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Red Flag Exercises Prepare Units Prior to Combat Deployments
By William B. Scott
10/30/2005 08:08:06 PM
NEW THREATS, NEW TACTICS
"Actual combat wasn't as tough as Red Flag" is a comment from veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that is music to Col. Dirk Jordan's ears.
It validates a decades-old concept that the U.S. Air Force's highly realistic, large-force Red Flag exercises are giving inexperienced pilots the equivalent of their first 10 combat missions, greatly improving their chances of survival in real-world situations.
As commander of the 414th Combat Training Sqdn., Jordan and his staff design, script and run 2-5 Red Flag exercises a year. Each runs four weeks, but is broken into two-week segments. Some units can only stay for one segment, but most complete all four weeks.
As new threats, weapon systems and tactics emerge, Jordan's team is ensuring the exercises keep pace. "We need to look [exactly] like what we and our joint and coalition partners see when we go to war," the colonel says. "If we're not using all the assets here that they'd use [in real combat], then we run the risk of becoming irrelevant."
Red Flags grew from a realization that, during the Vietnam War, kill ratios and weapon effectiveness were on a disturbing downhill trend. By the mid-1970s, USAF aircrews were downing slightly less than two enemy MiGs for each U.S. aircraft lost in combat, far below the roughly 10:1 ratio achieved during the Korean War. Numerous U.S. fighters and bombers also were lost to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery fire. Furthermore, tons of air-delivered weapons were missing their targets.
"We were dumping millions of pounds of bombs in the jungle, just blowing up timber," Jordan says.
But Maj. Richard (Moody) Suter, an aggressive, visionary fighter pilot kept asking: "Why? What's the problem? How do we fix it?" USAF leaders eventually conceded that more realistic training was needed. Red Flag exercises became the answer, and the 15,000-sq. mi. Nellis range complex was the place.
Today, Jordan's staff designs Red Flag scenarios that reflect new threats and changing air combat operations. For example, dynamic targeting, quick-response attacks on time-sensitive or "fleeting" targets, combat search-and-rescue missions and coordinating with special operations teams are integrated into traditional large-force exercises.
Although still infrequent, unmanned platforms such as Predator and Global Hawk also are becoming highly valued participants. "We use Predators at every opportunity, especially for time-sensitive targeting. But the problem is, they're very highly tasked [with] real-world combat, or used 14 hr. a day to train new operators," Jordan says.
Another significant upgrade is the integration of combined air and space operations centers (CAOCs) into Red Flags, elevating the tactical-level exercise to an operational level of war and providing CAOC operators training they can't get elsewhere. "A little over a year ago, we stood up our 505th Command-and-Control Wing under the Air Warfare Center, and training is its sole responsibility," says Col. Terry L. New, vice commander of the Air Warfare Center (AWC). "We're now treating the CAOC as a weapon system on its own, developing tactics, training and procedures--all at the operational level."
Although all U.S. military services and numerous allies routinely participate in Red Flags, a broader, more complex version of the exercise was launched earlier this year. The first "Joint Red Flag," sponsored by Joint Forces Command, was structured to meet Pentagon criteria for joint training. It combined Red Flag's traditional live flying of aircraft on Nellis ranges with virtual and "constructive"--computer-generated--missions at myriad sites across the U.S.
The cornerstone of modern Red Flag exercises is the Nellis Tactics and Training Range (NTTR). This huge expanse of sparsely populated desert and treeless mountains in central Nevada is considered "the crown jewel of Air Force training ranges," Jordan says. Significantly upgraded in recent years, "NTTR has all kinds of advanced, high-fidelity threat emitters and simulators, with 120-150-mi. run-ins and the ability to drop live munitions." Manned and unmanned simulated SAM sites replicate both single-digit threats--SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 missiles--and a growing number of modern double-digit SAMs. These are augmented by "red force," or aggressor, aircraft that simulate contemporary Russian MiG fighters (see p. 49).
Today's NTTR emulates an advanced integrated air defense system (IADS), enhanced by a dense electronic warfare environment, complete with communications jamming. That environment underscores the value of secure, jam-resistant communications and data links for sharing vital information.
"All the annoying things that will bite you on day one of combat will bite you on day one of Red Flag," Jordan explains. "If you can't get into the Have Quick [secure communications network] or into Link 16 [datalink network], and if you don't fix the [problems], you're going to get comm-jammed and it'll be painful. If you're not up on the datalink, you don't get the surveillance tracks and don't know where those MiGs are. Then, you're left listening to the radio instead of looking at a picture--and getting comm-jammed. It's a cascading [situation] then."
As many as 100 participating aircraft now carry Nellis Air Training System (NATS) instrumentation pods that capture and transmit data about position, altitude, speed, maneuvers and weapons employment. Those data are invaluable during debriefings, because they enable accurate assessments of engagements.
"In the last 25 years, I'd say we've come the furthest in our debriefings," Jordan says. In the past, "whoever had the chalk last won. Now, we have a very high-fidelity environment and the ability to track more than 100 aircraft at the same time. We know exactly where every airplane is at all times."
"The sophistication of our surface-to-air threats has improved quite a bit, even compared to five or 10 years ago," New says. "And the NATS instrumentation helps us adjudicate all the [post-flight] claims." Missile-flyout timing, bomb-scoring systems, on-range video cameras and target-maneuvering assessment tools remove considerable doubt, enabling Red Flag and weapons experts to quickly determine whether a player was shot down or a striker hit its target.
A recent range upgrade is the creation of an urban-combat environment that simulates what many pilots will encounter in Iraq. "We're taking Conex sea containers, stacking them up, and painting windows and doors on them. From the perspective of someone at 3,000-5,000 ft. and 300-400 kt., they look pretty realistic," New says.
Simulated roads and waterways are painted on the desert floor. Enemy tanks and terrorist vehicles that prowl the streets of those mock cities are emulated by small, remote-control "dune buggies" covered with a thin metal shell. Aided by an onboard GPS receiver, a remote-control driver moves the vehicles through those streets, challenging overhead Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets to find, track and hand off the target to an attacker.
Laser and infrared detectors in the "city" allow the scoring of simulated laser-guided weapon deliveries against a building. "And not just the building, but the second floor, second window from the right," New adds. "We can score the [laser-guided] weapon's effectiveness by detecting its laser spot." A smoke charge triggered remotely lets the pilot know he has hit the intended target.
A recent Red Flag F-16 pilot participant noted that the Nellis range has a "big donut hole where Groom Lake is," which funnels attacking blue forces into a relatively confined, predictable channel in the northern areas. New counters that such airspace constraints occur frequently in today's combat zones, so the Groom Lake restricted area actually contributes to Red Flag's training objectives. It demands aircrews pay close attention to their location, even when dodging SAMs and fighting MiGs.
Range upgrades and constantly evolving training scenarios are structured to focus Red Flags first and foremost on two objectives: providing a new pilot--referred to as "Blue Four" because he typically flies in the No. 4 wingman position--the equivalent experience of 10 or so combat missions, and training young mission commanders to plan complex strikes.
"A lot of things at Red Flag have changed over the years, but . . . the focus is still on Blue Four," Jordan stresses. "On his first mission, if [the young wingman] can get his gas from the tanker and not lose sight of his element lead in the first 45 sec. of the push, he's happy. And it's a real bonus if he can get all the way to the target, have his switches set right and drop scorable bombs near his target. If he can do all that, he's a hero."
Similarly, the mid-level-to-senior captain named as a Red Flag mission commander is challenged with planning a mission involving about 140 aircraft. He or she must meld a commander's intent, priority targets, air refueling tankers, and always-limited air and weapon assets into a plan that can be executed successfully. A mission commander's job is to "make sure the greatest number of priority targets are destroyed and the highest number of aircraft survive the mission--and the commander's intent is achieved," Jordan says.
"We give them a limited amount of time to plan and not as many escort assets as they'd like to have, then put them up against a challenging simulated MiG and surface-to-air threat," he adds.
To avoid demoralizing inexperienced aircrews, Red Flag's staff follows a crawl, walk and run approach. "On day one of Red Flag, nobody drops any real weapons," Jordan explains. "Around the third day, they may start dropping inert [bombs], then full live drops in the second week. Same with the MiG threat. Day one might simulate MiG-29s with less-capable weapons, very vanilla tactics and no electronic attacks. By the middle or end of the week, they get more aggressive, simulating SU-27s with more-capable weapons. The next week, they're flying SU-30 MKKs, and the surface-to-air threat also cranks up, with more free play."
Each mission is carefully choreographed, but things inevitably go wrong, requiring on-the-fly innovation. Those monitoring the battle from a central facility watch a top-down view of colored icons crawl across big screens and can spot subtleties that escape those in the cockpits, who are confined to an insular world of SAMs, MiGs, targets and swirling chaos. As a result, the real learning takes place in a series of debrief- ings, capped by the "mass debrief."
Held in an impressive auditorium at the Red Flag building, a mass debriefing this Aviation Week & Space Technology editor attended recently began at 8:30 p.m., long after the last aircraft had landed. An accelerated computer replay of the mission, displayed on the room's big screens, was accompanied by a running commentary from Capt. Patrick (Newman) Small, a B-52 weapon systems officer who served as the mission commander. Periodically, a flight leader would call for the replay to halt, then provide a brief verbal account of some noteworthy incident.
Overall, the mission was a mix of successes and frustrations. Several foreign F-16s were unable to release their weapons. A B-1B bomber "fell out," apparently for maintenance reasons, reducing the number of targets hit to about 67% of the planned list. Several F-16CJs were complimented for taking out SAM sites--but several of the CJs were "hit" by high-probable-kill (high Pk) SAM shots. The EA-6B Prowlers also won kudos for effective jamming.
At one point, a simulated MiG "aggressor," flying at low altitude, slipped through a blockade of F-15 Eagles and immediately went after an EA-6B in the blue force's "backfield." An alert Singaporean F-16 pilot either spotted the simulated MiG or was directed to intercept it by an AWACS controller, shooting down the MiG and saving the high-value jammer aircraft.
Overall, the mission hit 94% of its main targets for an "excellent" rating.
A chronic problem for Jordan's team is getting enough air refueling tankers to support the 2-3 Red Flag exercises now being run each year. Real-world combat operations are severely stretching the aging U.S. tanker fleet, leaving few for even high-priority training.
"If we don't get tankers, we have to go to the no-tanker plan, and there's just no way to do things realistically," Jordan says. "If we get the tanker support needed by the blue force, our training is easily 10 times better. Without tankers, the training value drops way off."
At some future date, Red Flags will incorporate unmanned combat air vehicles and the USAF's newest air superiority fighter, the F/A-22 Raptor.
"As soon as they become IOC [initial operational capable], we'll have F/A-22s mixed into Red Flags," New said. The first Raptors to play will be those scheduled for an Air Expeditionary Force rotation to a combat zone. "In some ways, the F/A-22 will change the way we do warfare . . . not only enabling control of the air, but control of the ground [war], too."