continued from above post
It is seen within this context of overarching American influence that Abe's vision of a "normal" Japan betrays its true intent. Just as the U.S. administration ignores protest at home in order to pursue an aggressive, costly, and illegal war in Iraq, so too is the Abe camp, largely without public support - and in important areas without even their knowledge - angling to "strengthen" the Japanese military in preparation for similar ventures abroad. So too do both sets of leaders boast a similar disdain for any sense of universal moral principles. Abe's claim to fame, featured prominantly in a recent Time article and covered extensively by the Japanese press, is seen as his "firm," "hard line" position on the issue of the abductions of a group of Japanese civilians by North Korean agents in the period between 1977 and 1983. As Walsh describes it:
"Abe had been active on the abductee issue since the late 1980s, and he arranged meetings for [the family of one the abductees] with high-level officials and kept the couple personally updated on Tokyo's progress. But what mattered most ... was the sense that Abe truly cared" [1].
This public perception of a caring and courageous statesman "fighting for us" - greatly amplified by media attention lavished on the abduction issue - attracted much-needed popularity to a formerly little-known politician. Yet as Gavan McCormack and Wada Haruki point out:
"[T]he mainstream media failed to mention that during the colonial era Japan had abducted hundreds of thousands of Koreans to work as prostitutes ('comfort women') for Japanese soldiers or to work in mines, factories, and low-ranking jobs in the Japanese military such as guarding Western prisoners during World War II. Viewed in this larger historical context, by Koreans north and south, the transformation of the obviously criminal abductions of thirteen Japanese citizens into the crime of the century and the Japanese into the ultimate victims of Asian brutality had a painful air of unreality" [15].
The situation was greatly exacerbated in October 2002 when, in an act of sheer hypocrisy, the Japanese government demanded compensation from North Korea for the abductions - itself having refused compensation to the victims of the colonial era. An agreement to allow five surviving abductees to "temporarily return" for one or two weeks was broken by the Japanese, who made the decision, before the five had even set foot on Japanese soil, not to follow through on their part of the deal. As Japan pressured North Korea for further concessions, the Association of Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea and Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea, represented in government by Abe and his supporters, issued a statement that Japan should "wait until the North Koreans can no longer endure" [16]. In words that echo those of the former U.S. Embassador to the United Nations Madeine Albright, who, probed on the "cost" of the sanctions against Iraq that had resulted in deaths of over 500,000 children, remarked that "we think the price was worth it," Abe Shinzo stood "firm" against North Korea, declaring: "In Japan, there is food and there is oil, and since North Korea cannot survive the winter without them, it will crack before too long" [15]. Abe was proven wrong, and a prolonged stalemate ensued in which the Japanese government repeatedly played its key bargaining chips - freezing humanitarian aid and threating sanctions - to little success.
In light of the above, one might reflect further on the background of the "enigma" that is Abe Shinzo. As Wallace notes in the Los Angeles Times:
"To understand Abe ... you must understand his relationship with Nobusuke Kishi, his maternal grandfather, who died in 1987 and was once prime minister."
Indeed, Kishi is commonly presented as an example of the image of the "fighting statesman" to which Abe aspires: "the minority of politicians willing to take an unpopular stand and stick to their convictions" [3]. Putting aside the dubious merit of an elected politician taking an "unpopular stand" in a so-called "democracy" - Kishi was widely distrusted by the Japanese public and ultimately resigned amid massive protests - it is relevant to ask what types of "convictions" Abe's grandfather actually held.
Although talk of Kishi normally begins with his stint as prime minister between 1957 and 1960, he in fact first rose to prominance in the midst of World War II, winning a seat in the Yokusan [All-Out National Support] "elections" of 1942. Wakamiya Yoshibumi, deputy managing editor of the Asahi Shimbun, describes Kishi as "the epitome of Japan's prewar and postwar political 'continuity' - Japan's failure, in other words, to perform a thorough political housecleaning after the war":
"Before the war, Kishi was a career bureaucrat in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; soon after its foundation, he was sent to Manchukuo, where he controlled the country's development from a top-ranking official's desk; he was directly involved in the opening of hostilities in the Pacific in the Tojo cabinet ... Yet not only was Kishi exonerated of all blame for his role after Japan's defeat, he also had the unbelievable luck to climb all the way to the top of the greasy pole while his erstwhile colleagues looked on in blank amazement" [17, p. 49-50].
Mainichi Shimbun describes this transition from class-A war criminal back to government office with a depth of analysis indicative of the Japanese press on this issue. Noting that Kishi "was banned from taking office because of the suspicion of war crimes," the paper recounts that "the ban was lifted in 1952. The following year, he became a Dietman for the first time and was prime minister four years later in a meteoric rise even faster than his grandson's almost 50 years later" [7]. No reference is made to the extensive documented records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), declassified in 2002 after decades of attempts at a cover-up, recounting Kishi's direct involvement in the forcible abduction and transportation to Japan of thousands of Chinese workers in the midst of the war [18]. As William Underwood describes it in Japan Focus, the government was first approached by corporate Japan with the idea of importing Chinese workers in 1939:
"As Japan's domestic heavy labor shortage became increasingly critical, the state turned this corporate vision into administrative reality in two steps: the November 1942 'cabinet resolution' that led to the trial introduction of 1,411 laborers beginning in April 1943; and the February 1944 'vice-ministers' resolution' that led to the full importation phase beginning in March 1944. Kishi authorized both measures, first as Minister of Commerce and Industry and later as Vice-Minister of Munitions; both portfolios included extensive oversight of forced labor operations" [19].
The released report lists the names of 38,935 Chinese workers (estimates of the actual total number of workers ranges in the hundreds of thousands), of which 6,830 died under conditions of harsh forced labour [18]. That Kishi was released from prison despite these war crimes, by direct command from the Intelligence Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP), was "not unrelated to the ongoing cold war, and that subsequently Kishi as a postwar political leader maintained a consistently pro-American stance" [17, p. 57].