US Army: Nicer Drill Sergeants more effective
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Everything has its place and time.Originally posted by Blockhead:Well, my own personal take is that some abuse is necessary in order to build up some tolerance to pressure and the ability to focus on the task at hand...
I always wondered why my instructors back during BMT were always shouting and screaming, until I went thru my first field exercise. Even in a simulated firefight, it is basically organised chaos at best, with loud noises, smoke and pple yelling their heads off. In a situation like that, one needs to be able to operate to stay alive, i guess, and all that screaming and shouting did help to some extent to help us function a bit better in stressful conditions.
That said, I have to point out that altho we did recieve a fair bit of insults and vulgar language, our instructors were also quick to give us credit for a good job. This, I believe, lies the crux of the issue. The shouting and screaming forced us to work together, but the credit given also built up our confidence and encouraged us to push further. Encouragement and tough words must go together to ensure that troops maintain their morale and learn to fight at the same time.
Being nasty all the time will not be of any use, and being nice all the time will definitely not help to mould the fighting spirit desired of a soldier.
Good Commanders and Instructors know when to grind and when to praise, and it is their job to ensure that trainng is made as realistically safe as is possible. -
Well Said...Originally posted by Atobe:Everything has its place and time.
Being nasty all the time will not be of any use, and being nice all the time will definitely not help to mould the fighting spirit desired of a soldier.
Good Commanders and Instructors know when to grind and when to praise, and it is their job to ensure that trainng is made as realistically safe as is possible. -
You are so full of shxt and I will not dignify your tiresome rubbish any further replies.Originally posted by Atobe:If I must grade your reply blah blah blah @#$%^
Since you have completely skirted the issues of why I brought the issue of Korea into this discussion, here are some more quotes pertaining to the training, affecting the combat efffectiveness of some US troops especially the initial lot shipped from Japan.
These are the only things relevant to the topic that you should concern yourself with. Instead of talking about nuclear war etc.
"When they finally crossed the Naktong and began their violent assault along the entire Perimeter, simultaneously, only 98,000 NK were attacking about 180,000 US and ROK troops. We were well equipped, with 600 main battle tanks against only 100 NK T34s, in excellent defensive positions, supported by far superior artillery, and we had overwhelming air superiority. Yet the NK came within a hair of wiping us out.
In part, this early NK success was owing to the Truman administration having reduced our Army from tough professional soldiers to poorly armed civilians in uniform, fit for garrison duty but completely unprepared for the savagery of combat.
The most serious example was 25id's unreliable all-Black 24th Infantry Regiment. 24th Infantry coined the term "Bug Out" and illustrated it, as around Sangju where 24th units abandoned their machine guns and mortars without being attacked. Exposing the flanks of adjacent regiments without warning offered the enemy access around our front lines, endangering all Eighth Army. ..." -
Moca, I find the numbers u Quoted slightly doubtful. Mainly because u didn not quote the timelime in which the numbers were based on.
The ROK -US forces were pushed back all the way to the Yakdong river by August 1950. So what was the number of troops, tank and equipment at this point?
Reinforcements, such as the 500 Main Battle tanks, and additional reinforcement only reached the numbers you mentioned by late August to early September 1950.
In otherwords, the numbers prior to August 1950; when the North Koreans pushed the ROK-US forces, should be much lower than you are leading us to believe. -
Please read the website. Written by veterans. I didn't make up the numbers or the quotes.Originally posted by Shotgun:Moca, I find the numbers u Quoted slightly doubtful. Mainly because u didn not quote the timelime in which the numbers were based on.
The ROK -US forces were pushed back all the way to the Yakdong river by August 1950. So what was the number of troops, tank and equipment at this point?
Reinforcements, such as the 500 Main Battle tanks, and additional reinforcement only reached the numbers you mentioned by late August to early September 1950.
In otherwords, the numbers prior to August 1950; when the North Koreans pushed the ROK-US forces, should be much lower than you are leading us to believe.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/TimeLine.htm
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/pusan.htm
Some debates can have no end: I say you say... you say that I said blah blah blah...
I can only recommend you read some of the books that offer a more frank assessment of the combat that took place in 1950, written by people whom were there.
http://www.amazon.com/This-Kind-War-Five-Star-Paperback/dp/1574881612
And please let's get back to the topic of whether harsh instructors are necessary for good perfomance in the field. It is a good topic and merit more of your effort than this silly debate about historical facts that has gone on far longer than it should.
Please move on with your life. -
Amen to that.
Let's put Korea behind us!
PEACE
We had a very very strict instructor at BMT. We never saw him smile once. He was harsh, but he was fair. He wore severe-looking plastic frame glasses and had a crew-cut throughout. Seldom book out at weekends.
Imagine our surprise after 3 months when he opened up and became normal human being once training was over, as we were about to pass out of BMT.
He immediately became the most popular NCO and us recruits dragged him to the mess to get him hilariously drunk night after night!!!
In a strange way, we were very thankful that what he made us go through made us more more of a man. -
Originally posted by moca:
Thanks for the appreciative remarks, which I am surprised at your remarkable ability to recognise shxt and rubbish, and your ability to continuously contradict yourself by saying one thing and doing another.
You are so full of shxt and I will not dignify your tiresome rubbish any further replies.
Despite the rubbish that you find tiresome, yet you have shown enough of your childish dignity by making irrelevant comments with even longer replies at each turn.
Surely, you must be recognised for your stupendous ability to respond to all the shxt and tiresome rubbish.
Since you have completely skirted the issues of why I brought the issue of Korea into this discussion, here are some more quotes pertaining to the training, affecting the combat efffectiveness of some US troops especially the initial lot shipped from Japan.
Have I skirted the issues that you have brought up ?
In my responses to your postings, I thought I was quite meticulous in responding to each point, by addressing to each group of your related paragraphs with my reply.
Unfortunately, have you deluded yourself that I have skirted those issues, when in actual fact you have preferred to drop the subject matter without any additional response.
These are the only things relevant to the topic that you should concern yourself with. Instead of talking about nuclear war etc.
Someone brought up the nuclear issue, and I proceeded to dignify the effort with my response, and I presumed it was positively received - except for your unappreciative tantrum.
You surprise me with your depth of argument by simply basing your opinion on a single veteran's experience of his very personal and localised war environoment ?
"When they finally crossed the Naktong and began their violent assault along the entire Perimeter, simultaneously, only 98,000 NK were attacking about 180,000 US and ROK troops. We were well equipped, with 600 main battle tanks against only 100 NK T34s, in excellent defensive positions, supported by far superior artillery, and we had overwhelming air superiority. Yet the NK came within a hair of wiping us out.
In part, this early NK success was owing to the Truman administration having reduced our Army from tough professional soldiers to poorly armed civilians in uniform, fit for garrison duty but completely unprepared for the savagery of combat.
The most serious example was 25id's unreliable all-Black 24th Infantry Regiment. 24th Infantry coined the term "Bug Out" and illustrated it, as around Sangju where 24th units abandoned their machine guns and mortars without being attacked. Exposing the flanks of adjacent regiments without warning offered the enemy access around our front lines, endangering all Eighth Army. ..."
If you compare his writings, and the timelines of events in Korea - it seems that you are nit-picking events to fit your own agenda of proving some useless point in your arguments.
This veteran's view is bigotted towards the 'black soldiers' in the US Military, and as a single digit in the vast Korean War Theatre, is he in any position to comment on the entire conduct of the War ?
One bad apple do not spoil the entire apple cart - so they say; and I will not accept this veteran's bigotted views and narrow interpretation for the losses encountered by the ROK and subsequently by the US-led UN Force.
Are you blaming the ROK and US led UN Forces for poor training that led to deterioration of discipline and morale ?
The Chinese PLA and the North Korean forces using their superior numbers in unrelenting Human Wave Attacks, and superior tactics and strategies were able to overwhelm better equipped ROK and UN forces.
With the element of surprise on the Communist side, is it any wonder that events turned out initially in their favor; and when General MacArthur surprised the Communist forces with his 'flanking move' in an amphibious landing at Inchon, it also knocked the Communist forces off-balance and retreated.
In all wars, it is not necessarily that a superior well trained force will be able to be victorious every time, and all the time.
The Yom Kippur War was a surprised attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel's most Holy Day, and the best trained IDF units were knocked off the ground and had to give up a large part of the Sinai Peninsular.
During WW2, the combined Commonwealth Force - of British, Australian, NZ and Indian units - were tasked to defend Peninsular Malaya and the Fortress of Singapore from Japanese invasion.
Yet, in less than three months on landing at Kuantan, a smaller Japanese unit was able to force a larger British led Commonwealth Force to surrender all of Malaya and Singapore. -
Originally posted by moca:
The best trained troops may not necessarily win the battle, and winnning a series of battle may not necessarily win the war.
Please read the website. Written by veterans. I didn't make up the numbers or the quotes.
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/TimeLine.htm
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/pusan.htm
Some debates can have no end: I say you say... you say that I said blah blah blah...
I can only recommend you read some of the books that offer a more frank assessment of the combat that took place in 1950, written by people whom were there.
http://www.amazon.com/This-Kind-War-Five-Star-Paperback/dp/1574881612
And please let's get back to the topic of whether harsh instructors are necessary for good perfomance in the field. It is a good topic and merit more of your effort than this silly debate about historical facts that has gone on far longer than it should.
Please move on with your life.
After winning the War, can one win the Peace ?
The best trained US Military took over Iraq in less than four weeks of fighting, but could not forged any peace after four years in Iraq.
In the recent IDF attempt at a limited war against the Hezbollah and Hamas, the World's best trained Military, with the highest morale, with the best equipment could not beat a dedicated and disciplined force of rabbles.
Even the US Military had its trouble when it attempted to rescue the US Embassy Staff in Tehran, Iran when the Iranians refused to recognise diplomatic niceities, proceeded to occupy the US Embassy and holding the US Embassy Staff as hostage for negotiations.
The airborne rescue force had a major accident at its forward RV point, and the entire rescue attempt had to be aborted.
Training at the Basic Level should not be entirely an experience in the deepest hell hole for new recruits.
The US Military felt that a change was necessary when there are less volunteers coming forward, and are losing a high rate of attrition at the basic military trainiing level due to psychological abuse (not pressure).
In the SAF context, there has been an evolution of change from the early days of NS when it was common practise to use abusive methods to immersed the naive civilian into the rough and tumble military environment. Methods of punishments were creatively designed to frustrate the stubborn and swollen headed individuals, to mould them to be less of an individual and part of a larger team.
Unfortunately, as the years went by, the abusiveness seems to run out of control, when there have been instances when Platoon Commanders, Platoon Sergeants and Section Commanders even ignored the SAF Medical Officer's instruction and abused the sick recruit further.
Standard Instructions for Punishments and Disciplinary Measures were ignored, while the Junior Commanders made their own decisions in handing out punishments. Some has resulted in casualties that baffled even the doctors until the truth came out.
The SAF has changed since the SAF was formed in 1966.
We have seen discipline being relaxxed from the mirror shined boots of the 1960s, to the simple clean black boots of the 1980s.
Today, SAF Soldiers are not allowed to walk in public without any head gear, in contrast to the late 1960s and up to late 1970s.
Surely, MINDEF must have seen the merits of a nicer SAF environment that allows for more creativity and productivity from each and every SAF personnel. -
OOps, Are SAF soliders not allowed to walk in public without headgear? I often see them in MRT trains without any head gear!
BTW, do you think it is better if SAF got the SAS in to train us for Jungle Warfare? Maybe the Vietnam Army to train us for Guerilla warfare? -
Printing error - it should read as SAF soldiers are allowed to walk in public without headgear today, compared with the early days of the SAF from 1966 up to the mid-1970s.Originally posted by acwire_2125:OOps, Are SAF soliders not allowed to walk in public without headgear? I often see them in MRT trains without any head gear!
The Malaysians have the benefit of the SAS and Royal Commandos in their Jungle Warfare School, which was originally set up by the British in Johor and remains to this day.
BTW, do you think it is better if SAF got the SAS in to train us for Jungle Warfare? Maybe the Vietnam Army to train us for Guerilla warfare?
From the following site 'Combat Tracker Team' - it was reported that during the 1950s Malayan Communist Insurgency, the Jungle Warfare School was set up on the advise of an SAS Major "Mad Mike" Calvert. He was also instrumental in advising the Colonial Governor to isolate the remote civilian population from threats to cooperate with the Communist Terrorits, by regrouping the population in the New Villages with British military amongst them.
The US Military facing difficulties in the early 1960s battling the elusive Vietcong guerrilas, were not familiar with the VC battle tactics. The US Military Commanders in Vietnam realised that they had to retrain and reorganise their battle formation to tackle a new form of hit-and-run guerrilla warfare.
General Westmoreland sent some of his men to be trained at the Jungle Warfare School in Johor, and on their return new units, battle groupings, and new tactics and strategies were formulated to combat the Vietcong method of fighting. At that time, the NZ SAS were on station at the Johor Jungle Warfare School and trained the US groups.
Our 1st and 2nd SIR had the benefit of fighting during the mock war in the Indonesian Konfrontasi when Singapore was part of Malaysia, and the SAF troops had passed through the Johor based Jungle Warfare School before each unit rotated into Sarawak, to garrison one of the outpost deep in the Borneo jungle.
During the hunt for some Indonesian inflitrators who had parachuted into Johor, 1st SIR had suffered the loss of nearly an entire section in Johor, when the guard 'fell asleep' while his team took a break bathing in the river, but were ambused with their bodies mutiliated. The 'sleeping guard' was the only survivor, returned to base to report the incident.
The remaining 1 SIR Battalion picked up the trail, and pursued the murderers, and returned them the treatment that they have committed to our fallen men.
The experiences that 1st and 2nd SIR Battalion had gone through, formed the foundation of a revised doctrine when it was reviewed in the mid-1970s, and more could have been added when more of our men returned from overseas training through the years.
It will certainly do us no harm to have the SAS (from UK, Australia and NZ) review the standards of our Jungle Warfare Doctrine and training methods; afterall the SAF has always believed in benchmarking with the very Best. -
Is this not a typical Hollywood stereo-type that is being copied by some overzealous SAF NCO, when there are few or no role models to learn from ?
In developing into a 3G Army, more soldiers who can think will be needed, and a new breed of SAF NCO will be needed with the ability to lead and mentor his men, who will automatically trust his instructions and respond accordingly.
The 1st armored training brigade overhauls initial entry training
Armor, Jan-Feb, 2005 by Jim Larsen, Jerry Cashion
Over the past year, initial entry training (IET), specifically basic combat training (BCT), has undergone the most significant change since World War II. The new curriculum focuses on producing soldiers who can immediately contribute to their unit following advanced individual training (AIT).
Developing Individual Skills
Gone are the days of sterile phase testing--soldiers standing in line at parade rest at field tables covered with camouflage net, score cards neatly tucked under the camouflage bands of their helmets, waiting to be tested on individual tasks. The hours of perfecting drill and ceremony and sitting in large lecture-style classes have been slashed.
In place of sterile phase testing comes judgment-based training in the form of end-of-phase situational training exercises (STX), where soldiers perform critical individual tasks under replicated combat conditions. Squad tactical movement, urban operations, and convoy operations have replaced many of the hours formerly devoted to marching. Small group, performance-oriented training, taught by a new breed of warrior-focused drill sergeants, characterize most of the instruction once taught by committee, or at the very least, in a classroom with a platform instructor addressing 220 students. Combat-focused courses are constructed so that teamwork events, such as litter carrying, water and ammunition resupply, and fighting position construction, replace the noncombat-related teamwork development course.
The first step was to change the training methodology and preserve this methodology through the application of an updated mission essential task list (METL) for BCT. The second step was to incorporate individual skills developed and mastered during the first weeks of BCT into a new training strategy called "warrior challenge," which empowers drill sergeants and BCT soldiers to focus on combat-oriented, squad-level tactics.
At the core of this transformation is the new Basic Combat Training Methodology, which is shown in Figure 1. As indicated in the upper "individual" band, soldiers are trained in key individual tasks that are relevant to the force's current needs. Instead of sterile testing at the end of each training phase, soldiers' performance is validated during the execution of critical collective tasks in the form of STXs. Every effort is made to ensure these STXs are as realistic as possible, to include media, civilians, urban areas, improvised explosive devises (IED), and a healthy dose of ambiguity, information overload and/or deprivation, uncertainty, and unpredictability. These training standards are ultimately measured by mission accomplishment within the commander's intent, rather than performance measures accomplished in specific order.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
During the final five-day field training exercise (FTX), soldiers conduct an intensive squad external evaluation (EXEVAL), which challenges soldiers and drill sergeants in executing warrior tasks and drills. By the end of nine weeks, soldiers have been exposed to many of the same situations they will face in combat. They will make tough decisions, just as they will in combat, and for many, combat is just around the corner. The STXs and the final EXEVAL add focus to BCT and require drill sergeants to develop training strategies to prepare them for these events; battle-focused training improves soldiers and leaders.
The current goal is to preserve this methodology and consolidate gains made over the past year, making BCT more realistic, relevant, and rigorous. Recent headway was made when the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved changes to the Infantry School's BCT program of instruction. However, resources are only part of the effort--ensuring BCT battalion and company METL are battle-focused is another critical component.
"Conduct BCT" has been the usual METL task briefed by nearly every BCT battalion and company commander far too long. This task might work at the battalion level, but it is not adequate to focus company commanders and their cadre. U.S. Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, states, "Battle focus is equally applicable in TDA organizations," and "mission essential tasks should include critical training tasks." (1) The critical training tasks in the new BCT are the foundation for the STXs, which include establishing a checkpoint, occupying an assembly area, conducting tactical movement (mounted and dismounted), and conducting tactical movement in an urban area. Moreover, accomplishing these collective tasks enable soldiers to execute many of Task Force Soldier's recommended 40 core warrior tasks and nine core warrior drills. (2)
All U.S. Army BCT organizations must accomplish identical functions to get the most from the new BCT POI. To accomplish this, every BCT organization must have a standardized METL for common tasks. At the battalion-level, the METL can be organized into three essential tasks, which include conducting BCT, exercising command and control, and maintaining certification and readiness. Each of the battalion's METL tasks has supporting battle tasks that logically feed into the company's METL. For example, the battalion METL task of conduct BCT has supporting battle tasks of establishing a checkpoint, conducting tactical movement (mounted and dismounted), and conducting tactical movement in a built-up area. The company's METL would then include tasks such as establishing a checkpoint, conducting tactical movement (dismounted), conduct tactical movement (mounted), and conducting tactical movement in a built-up area. The company battle tasks then logically become critical collective and/or individual tasks on which drill sergeants can focus their efforts. For instance, the company battle task of establishing a checkpoint would have supporting battle tasks that include tasks such as handling enemy prisoners of war/detainees, determining location on ground, reacting to media, and performing first aid. The majority of these battle tasks, critical collective tasks, and critical individual tasks are, in fact, core warrior tasks and drills.