from various parts of the SAF. 'We were confident of the SAF training system but to see the men adapting existing systems to realise what we were not familiar with was remarkable,' commented Col Tan. This, in fact, is the SAF style...Commented CDF Lt-Gen Ng: 'The principle of concurrent activity is part and parcel of the SAF's way of doing things. We can give units 24 to 48 hours' notice and they would be ready to go.'
Here's a bit that may be a little shocking to any one seeing it for the first time:
One challenge was the lack of information on the area they would be operating in. Personnel were sent out to buy tourist maps. Others trawled the Internet for information.
Actually, it's even more complicated than that. First, the sea charts were not completely useful as the earthquake changed the shorelines significantly (see e.g., this). Secondly, what is the SAF doing with detailed maps of this piece of Indonesian real estate? If it has those maps, I'm sure it would not be publicizing that fact or passing them around the men indiscriminately.
One thing that really struck me about the (professional) SAF personnel--they embodied the very "initiative" and "thinking out of the box" that our education system tries so hard to cultivate (with debatable success). -
The section entitled "Sense of purpose" contains many human interest bits, which I will not attempt to summarize or quote here except for this bit:
The food for the first week was good. It included fresh, leafy vegetables like kai lan, fresh meat and fruit such as bananas. After supplies of these ran out, processed meat became the order of the day. The soldiers commented they hadn't eaten so many fish fingers in their life.
When the fresh food ran out, the menu was rice, baked beans, chicken platter and fish fingers. For breakfast, there was bread with kaya or peanut butter. Once every three days, the men had combat rations, supplemented with a hot meal.
Later, when a second LST arrived off Meulaboh, there were non-leafy veggies with lots and lots of broccoli, carrots, radishes and potatoes. They were cooked in all imaginable permutations - stir-fried, boiled, as soup, etc. Due to the broccoli 'overdose', some of those on board swore off the green after the mission.
This is funny to me because for about 2 years in the States, I survived mostly on carrots, broccoli and potatoes for the fresh vegetable part of my diet, because they last the longest without spoiling--a real consideration when you are staying alone and cooking for yourself. Fortunately, after my wife joined me, thing change. But the chefs on the Endurance deserves a round of applause for their work:
The Endurance chefs became among the most overworked people on board. There were only 10 of them working in two shifts, cooking for 470 people, using a galley designed to fit in only 200. Simple food like fried rice had to be cooked in batches and took 10 times the amount of time needed to prepare such meals.
Needless to say, you should read the whole thing for yourself.
One more thing: the very notion of the SAF as an expeditionary force is still very new. While I'll hazard a guess that there are contingency plans for action deep into a certain neighboring country to the north--in a doomsday scenario (e.g., see Tim Huxley's Defending The Lion City), it is much less clear that the SAF has detailed plans for large scale operations far away from Penisular South East Asia. Recall that the first LSTs became fully operational only in 1999. And until our Formidable class frigates go on line, we don't even have a green to blue water navy worth writing home about. In this context, the lack of integration between Army and Navy units is not surprising. In fact, with the arrival of the S70B helicopters--operated by the Air Force, but operated from the frigates, one expects kinks to be encountered for years to come. The relief operation is thus a genuine god-sent of an opportunity to put what integration the SAF has managed to achieve to the test. -
UPDATE: Singapore Ink has a nice rejoinder to the above here. The key point:
Something like massive rapid deployment overseas on LSTs or aircraft is I believe something our SAF could find itself doing in the future, & while we try to accommodate other countries, I think we should prepare for this contingency.
Singapore Commentator also looked at both our positions here. His verdict:
I agree with Lzydata that there is much that the SAF must learn to build up a credible expeditionary capability. In fact, in view of its general lack of combat experience, that is true of many other operational aspects as well.
But as Huichieh points out, that is where experiences like Operation Flying Eagle can help. And his comment on initiative and thinking out of the box is also worth highlighting; in real operations, things seldom go according to plan, so such abilities are often critical.
Fair enough. Now that I think about it, there are not that many armed forces in the world that are able to mount expeditions far away from home shores. In fact, most of our neighbors in South East Asia have little if any such capability. -
this is part 2... hope you all like it.
all credits goes to the writer of course... learn something that you dont usually get to know...
http://singaporeangle.blogspot.com/2005/02/operation-flying-eagle-part-2.html
Sunday, February 20, 2005
Operation Flying Eagle (Part 2)
posted by HUICHIEH LOY at 8:26 PM
"Operation Flying Eagle: The inside story of the SAF's tsunami relief deployment, Part 2: Setting up a lifeline to Aceh" (ST, Feb 20) is out, covering operations in Meulaboh (from the arrival of the RSS Endurance), and secondarily, in Banda Aceh and Medan. I blogged on the first part a week ago. Once again, the bulk of the big-picture details have already been covered on this blog at some point or other (like Singapore Ink, I didn't find as much of special interest--of the more controversial sort). But there are some points worth highlighting.
Let's begin with an example of "thinking out of the box":
The priority was to find and prepare a landing point from where the Endurance's fast landing craft could safely unload men and equipment. This was no easy task, especially in an environment that was totally new and alien.
Debris and underwater obstacles were a big headache. Said Naval diver 2WO (Warrant Officer) Wee Kheng Par, a graduate of one of the toughest training in the world, the US Navy Seal course: 'There was a huge amount of debris, such as sunken vessels, which could puncture our landing craft. Together with other divers, I secured the obstacles with heavy chain and rope.'
Obstacles like damaged vehicles and broken concrete pillars were pulled ashore by the Combat Engineers' tractor.
'There was no quick answer that could be found in a manual and many decisions had to be made on the fly,' commented 2WO Wee. 'We had to rely on our experience gained from training and brainstorming on the ground.'
No matter how thorough training may be, the world will continue to be full of surprises. Training is thus effective if it makes possible on the spot improvision. This is an example of military preparation of the sort that is hard to come by in contrived exercises.
If you have been following SAF's tsunami relief operations, you would have known by now just how crucial the RSAF's Chinook helicopters proved. These are the CH-47SD ("Super D") models (in fact, Singapore was the very first customer for these models). The only other countries in the broader region with such helicophers are Thailand, Australia and Taiwan. It is thus not completely surprising to read the following:
The Chinooks of the Republic of Singapore Air Force were the only medium and heavy lift helicopters in Aceh until Jan 15, when the US Marines started flying their CH-46s.
And for Meulaboh specifically,
Said Defence Minister Teo: 'The Chinooks made a difference to the people of Meulaboh as they were able to establish the initial supply lines.'...It was the only heavy-lift helicopter operating in the disaster areas until the arrival of Japanese Chinooks much later. It has a crew of two pilots, two flight engineers and one aircrew specialist.
For something like two weeks, our 6 Chinooks in Indonesia were the only medium lift helicopters operating in the area--no wonder the SAF was able to make an impact to the relief operations disproportionate to its size. This specific incident (I mentioned it here previously) now also makes more sense: the SAF were the only ones with the capabilities to respond to it speedily at that stage:
AT THE SAF relief mission in Banda Aceh, which was the worst hit with over 100,000 killed, things were also hotting up. On Jan 4, a chartered Boeing 737 cargo aircraft reportedly hit a buffalo, which damaged its wheel and left it stranded on the sole runway of Banda Aceh airport. This brought all relief flights into the airport to a halt. This was the official version given by a US navy liaison officer although many didn't believe him, especially when he said that the buffalo had walked away unhurt.
The SAF came to the rescue by dispatching a heavy-lift Chinook helicopter to Medan to carry heavy salvage equipment to haul the 737 off the runway. If not for this equipment, weighing 3.5 tonnes, the airport would have been closed for a couple of days. This would have seriously disrupted the overall relief work. It was unfortunate that news organisations like CNN gave wide publicity to the incident but failed to mention Singapore's role. Not that this bothered the Singaporeans, who preferred to maintain a low profile.
I noticed the lack of coverage as well, but there generally wasn't that much by way of international coverage of the SAF's relief efforts in those early days. And even today, I'll wager that the international public at large does not really know much about the SAF's operations in Aceh (outside of the militarily circles). As the Command Post blog nicely puts it--in a paranthesis too--"Singapore (whose efforts are unsung and amazingly valuable)." -
Another bit of SAF contribution that passed under the radar was not mentioned in the news story itself, but in the attached .pdf files (this and this; persumably, the attached charts in the printed edition): the deployment of a MATC (Mobile Air Traffic Control tower) to Banda Aceh. I remember reading an Australian news article going on about how bad the air traffic situation was in Banda Aceh airport (which was not made to handle the large volume of flights). But there was nary a follow up on the SAF's MATC beyond aviation publications.
Not that any of this mattered to the locals:
The local people were so excited when the helicopters came in to land that they would swarm around it. The children loved to play in the helicopters' downwash as it could make them actually float in the air. The Singapore pilots had to take extra care during their landings...
The Chinooks were also assigned to evacuate medical cases. These mercy missions brought much satisfaction to the pilots, who flew three-fold more than their average flying hours over a short span of time. This was indeed intensive flying. Said one of them: 'The casualties we ferried from Meulaboh to Medan could not speak English. But a simple wave from them as they were stretchered out from the Chinook spoke volumes about how grateful they were. This was very heartwarming.'
Another factor which I have highlighted often and early--the close relationship between the SAF and TNI:
Commented Lt-Col Yap: 'The TNI officers were comfortable with our cooperation. Our language capability and our understanding of local culture and the Indonesian system made us quite useful to TNI officers, such as helping them to interact with the foreign forces that were arriving in Banda Aceh.' His connections with the TNI officers helped immensely in understanding each other. Lt-Col Yap, who speaks fluent Bahasa Indonesia, is a graduate of the Indonesian Army Command and College in Bandung.
Some of the senior TNI officers assigned to the area, like the area military commander Lt-Col Djoko, were his and other SAF officers' course mates. 'This is why, shortly after we arrived in Banda Aceh, we were able to work closely with the TNI,' he said. 'They were comfortable with our presence, especially with our low profile and sincere assistance.'
But it wasn't just the ability to speak Bahasa, or the personal ties with TNI officers. More importantly, the SAF was able to play the role of a true friend in a time of need (see also this):
The SAF were effective in their contributions because they knew where the needs were. Some foreign medical teams deployed to places where there were no people to treat, although they brought along the full complement of medical equipment. They set up big field hospitals when the need was for primary health care.
As the above pointed out, the same cannot be said of many aid agencies (see e.g., this), though there are outstanding exceptions, most of which pass beneath the radar. But, the way I saw it (and continue to see it): the SAF was able to do all that not because Singaporeans are especially smart; rather, a keen consciousness of the limitations of our resources acts as that great necessity that compels inventiveness. Where it matters, we are quite good at getting the best bang for the buck. It is disappointing (though not surprising), therefore, that in more peaceful conditions, we tend to throw money at problems. Or at least, there is a perception that this is what we often do. (from this earlier post).
And finally, what would we Singaporeans be without some concern for good food?
Although the food served by the 10 chefs of Endurance was palatable, albeit unexceptional, it became a game for the men to spread wild rumours about food. These rumours were invariably sparked off by the steady stream of VIP visitors. The men would strain to see if these visitors brought along any goodies with them. There were rumours of refrigerated containers of mandarin oranges arriving. Another rumour, even more fanciful, was the arrival of a shipment of bak kwa. As it turned out, the rumours were not totally unfounded. The Chief of Engineers did bring with him goodies like canned food and Chinese New Year snacks when he visited his men. -
A really good read up. I'm glad to see that our contributions towards OFE was not totally unnoticed. I'm also glad to see that the SAF is able to successfully engage another country, not in battle, but in building warm and friendly bilateral ties in time of need. No doubt, OFE has done much in promoting regional stability and friendlier relations with Indonesia.
When the tsunami hit, we were immediately notified and were on standby to be recalled to provide aid for the affected areas. That period, I was near my ORD, and was already decomposed as a ORD-ing personnel can get. The rest of my section and department were also in the festive mood, and none of us really liked the news.
Despite that, when we were eventually recalled, (late in the night IIRC), we all turned up on time despite the hour. We were not without complaints, but everybody did our best to encourage each other. A behavior I never really quite saw in my colleagues.
For the next 48 hours, we worked hard, and with minimal rest to consolidate, coordinate and send the aid equipment to support our units over in Indonesia. Everybody was tired, but nobody stopped working. We didn't want to stop until everybody else stopped. We worked because the guy beside us was still working.
I think OFE was also one of the few times that I see our Warrant Officers function as leaders. Every now and then when we had time to rest, they'd talk to us and tell us the importance of what we were doing. For once in my entire NS life, I saw them lead. Not direct. I think my section's WO spent more time in the forklift than I've ever seen.
At the end of it all, after the entire Tsunami relief effort was deemed over, life went back to normal. Those who were gonna ORD, ORDed, those who continued to serve, served as they would. It was like nothing happened, just a few OILs for those who involved. No medals... no mention of it in our certificate of National Service. We just did what we were told to. Not because we wanted to, but because we were doing it together.
That was OFE for our side of the fence. -
seriously a good read.
-
It's a good read.
Unfortunately, my unit was not a major part of the fanfare. We did logistical support and rear-line equipment maintenance so that the guys in Meulaboh could count on reliable equipment being sent out to them.
So my company took up the slack of regimental duties as the other company focused on Ops support 24/7, doing OT on a daily basis and we contributed my Coy 2IC as the Ops Liasion Officer down at UN field ops area in PLAB, or so I heard. -
nice findings
reminds me of the time when i was serving NS 
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Accomplishments
Summary of important accomplishments of the SAF which were crucial to the situation in Aceh.
* They created land and air bridges by building two beach landing points and seven helicopter landing sites in Meulaboh.
* The SAF field hospitals in Meulaboh and Banda Aceh cured 5174 patients
* 190,000kg of relief supplies was ferried by Landing Ship Tanks.
* RSAF Chinook and Super Puma helicopters flew 143 missions, ferried 150,000kg of relief supplies and carried 2,500 passengers.
* C-130 and Fokker-50 aircraft flew 76 missions, ferried 240,000kg of relief loads and carried 1,200 passengers.
* The engineers built a modular building, approximately 139 square metre and two logistics storage areas.
* The SAF set up a mobile air traffic control tower and air traffic control support.
* About 70 personnel would continue assistance with the presence of two liaison teams and three Chinooks -
chinooks. -
Goes to show that one cannot conduct a successful operation without excellent logistics.
Hope that SAF has learnt from history of warfare. Logistics ( or lack of it ) makes or breaks a battle or war. -
yea, logistic is important.
in fact every part of a fighting force is important. -
So here is my question.
How to airlift the Primus? -
Charter a C-5 or AN-124.Originally posted by touchstone_2000:So here is my question.
How to airlift the Primus? -
Agree that all parts of Armed Forces important. However, many just look the "Teeth " - the shiny weapons - and neglect the " Tail " - the Logistics.
One does not have to look far at some neighboring countries' low availability / servicabilty rates of major weapons systems to understand that Logistics must never be overlooked.
Why do you want to send a Primus by air ?
Send the Pegasus by air first , then ship out the Primus. -
Correct.Originally posted by glock:Agree that all parts of Armed Forces important. However, many just look the "Teeth " - the shiny weapons - and neglect the " Tail " - the Logistics.
One does not have to look far at some neighboring countries' low availability / servicabilty rates of major weapons systems to understand that Logistics must never be overlooked.
Why do you want to send a Primus by air ?
Send the Pegasus by air first , then ship out the Primus. -
Originally posted by glock:
what does this mean?
Send the Pegasus by air first , then ship out the Primus. [/b] -
Pegasus by Chinooks , Primus by Endurance LSTs.Originally posted by beavan:what does this mean? -
they are 2 different platforms right?